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INTRODUCTION

Until most recently, the principle of federalism and the law of
domestic relations appeared to be following the same well-worn
path in the direction of an all-embracing nationalism. In both
fields, the traditional virtues of state sovereignty had been displaced, if not banished altogether, by an increasingly powerful ideal
of national supremacy. Over the last century, federalism had
evolved from being a structural constraint on the powers of the
federal government to a pragmatic accommodation of the interdependent relationship between the national and state governments.
And as the chains of state sovereignty fell away, family law had
emerged in recent years as an important arena of national interest,
increasingly governed by national legislation' and increasingly

' See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)
(extending full faith and credit standard to child custody determinations); Child
Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing
national program to aid states in developing and implementing child support enforcement policies and procedures); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5106h (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing comprehensive federal program
directed toward the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect); Family
Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10415 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (providing federal funding to states to address the problem of family violence);
Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40221, 108 Stat. 1796,
1926-31 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266) (making domestic abuse a federal
crime when the perpetrator crosses state lines); Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a) (prohibiting state agencies from denying foster or
adoptive placements solely on the basis of race).
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presided over by federal courts. Indeed, prior to the current
Supreme Court term, one might easily have concluded that we were
witnessing the inevitable surrender of perhaps the last remaining
substantive legal area within the states' exclusive control.
In its recent decision in United States v. Lopez,2 however, a
majority of the Supreme Court defied conventional wisdom by
reestablishing substantive limits on federal lawmaking authority. In
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court struck down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,' a federal statute prohibiting
the possession of firearms on or near school property.' Displaying
a dramatic shift in its approach to constitutional federalism, the
Court set limits on congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause for the first time in almost sixty years. More importantly,
the Court did so on the ground that the sphere of private noncommercial activity falls outside the scope of Congress's enumerated
powers. No Supreme Court decision since 1936 has attempted to
revive the principle of federalism by staking out a substantive realm
of purely local concern belonging to the states. Even the Supreme
Court's most notorious (and short-lived) stand in support of
federalism-National League of Cities v. Useiy-was premised on a
respect for the institutional autonomy of state processes and
structure rather than on a concern for safeguarding a sphere of
substantive state authority.
Lopez did not directly concern federal legislation on the family,
yet the case provided the opportunity for an otherwise deeply
divided Court to unite around the principle that family law
constitutes a clearly defined realm of exclusive state regulatory
authority. Both the majority and the dissent invoked the regulation
of "marriage, divorce, and child custody" as a paradigmatic example
of lawmaking power beyond the constitutional competence of the
federal government.6 Although the majority rested its analysis on
an untenable distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities, and the dissent rested on no evident rationale at all, the
opinions in Lopez laudably draw our attention to the importance of
family law within the constitutional ideal of federalism.
S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
4 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
5 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
2 115

6 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This Article defends state sovereignty over family law7 on
grounds very different from those briefly noted in Lopez. States
enjoy exclusive authority over family law, not because families are
in some sense noncommercial, as the Lopez majority suggested,' but
instead because of the fundamental role of localism in the federal
design. The theory of localism presented here rests on the view that
the law of domestic relations necessarily promotes a shared moral
vision of the good family life. Although in law, as elsewhere, we are
accustomed to thinking of the family as a private realm free from
governmental influence and control, the domestic sphere is deeply
patterned by state laws regulating the formation, maintenance,
dissolution, and boundaries of family life. Legal regulation of the
family forms domestic roles, directs intimate relationships, and
consequently shapes human identity in profoundly normative ways.
Legal decision-makers confront fundamental questions concerning
the meaning of parenthood, the best custodial placements for
children, the rights and obligations of marriage, the financial terms
of divorce, and the standards governing foster care and adoption.
In answering such questions, state legislatures and courts draw upon
community values and norms on the meaning of the good life for
families and children.
This Article argues that the normative character of family law is
closely tied to a communitarian model of state authority under the
federal Constitution. Part I traces the roots of this communitarian
ideal in early Supreme Court decisions recognizing exclusive state
authority over matters of "local" concern. Although the localist
conception all but disappeared from constitutional law by the time
of the New Deal-in no small part because of its association with
proslavery sentiments-its continuing absence from the contemporary debate over constitutional federalism raises serious concerns
regarding the future role of the states in the federal design. As Part
I explains, the prevailing procedural model of federalism extends
protection to-at most-the institutional processes and structure of
state governments; the procedural model establishes no safeguards
against the threat of unlimited national regulatory power. Although

' I use the term "sovereignty" advisedly in light of Professor Rapaczynski's
persuasive argument that the word should be abandoned in the context of American
federalism. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: TheJurisprudenceof
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 346. My choice to retain the
traditional terminology reflects my belief that the states retain exclusive regulatory

control over a core domain of family law.
"See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
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the recent decision in United States v. Lopez attempts to set substantive limits on national authority, the Supreme Court relied on an
untenable distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activities that missed altogether the vital connection between
localism and the substantive domains of education and family law.
Part I concludes with an historical review of the localist philosophy
underlying the Supreme Court's traditional deference to state
sovereignty over family law.
Part II of this Article provides the theoretical foundation for the
localist theory of family law by examining the relationship between
government and families in liberal society. This Part seeks to dispel
the prevailing myth of family privacy and to elaborate the family's
essential role in raising good citizens. Traditionally, liberal theorists
have assumed the existence of adult citizens possessing the
psychological and moral autonomy-what I refer to as "situated
autonomy"-necessary for full participation in the political life of the
liberal state.9 This assumption ignores, however, that families
provide the human environment within which the infant acquires a
distinct sense of self and the dependent child acquires a sense of
mastery over the moral direction of his or her own life. Laws
regulating family life have less to do with respecting the moral
autonomy of mature individuals than with fostering the growth of
responsible, independent citizens. What distinguishes family law as
a distinctly communitarian subject matter is its concern for the
development of children in liberal society.
Part III explains why national authority over family law raises a
serious threat of governmental tyranny over the moral identities of
developing citizens. To begin with, a politics of the good family life
entails a degree of civic engagement and a sense of shared community identity unattainable at the national level.10 Although family
law does not require the moral homogeneity characteristic of strong
communitarian cultures, it does demand a political discourse built
upon the normative commitments of a specific historical community. States are far from exemplifying the participatory ideals of
classical Greece or colonial New England, yet they are far better
situated than the national government to develop and sustain a
normative political discourse on family life. Moreover, regulatory
See SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 9-10 (1989).
10 For a discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of control over
family law at levels more localized than the states, see infra text accompanying note
276.
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diversity among the fifty states preserves some measure of individual
and family choice in matters touching upon the formative conditions of human identity. National regulation on the family destroys
the opportunity for citizens to exercise choice through exit, that is
by moving to a different jurisdiction more accommodating to
citizens' particular preferences. Federalism thus utilizes diversity as
a crucial structural safeguard against the threat to individual moral
freedom posed by uniform national laws on the family.
The localist theory of family law speaks to national tyranny, but
what safeguards exist against the threat of local oppression? Part III
emphasizes that state sovereignty over the core domain of family law
does not diminish the federal government's role in protecting
individual rights against the tyranny of local regulation.
Communitarian lawmaking in an area so constitutive of human
identity and essential to liberal citizenship raises obvious concerns
about the oppressive effects that such laws may have on particular
dissenting individuals. In addition to enforcing the fundamental
rights to equality, individual privacy, and parental authority, the
national government bears the responsibility for ensuring the right
of citizens to exit state communities, for settling jurisdictional
disputes among states over family matters, and for reinforcing state
authority through the allocation of national resources.
The localist theory of family law presented in Part III envisions
exclusive state authority over a core domain of family law matters.
Obviously, the boundaries of this core domain are difficult to draw.
For purposes of this Article, however, I assume that at the present
time the domain of state authority encompasses marriage, divorce,
child custody, child support, alimony, property division, termination
of parental rights, adoption, foster care, and child welfare laws. In
situations where Congress does not intend to preempt state
authority over a core area of family law but nevertheless regulates
an aspect of family life, as is the case with certain federal tax laws,
a presumption in favor of state authority should arise. In these
circumstances, where an otherwise legitimate federal statutory
scheme bears directly on family life, the presumption of state
authority should be overcome only by the presence of an important
federal interest.
By examining the family's critical role in raising good citizens,
I hope to provide the foundation for a comprehensive understanding of federal-state relations in the area of family law."
The

" The need for a theory of state-federal relations with respect to family law has
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localist theory of family law affirms the vital role that families play
in preserving the fundamental liberal values underlying the constitutional structure. Far from being an anachronistic exception to the
general demise of constitutional federalism, state authority over the
substantive domain of family life represents an essential and
fundamental communitarian aspect of our liberal democratic order.
It is my hope that affirming the importance of state authority over
family law may not only serve to refocus the constitutional principle
of federalism, but may also contribute to a revitalized conception of
liberal theory" that acknowledges the familial origins of the civic
self.
been identified but not answered by Judith Resnik. SeeJudith Resnik, "Naturally"
Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the FederalCourts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682,
1750-59 (1991). For a discussion of her views, see infra note 113. For the only other
extended discussion of the implications of family law for federalism, see William W.
Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
CellophaneSea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 782-88. In his article, Professor Van Alstyne uses
a hypothetical federal law on the family, "The Commerce Clause Regulation of
Marital Standards Act," see id. at 783-84, to illustrate his position that the Tenth
Amendment sets limits on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. His hypothetical
statute sets the employment terms of businesses engaged in interstate commerce by
requiring employees to be married and divorced in accordance with uniform federal
standards. See id. Although Professor Van Alstyne believes the subject of marriage
and divorce to be beyond the scope of national power, his theory rests on the
enumerated powers doctrine rather than on an affirmative theory of the states'
constitutional authority over family law, and thus differs fundamentally from the
analysis set forth in this Article. Cf Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the
FederalCourts,79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1095-97 (1994) (examining federalism concerns
underlying the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction).
12 Many contemporary liberal theorists have begun the project of reworking
traditional liberal principles in response to communitarian and feminist critiques. For
recent collections of essays engaged in this effort, see LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD (R.
Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990); LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 1989); see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990);JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986); PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY
AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985). Feminist theorists have a strong
presence in this endeavor. See OKIN, supra note 9, at 5; IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 226-56 (1990); Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man"
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feministjurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171

(1992);Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 7, 20-26 (1989). I discuss the relationship between feminist
legal theory and the revival of liberalism in Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to
Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS
IN LAW AND GENDER (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)).
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I. THE LOCALIST STRAND IN CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

[T]oday the question faces us whether the constituent States of the
System can be saved for any useful purpose, and thereby saved as
the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic
sentiment, impulse, and action.' s
The decline of federalism as a constitutional principle capable
of restraining national power has been the source of great scholarly
debate and discomfort over the past fifty years. Despite prevailing
references to federalism's demise, few have been willing to
surrender the states wholly to the unlimited authority of the
national government, and many have been engaged in the effort to
resurrect federalism as a constitutional principle of meaningful
stature. As a consequence, the "death" of dual federalism, 4 by
which is usually meant the end of state sovereignty over the realm
of "private" law, has been followed in recent years by the birth of
15
process-based federalism, a theory first shaped in the literature

is Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof DualFederalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1950).
14Professor Corwin defined "Dual Federalism" as follows:
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2. Also the
purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3. Within their
respective spheres the two centers of government are 'sovereign" and hence
"equal"; 4. The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension
rather than collaboration.
Id. at 4; see also Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "IndustrialPolicy" in American
Developmen4 1790-1987, 75 CAL. L. REV. 415, 419-20 (1987) ("The political realities
of the nation from 1790 to 1861 made 'dual federalism' (with significant authority
remaining in the states) an accurate description of the governmental system, in
addition to being an accurate description of the prevailing constitutional doctrine.").
Some political historians take the position that dual federalism has never defined the
actual practice of our governmental system. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 31 (3d ed. 1984) (stating that "[i]n the
American federal system, sharing of functions by all planes of government is and
always has been the norm," and urging a "noncentralization" model of American
federalism); Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American
FederalSystem, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM

1, 6-7 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963) ("[T]he history of the American governments is
a history of shared functions. All nostalgic references to the days of state and local
independence are based upon mythical views of the past. There has in fact never
been a time when federal, state, and local functions were separate and distinct.
Government does more things in 1963 than it did in 1790 or 1861; but in terms of
what government did, there was as much sharing of functions then as today."). For
an excellent summary of the debates over the history of American federalism, as well
as a refutation of the Grodzins-Elazar historical model, see Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historicaland Contemporay Analysis of the American System, 14
L. & Soc'Y REV. 663 (1980) [hereinafter Scheiber, Federalismand Legal Process].
" See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism: The R6le ofthe States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546
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and more recently taken up by the Supreme Court. 6 A less welldeveloped theory of state sovereignty, which I refer to as "institutional federalism," has also joined the contemporary debate over
federalism. Although they differ in important respects, both
contemporary theories share an aversion to the substantive line
drawing of traditional dual federalism, and I consequently characterize the overall modern approach to state sovereignty as "procedural
federalism."
In its recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 17 the Supreme
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the
ground that the Commerce Clause limits Congress to the regulation
of "commercial" activities having a substantial relation to interstate
The Court's distinction between commercial and
commerce."
noncommercial activities has revived the long dormant principle of
state substantive authority. Although the Court recognized that
federalism calls for substantive limits on federal authority, both the
majority and the dissent in Lopez failed to connect these limits to
the principle of localism. The localist view, which once contemplated that the states would exercise exclusive authority over matters
touching upon the moral life of their citizenry, passed with dual
federalism into constitutional obscurity over half a century ago. I
hope to show that the disappearance of localism from constitutional
discourse has impeded our understanding of the distinctive role that
states play in the formulation and enforcement of community norms
and values. More specifically, I contend that family law exemplifies
why federalism needs to reclaim localism as a constitutional value
of fundamental importance.
(1954) (contending that the states can effectively protect their own interests through
the national political process);see alsoJesse H. Choper, The Scope ofNationalPowerVis&-Vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1560 (1977)
("Numerous structural aspects of the national political system serve to assure that
states' rights will not be trampled, and the lesson of practice is that they have not
been.").
16 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,554 (1985) ("[W]e
are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes
on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than
one of result."). The Supreme Court recently upheld a federalism-based challenge
to national legislation for the first time (with two short-lived exceptions) since 1937.
See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (holding that state sovereignty
prevents the federal government from compelling the states to enact or administer
a federal radioactive waste program).
17 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
18 See id. at 1630-31.
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Section A of this Part traces the modern transformation of
federalism from a principle oriented toward the protection of
substantive areas of private law to one focused upon the national
political process and the institutional framework of state activity and
decision-making. Sections B and C address how both the prevailing
model of procedural federalism and the substantive approach taken
more recently in Lopez fail to comprehend the importance of
localism in the constitutional structure. After a brief historical
review of state sovereignty over family law in Section D, the
remainder of this Article develops the connection between the role
of families in liberal society and the constitutional principle of
localism.
A. Localism Under Dual Federalism
The principle of dual federalism may lay claim to noble origins
within constitutional law. Inspired by the novel political idea of
divided sovereignty, 9 the framers conceived of a national government possessing limited, expressly delegated powers. ChiefJustice
Marshall proclaimed in McCulloch v. Mayland" that the constitutional design recognized distinct spheres of governmental authority
and that the Supreme Court would exercise its power of judicial
review to restrain the reach of national power.2 The principle of
dual federalism extended the traditional concept of dual sovereignty
premised on a territorial division of authority to embrace the
singular idea of a substantive division of authority within a single
22
geographic realm.
19 See BERNARD BAILYN,

THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

198-229 (1967) (describing how the American conception of divided sovereignty
departed from popular European political thought).
21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21 See

id. at 423. Marshall wrote:

[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [national] government[,]
it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the
land.
Id. Ironically, Marshall's opinion inMcCulloch also takes avery broad approach to the
scope of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see id. at 406-25,
thereby laying the foundation for the Supreme Court's virtual elimination of the
enumerated powers doctrine after 1937. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.

r See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410 ("In America, the powers of sovereignty
are divided between the government of the Union, and those of the States. They are
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign
with respect to the objects committed to the other."); see also The Collector v. Day,
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Despite the Supreme Court's forceful support for the principle
of dual federalism throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries," the Court nevertheless remained exceedingly vague
about the precise meaning of state sovereignty and certainly never
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the line separating state
authority from national authority. With some hindsight, however,
we can see that the Supreme Court's understanding of the states'
sovereign powers during the reign of dual federalism reflected two
quite different conceptions of their political role in the federal
scheme. The first conception evolved in large part from decisions
under the Commerce Clause, a constitutional provision whose
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870) ("The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their
respective spheres."). For the intellectual history behind this "revolution" in the idea
of sovereignty, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969) (recounting the American debate over sovereignty).
23 Even the Supreme Court's most nationalist decisions (and jurists) early in its
history expressed loyalty to the concept of dual federalism. See Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. 264, 414, 6 Wheat. 120, 185 (1821) (referring to the states as "members of
one great empire-for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate"); see
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,203 (1824) (describing the police power
of the states as "a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government").
See generally Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power.
Historicaland ContemporaryPerspectives, 9 TOLEDO L. REv. 618, 628-31 (1978) (arguing
that the Supreme Court adhered to the principles of dual federalism up to the Civil
War).
If one were to judge by Supreme Court activity, the high watermark of dual
sovereignty in constitutional law was the period between the Civil War and the New
Deal. Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court struck down only two acts of
Congress, neither directly on federalism grounds. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1856) (striking down a federal statute prohibiting United States citizens
from takingslaves into a federal territory); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803) (holding that Congress does not have the power to give original jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court beyond those cases enumerated in Article III of the
Constitution). As Congress began to exercise more intensively its legislative powers
after the Civil War, however, the Supreme Court in turn aggressively exercised its
power of judicial review. Between the Civil War and 1937, the Supreme Court
invoked the enumerated powers doctrine to strike down laws enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement
Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918); The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); the taxing and spending power, see United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); the bankruptcy
power, see Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S.
513 (1936); the treaty power, see Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); and the
power to admit new states, see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
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express identification of national authority with interstate economic
interests implied the correlative preserve of state authority over
matters of intrastate concern.24 The intrastate domain of state
sovereignty was viewed as a residual category comprised of those
substantive powers not constitutionally committed to the national
government. 25 That the Commerce Clause explicitly designated
interstate concerns as part of the national power naturally gave rise
to the view that state sovereignty inhered in territorial localism;
analogous to the individual's right to private property, it was
assumed that states exercised unimpeded control over all affairs
occurring exclusively within their geographic borders.26
The intrastate view of state sovereignty clearly reinforced the
central role of federalism in the constitutional design by recognizing
concrete limits on federal power. The value of federalism has
always been understood to lie first and foremost in the prevention
of governmental tyranny. Along with the horizontal separation of
powers, the Framers relied on the vertical division of authority
between the national and state governments to diffuse the potentially oppressive accumulation of power in a single governmental
2 Because the Commerce Clause served as the most important textual source for
congressional action in the post-Civil War period, its distinction between interstate
and intrastate affairs came to dominate the debate over state sovereignty. See Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (defining "production" as an inherently
local activity distinct from interstate commerce); cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 67 (1936) (noting that "the powers of taxation and appropriation extend only to
matters of national, as distinguished from local welfare").
' The intrastate view of state sovereignty was the mirror image of the enumerated
powers doctrine. As Madison explained, the national power "extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects." THE FEDERAUST No. 39, at 195 (James Madison)
(Max Beloffed., 1948); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,326
(1816) (noting that the federal government "can claim no powers which are not
granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are
expressly
given, or given by necessary implication").
26
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 (explaining that the words of the
Commerce Clause do not "comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal,
which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of
the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States"). As Professor
Rapaczynski points out, the impulse to define intrastate affairs by way of geographic
boundaries, while appealing to a traditional notion of sovereignty, is nevertheless
exceedingly problematic in the United States. See Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 35152. "The domain in which national governments are sovereign can be easily delimited
by their geographical boundaries. The case of the American states is different
because, although statejurisdictions are geographically determined, their sovereignty
over their territory is vitiated by the geographically coextensive reach of the federal
government." Id.
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entity. 27 Although the promotion of social diversity and political
experimentation are also associated with federalism, 28 they alone
cannot explain dual federalism's long reign among our constitutional first principles. Diversity and experimentation have been "happy
incidents" 29 of what the early Supreme Court understood to be
federalism's central role in the constitutional structure: securing
human liberty against abusive governmental power. In the Court's
view, the principle of intrastate sovereignty offset the danger of
national tyranny by establishing geographically impenetrable spheres
of state power.
The intrastate perspective and its emphasis on constraining
federal power did not entirely exhaust the meaning of state
sovereignty under dual federalism. Present in Supreme Court
decisions during this era were references to an alternative conception of sovereignty that appealed to a substantive, rather than a
27See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1981).
As Madison argued:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted
to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded
against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other; at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself.
Id. at 321; see also BAILYN, supra note 19, at 272-301 (recounting the Framer's
concerns regarding governmental oppression). Professor Rapaczynski describes
"three somewhat different scenarios of governmental oppression that the Framers
seemed to have had in mind when they spoke of the danger of 'tyranny'":
First, they were clearly concerned that a small minority might be oppressed
by a sufficiently homogeneous majority. Second, they were concerned with
the danger that a few powerful minority interests might gain ascendancy
over the political process and exploit the rest of society. And third, they
were afraid that a powerful central government may itself develop its own
separate interest and oppress the citizenry.
Rapaczynski,
supra note 7, at 382.
2
1 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-70 (1991) (noting that the authority
of a state to determine qualifications for governmental officials is implicit in the idea
of representative government); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting) (noting that political experimentation is a feature of
federalism); DeborahJ. Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalism
fora Third Centuy, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988) (identifying social diversity and
political experimentation among the values of federalism); Richard B. Stewart,
Federalismand Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917, 917 (1985) (noting that "[flederalism seeks
to maintain political decentralization and social diversity").
"New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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purely territorial, vision of the domain of exclusive state authority." In many of these cases, the Supreme Court expressed the
view that certain subject matters were inherently local in nature.
Although the Court never attempted to define in any systematic way
this sphere of local concerns, its decisions from this time portrayed
the states as the primary institutional guardians of public health and
social morality."1 Matters of moral concern were not merely local
in the intrastate sense of being geographically confined,32 they
were local in the sense of implicating the normative values of the
relevant state communities.33 Whereas national interests were

"oSee Corwin, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that under dual federalism, "certain
subject-matters were also segregated to the States and hence could not be reached by
any valid exercise of national power" (emphasis omitted)); Rapaczynski, supra note 7,
at 351 (describing "the history of the American idea of state sovereignty" as "the story
of a succession of vain attempts to define some substantive domain over which
exclusive and ultimate state authority could be confidently asserted").
" See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918) ("The maintenance of the
authority of the States over matters purely local is as essential to the preservation of
our institutions as is the conservation of the supremacy of the federal power in all
matters entrusted to the Nation by the Federal Constitution."); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) ("It cannot be denied that the power of a State to
protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and
the public morals, 'the power to govern men and things within the limits of its
dominion,' is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not surrendered
by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by the Constitution of the
United States, and essentially exclusive.").
The sovereign sphere of local concerns was also associated with the states' "police
power," a vague concept that continues to be invoked to define the core area of state
sovereignty. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13 ("It is vital that the independence of the
commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them,
however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while
the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the
preservation of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of
government.... .");see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,359-60 (1943) (noting that
state governments "are sovereign within their territory save only as ... their action
in some measure conflicts with powers delegated to the National Government");
Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 365 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("To hold that
Congress has general police power would be to hold that it may accomplish objects
not entrusted to the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth
Amendment .... "); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1876) (upholding an
Illinois statute regulating public warehouses as a proper exercise of state authority
over its domestic affairs); cf. United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869)
(striking down federal regulation of the sale of certain oils within state limits); New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736, 10 Pet. 446, 449 (1836) (denying the
United States general jurisdiction over land found to be part of Louisiana).
1 To the extent that moral matters could be viewed as intrastate, of course, these
two conceptions of state sovereignty were not necessarily incompatible.
s See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69 (1936) (striking down portions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 39 (1922)
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focused upon economic and international affairs, the states were
identified with the social and moral welfare of their citizenry. This
"localist" conception of state sovereignty thus envisioned a more
substantive connection between state boundaries and local commu3 4
nity life than the mere protection against national overreaching.
Localism as the defining principle of state sovereignty indicated
that the Framers did not view the prevention of tyranny as federalism's only contribution to the securement of political liberty. 5
Localism implicitly recognized meaningful civic engagement as an
essential condition for the exercise of political authority over
matters going to the moral life of the community. In the localist
view, the threat posed by a strong centralized government lay not
only in the danger of national overreaching per se, but more
insidiously in the exercise of national -power by representatives
politically distant from the particular interests and concerns of local
communities. 6 This localist view of state sovereignty distinguished

(invalidating a federal law designed to regulate child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251,277 (1918) (striking down a federal child labor law), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941); E.G. Knight, 156 U.S. at 11 (1894)
(noting that states retain the power to "preserve good order and the public morals"
of its citizens). Some earlier cases had upheld congressional power to regulate
commerce for social and moral ends. See e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308,
323 (1913) (upholding the power of Congress, through the White Slave Traffic Act
of 1910, to regulate the transportation ofwomen in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (upholding the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 as a proper regulation of interstate commerce);
Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321,363 (1903) (upholding the power of Congress to regulate
the transportation of lottery tickets through interstate commerce).
" In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court offered an analysis
under the Commerce Clause similar to the intrastate/localist distinction offered here.
The Court in Parkerdrew a distinction between the application of a "mechanical test
to determine when interstate commerce begins and ends," id. at 360, which focused
on the relationship of the regulated commodity to interstate commerce, and an
inquiry into the "local character" of the regulated activities. See id. at 362. With
respect to the latter "localist" inquiry, the Court found that state regulations "are to
be upheld [against a negative Commerce Clause challenge when].., it appears that
the matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the safety,
health and well-being of local communities, and which, because of its local character,
and the practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with by
Congress." Id. at 362-63. In conclusion, the Court held that "the evils attending the
production and marketing of raisins in that state [of California] present a problem
local in character .... " Id. at 363.
" See Rapaczynski, supranote 7, at 401 ("[The Framers'] ever present concern with
what they called public, civic, or 'republican' virtue testifies clearly to their belief that
the 'good life,' as Aristotle would have termed it, involves a commitment to a political
community and participation in a process by which individuals shape in common the
mode of life they are going to share.").
' See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-
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the political life of the large, heterogeneous national government
from that of the smaller, relatively more homogeneous states.37
While accepting that the representative politics of liberal democracy
must prevail at the national level, localism presumed that the states'
responsibility for the well-being of their citizens required a
qualitatively different form of political engagement."s The point
was not simply that citizen participation at the state level offered a
more authentic form of self-government, although it may still be
true that the quality of representative democracy increases at the
local level.3 9 Rather, localism suggested that only at the state level
could meaningful individual engagement in the communal process
of shaping shared values and aspirations be realized. From the
localist perspective, federalism was understood to foster human
liberty by preserving the states' distinctly communitarian political
character.
The principle of dual federalism and the value it placed on
localism did not endure. As the Supreme Court ratified the
growing sphere of national lawmaking powers after 1937, the
40
intrastate theory of state sovereignty was marked for extinction.

Federalismfrom the Attack on "Monarchism"to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74,
84 (1989) (noting that the antifederalists insisted that "a national government would
be too large and its representative bodies too far removed from the people to reflect
their multiform mores and natures"); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15-23 (1981) (discussing antifederalist views on the political
dangers associated with a large republic).
" See Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 401 ("It should... be by no means surprising
if, given the limited possibility of direct participation on the national level, the
Framers envisaged the states, and particularly their subdivisions, as the most fertile
ground for the development of the alternative political processes, responsive to the
need for participatory forms of political life.").
' By stressing meaningful political participation and communally shared values,
the localist view of state sovereignty implicitly appealed to the civic republican roots
ofantifederalist ideology. For an elaboration of the connection between "the localist
tradition" and the political ideology of the antifederalists, see Rose, supra note 36, at
94-99; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 29, 36 (1985) (noting that antifederalism echoed the classical republican belief
in "decentralization"). Although Professor Rose acknowledges that the antifederalists
"spoke fervently and often for the continuing autonomy of the states," Rose, supra
note 30, at 94, she believes that the republican values adhered to by the antifederalists
are "only possible at a level more localized than the states." Id. ("[T]he association
of Anti-Federalism with states' rights is relatively sterile ground if we are looking for
the lasting contribution of Anti-Federalist ideas.").
" See Merritt, supra note 28, at 7-8 (observing that "[t]he greater accessibility and
smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate actively in
governmental decision-making"). ButseeRapaczynski,supranote 7, at 399 (discussing
why "the problem of assuring the representativeness of political institutions is by no
means solved by uncritically striving for increased citizen participation").
40 See Rapaczynski, supranote 7, at 345 (noting that "as long as the actual exercise
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The Supreme Court's increasingly expansive interpretation of
congressional powers under the Commerce Clause beginning in the
New Deal era4 1 signalled the end of federalism as a viable constitutional constraint on the substantive lawmaking powers of the federal
government.4 2 And as Congress's power over intrastate matters
of the federal commerce power was relatively restricted, the inadequacy of the
concept of sovereignty for analyzing the role of the states in the federal system was
not immediately apparent"). The fact that, with only one short-lived exception, see
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-31 (1970) (plurality opinion) (striking down
national legislation setting state and local minimum voting age requirements),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, the Supreme Court did not uphold any
federalism-based challenges to the reach of national legislative power from 1937 to
1976 demonstrated that federalism would no longer serve as an independent
substantive doctrine in post-New Deal constitutional law.
Although the doctrine of constitutional federalism was inactive during this time,
the principle of federalism remained an important influence on the shaping of
constitutional rights and remedies. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) ("Questions of federalism are always inherent in the
process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the traditional
presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial
scrutiny."); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509
(1987) (noting that "state governments can help federal courts implement truly full
remedies" for plaintiffs injured by the federal government); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1151-64 (1988) (discussing
what he calls the Nationalist and Federalist models ofjudicial decision-making).
"' See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (interpreting Congress's
interstate commerce power to include the regulation of restaurants serving food
which has moved in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128
(1942) (interpreting Congress's interstate commerce power to include the regulation
of local wheat farming which in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942)
(interpreting Congress's interstate commerce power to include the regulation of milk
produced and sold intrastate); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941)
(interpreting Congress's interstate commerce power to include the regulation of
wages and hours for employees engaged in the production of goods in interstate
commerce).
42
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 378 (2d ed.
1988) ("For almost four decades after 1937, the conventional wisdom was that
federalism in general-and the rights of states in particular-provided no judiciallyenforceable limits on congressional power."); see also Richard Briffault, "What About
the 'Ism 7" Normative andFormalConcerns in ContemporaryFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV.
1303, 1311 (1994) ("[Gliven the capacity of the federal government to act under the
Commerce Clause, the spending power, or the Fourteenth Amendment to preempt
state authority, there may not be any substantive area of policy-making authority
reserved to the states exclusively." (footnote omitted)); Corwin, supra note 13, at 5
("[T]he operation of the 'enumerated powers' concept as a canon of constitutional
interpretation has been curtailed on all sides."); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process-the Alternative to Judicial Review of
FederalismIssues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 584 (1985) ("Since 1937,... [w]ith the sole
exception of... [National League of Cities v. Usery], state sovereignty concepts have
not been a significant restraint on Congress' power to regulate the states."); Harold
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increased, the Court's commitment to localism as a principle of
state sovereignty simultaneously diminished." Most obviously, the
localist ideal of the states as enclaves of communitarian politics was
compromised by the nation's experience with slavery.44 The
rhetoric of community which had shaped the states' claim to define
and enforce their own local norms came to be seen as a euphemistic
pretext for the support of slavery and racially discriminatory
practices. Plagued by its association with the politics of racism,
localism made an abrupt and enduring departure from constitutional law.45

J. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism,NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1939, at 367 ("I infer,
in a word, that the epoch of federalism is over... ."); Robert F. Nagel, Federalismas
a FundamentalValue: National League of Cities in Perspective,1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81,
81 n.3 (noting that, after 1937, "[tlhe basic constitutional 'test' (whether the
regulation 'affected' commerce) was immediately understood to provide no limitation
on national power"); Rapaczynski,supra note 7, at 351 ("The real problem is that even
a moderately searching scrutiny of the powers of the federal government shows that
the alleged existence of a residual category of exclusive state powers over any private,
nongovernmental activity is in fact illusory."); Scheiber, Federalismand Legal Process,
supra note 14, at 666 ("'It is no longer true that there are any substantial areas of
government that cannot be exercised by the national government or any that can be
exercised only by the states'...." (quoting PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 156 (1978))); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1711-12 (1985) ("[The] death of federalism... [was caused
by] the.., series of endless judicial passive acquiescences that appeared as Congress
greatly expanded the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act] and moved on to claim a more
generalized police power at large."). For a prescient view, see A.N. Holcombe, The
States as Agents of the Nation, 1 S.W. POL. SC. Q. 307, 324 (1921) ("The principle of
dual sovereignty, long supposed to be the foundation of our political system, has been
practically overthrown.").
"' See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) ("Congress ... is free to
exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are
destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even
though the state has not sought to regulate their use."); see also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) ("The Court long ago
rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the
Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce
Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers.").
"See Merritt, supra note 28, at 2-3 ("At worst, state governments perpetuate
racism and other oppressive political agendas."); see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1105 n.188 (1980) (noting "the advocacy of
states' rights in opposition toJacksonian programs in the 18 20's and 1830's, and in
support of slavery in the Nullification controversy").
4- Although commentators may differ as to when liberal values came to dominate
the constitutional imagination, there is little disagreement that they eventually did.
See Michael J. Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL.
THEORY 81, 92 (1984) (describing the "nationalizing project.., consummated in the
New Deal"); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 561 (1986) (describing the Constitution of 1787 as
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The following two Sections explore what the collapse of localism
has meant for contemporary federalism. After examining the rise
of procedural federalism and the Supreme Court's recent return to
substance in United States v. Lopez,4" Sections B and C conclude
that the effort to revive constitutional federalism without reviving
the principle of localism cannot succeed in any meaningful way. By
tracing the doctrinal history of state sovereignty over family law,
Section D provides an introduction to my central thesis that the law
of family relations serves to illustrate, if not define, the importance
of localism in the constitutional design.
B. The Paradigmof ProceduralFederalism: Process and
InstitutionalModels
After almost four decades of dormancy, constitutional federalism
stirred to life again in the early 19 70s. Although Justice Blackmun
proclaimed the virtues of "Our Federalism" in Younger v. Harris,47
a "triumph of modern liberalism over classical republicanism"); WOOD, supranote 22,
at 606 (proposing that ratification of the Constitution marked "the end of the classical
conception of politics"). Bruce Ackerman offers a theory of "dualist democracy"
under which an ordinary regime of liberal politics is punctuated by extraordinary
moments of republican lawmaking.
FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991).
46115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:

47 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). By "Our Federalism,"Justice Blackmun meant:
[A] system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. Federalism's reawakening was foreshadowed in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
125 (1970) (plurality opinion) (striking down federal legislation setting state and local
minimum voting age requirements), and in some dissents prior to 1976. See, e.g., Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
federal regulation of the wages of state employees is an unconstitutional intrusion on
state authority); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas,J., dissenting)
(arguing that federal regulation of the wages of state employees constitutes "such a
serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in
my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism"). Even thosejustices most
sympathetic to "nationalistic" principles affirmed their loyalty to the values of
federalism. See, e.g., Fiy, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7 ("While the Tenth Amendment has been
characterized as a 'truism,'... it is not without significance ....
The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system." (citations omitted)). Courts also regularly appealed to the value of
federalism in fashioning doctrines cuttingback on constitutional rights and remedies.
See Amar, supra note 40, at 1425 (noting that federalism "is now regularly deployed
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it was not until the Supreme Court decided NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usery4 s in 1976 that federalism reclaimed its stature as an

enforceable principle of constitutional magnitude. In Usery, the
Supreme Court upheld a federalism-based challenge to national
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause. Striking down the Fair Labor Standards Act as
applied to state and local employees, the Court concluded that,
although the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions were

clearly within Congress's enumerated powers, the law nevertheless
interfered with "the States' freedom to structure integral operations

in areas of traditional governmental functions. " "
Usery's formulation

of the Tenth Amendment

Doctrinally,

limitations

on

congressional power appeared to revive a limited version of dual
federalism, with "traditional governmental functions" serving to
define the substantive sphere of state authority lying beyond the
Viewed in this way, the subsequent
reach of national power.
overruling of Useiy was to be expected, for there was no reason to
think that the contemporary Court would be any more successful in
defining state sovereignty in terms of "traditional governmental
functions" than earlier Courts had been at articulating a sovereign
realm of intrastate concerns.5 °
Useiy's protection for traditional governmental functions,
however, should not be understood as a modern effort to arouse
dual federalism from its post-New Deal slumber. Neither Usery nor
the later cases that together map the terrain of contemporary
federalism doctrine5 1 view the current debate over state sovereignty
as concerned with the definitional issue of substantive spheres of
regulatory authority. In our post-dual-federalism era, any substan-

to thwart full remedies for violations of constitutional rights"); Fallon, supra note 40,
at 1145-46 (discussing the effects ofjudicial federalism on legal rights and remedies).
48 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
49 Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.

" See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539 (rejecting Useny's "traditional governmental
functions" test in part because the Court "find[s] it difficult, if not impossible, to
identify an organizing principle" for distinguishing traditional governmental functions
from other state activity).
"' See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); Garcia,469 U.S. 528; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The
Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), reopened the question of state
substantive authority. See infra part I.C.
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tive lawmaking powers actually reserved to the states are understood
2
to remain so only at the pleasure of the national government.
Instead, the Court in Usery framed the debate over federalism in
terms of whether the "States as States " 53 may claim a constitutionally recognized status that immunizes them from direct national
regulation. The modem issue is no longer what the states exist to
do, but simply whether they have a constitutionally-enforceable right
to exist as independent governmental bodies in the first place. 4
Rather than signaling a return to dual federalism, the decision
in Usery marks the beginning of the Supreme Court's modern effort
to construct a viable theory of federalism that avoids the substantive
line-drawing characteristic of that earlier period. This modern
effort has produced two distinct, although not necessarily inconsistent, procedural models of federalism. The first model, which I
term "institutional federalism," understands state sovereignty in
terms of the institutional structures and processes that define the
"States as States."55 Institutional federalism seeks to discern the
'2 See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatoy Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 759 ("[T]he Federal
Government may displace state regulation even though this serves to 'curtail or
prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices.... .'" (quoting Hodel, 452

U.S. at 290)); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290 ("A wealth of precedent attests to congressional
authority to displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity ... when these
laws conflict with federal law."); Usery, 426 U.S. at 840 ("Congressional power over
areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law
determinations contrary to the result which has commended itself to the collective
wisdom of Congress, has been held to be limited only by the requirement that 'the
means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution.'" (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262
(1964) (alteration in original)); see also MICHAEL D. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM
163 (1972) (asserting that the power of the states "rests upon the permission and
permissiveness of the national government").
53 Usey, 426 U.S. at 845.
' See id. ("It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws
regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the
government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another
to uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private
citizens,
but to the States as States.").
5
1 Id.; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 ("Through the structure of its government,
and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself
as a sovereign."); FederalEnergyRegulatoy Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 761 ("We acknowledge
that 'the authority to make ... fundamental.., decisions' is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty." (quoting Usery, 426 U.S. at 851) (omissions in original));
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (concluding that the Federal Surface Mining Act does not
violate state sovereignty in part because "there can be no suggestion that the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
125 (1970) (plurality opinion) ("No function is more essential to the separate and
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essential features of state identity-those minimum institutional
powers that together constitute an autonomous self-governing
political body. 6 As Justice Rehnquist framed the issue in Usery,
"[t]he question we must resolve here ...

is whether ...

[the

regulated activities] are '"functions essential to [the States'] separate
and independent existence." "'' 5 7 In Usery, the Court held that the

minimum wage and maximum hour provisions as applied to state
employees were invalid because they operated "to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions.""8 The employment regulations interfered with powers deemed essential to the structural
59
integrity and procedural autonomy of the states.

independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to
determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters
for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for
filling local public offices."); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("The
[Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system."); Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 362-63 ("The
exception carved out from the federal powers [in Usery] pertained exclusively to the
immunity of internal state governmental processes, and nothing in the opinion even
remotely implied that the federal government could not reach any private activity.").
H.Jefferson Powell describes what he callsJustice O'Connor's "autonomy of process
principle" in similar terms: "[Flederalism requires that the federal government
respect the autonomy of state governments as the possessors of independent
institutional processes, even when Congress legislates in an area in which it has the
constitutional authority completely to preempt state choices." H.Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 641 (1993). Deborah
Merritt's theory of federalism premised on the Guarantee Clause is also a version of
institutional federalism. See Merritt, supra note 28, at 36.
' See Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money, and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 847, 851 (1979). Professor Kaden writes:
To function as a state, the body politic must have at least a minimum of its
powers protected against outside interference, including control over the
structure of government, the distribution of administrative responsibilities,
the process of selecting popular agents, and the capacity to tax and spend.
This is but another way to say that the characteristic integral to separate
identity in contemporary terms is a power to make choices ....

Id.

57 Usety, 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)
(quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869))).
RId. at 852.
5 Although Usery's principle of federalism invokes a procedural paradigm that
focuses on the governmental structure necessary to the states' "separate and

independent existence," id. at 845, the procedural analysis as framed in Usery does not
avoid entirely consideration of the states' substantive lawmaking authority. Under
Usery's "traditional governmental functions" test, the Supreme Court was faced with
deciding whether certain substantive powers, such as operating a railroad, see United
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Although Usety remains the fullest modern exposition of this
model, strong traces of the principle of institutional federalism may
be found in earlier cases decided during the era of dual federalism.
In his opinion for the Court in Usery, Justice Rehnquist relied upon
Coyle v. Smith,6" a case in which the Supreme Court had held that
"[t]he power to locate its own seat of government and to determine
when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and
to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially
and peculiarly state powers."6 ' In addition, the Supreme Court's
early decisions upholding state immunity from federal taxation, an
immunity grounded in the overall structural design of the Constitution and not in any particular constitutional provision, 62 were
rooted in a form of institutional protection of the "States as States."
A second model of procedural federalism, commonly referred
to as "process federalism," emerged nine years after Usery to
overrule the Supreme Court's "traditional governmental functions"
test. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 6 the

Supreme Court took the position that the "States as States" are
adequately protected by their participation in the national political
process.6 4 Clearly related to the political-representation theory of
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982) ("Federal regulation of
state-owned railroads simply does not impair a state's ability to function as a state."),
or managing a state park, see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 240 (1983) (concluding that federal retirement policy applied to state
game wardens does not pose "the same wide-ranging and profound threat to the
structure of state governance" as the regulations held invalid in Usey), were activities
essential to the states' separate existence.
o221 U.S. 559 (1911).
61Id. at 565; see also Lane County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76 (recognizing the states'
"separate and independent existence").
62 See The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 125 (1870); Child Labor Tax
Case, 259 U.S. 20, 41 (1922). The institutional model may also be understood to
inform the Supreme Court's deference, in the name ofjudicial federalism, to state
judicial proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also Day, 78 U.S.
at 126 (noting that the power to maintain a judicial department is "one of the
sovereign powers vested in the States by their constitutions"). Professor Powell also
suggests that Justice O'Connor's "autonomy of process principle" is similar to the
position rejected byJustice Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816) (holding that the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction over state court
rulings on issues of federal law). See Powell, supra note 55, at 675-81.
63 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
" See id. at 552 ("State sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by
judicially created limitations on federal power."). For earlier expressions of this view,
see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (noting that "effective restraints on
(the] exercise [of federal commerce power] must proceed from political rather than
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individual rights,65 the process model views case-by-case judicial
review of national legislation allegedly interfering with state
sovereignty as unnecessary; the states are capable of protecting
themselves by way of their actual influence within the national
government. Although its extreme version abdicates judicial review
entirely,6 6 the process model does not abandon the virtues of
federalism altogether in favor of a fully nationalized governmental
system. 67 To the contrary, process theory posits that the protection of state interests is best realized through the national political
structure established by the Constitution.
Process theory shares with institutional federalism the conviction
that the Constitution as a whole does assume the continued
existence of the states themselves, even if the document does not
carve out protected zones of state authority.6" In the process view,
as long as the states participate in the lawmaking process, the
substantive ends of government may be freely pursued by the

from judicial processes"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("The
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are ... the sole restraints on
which they have relied, to secure them from abuse. They are the restraints on which
... people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.").
' See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938);
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77

(1980). For a criticism of the process-based theory in the context of individual rights,
see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980).
' See, e.g., Choper, supra note 15, at 1557 (arguing that "the constitutional issue
whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus
violates 'states' rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable, with final resolution left
to the political branches").
67See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 15, at 543 ("In a far flung, free society, the
federalist values are enduring. They call upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient
to resist their common perils and advance their common welfare, without undue
sacrifice of their diversities and the creative energies to which diversity gives rise.").
" See TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-20, at 379 ("It is clear.., that the Constitution
does presuppose the existence of the states as entities independent of the national
government."). Constitutional provisions recognizing the formal existence of the
states include the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4; the prohibition on
alteration of state boundaries and reduction of state representation in the Senate
without consent of state legislatures, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; the provision
for constitutional amendment, see U.S. CONST. art. V; and other miscellaneous
provisions, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (describingvoter qualifications for the
House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (reserving to the states
certain powers over the militia); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (prohibiting the federal
government from giving preference to the ports of any state or from imposing
interstate duties on ships); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the direct election
of Senators by the people of each state).

1995]

FEDERALISM AND FAMILIES

1811

national legislature working alone or in cooperative relation with
the fifty state governments. The continued existence of the states
69
as independent political bodies remains a constitutional given.
Process theory's withdrawal ofjudicial review over federalism-based
challenges to national laws is therefore not a repudiation of state
sovereignty so much as 7an
affirmation of the states' power of
0
political self-preservation.
Even on its own terms, however, the process model does not
offer a vision of the states' constitutional role that entirely avoids
the need to elaborate some external limitations on national power
"' See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549 (noting that the states "unquestionably" retain
significant sovereign authority); Choper, supra note 15, at 1567 (reaffirming
Hamilton's and Madison's view that "'[tihe State Governments may be regarded as
constituent and essential parts of the federal Government'" (quotingTHE FEDERALIST
No. 45 (James Madison))). AsJustice Rehnquist did in Usery, the Supreme Court has
consistently reaffirmed the constitutional status of the states by referring to Chief
Justice Chase's assertion in Texas v. White that "'[tihe Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.'"
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976) (quoting Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) (alteration in original)), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (recognizing the Supreme Court's "ample power to prevent...
'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political entity'"); Lane County v.
Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869) ("[I]n many articles of the Constitution the
necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the independent
authority of the States, is distinctly recognized."); TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-20, at 379
(noting that "the structural assumptions and the tacit postulates of the Constitution
as a whole" do "presuppose the existence of the states as entities independent of the
national government"); Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 345 (noting that the Framers'
"assumption of the continued existence and vitality of state governments is visible
throughout the Constitution"); Wechsler, supra note 15, at 544 ("The continuous
existence of the states as governmental entities and their strategic r6le in the selection
of the Congress and the President are so immutable a feature of the system that their
importance tends to be ignored."). Whether the states possess a constitutionally
protected right to exist in the first place is not a new issue in constitutional law. See
e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 41 (1922) ("'It would undoubtedly be an
abuse of the [taxing] power if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and
independent self-government of the States.... .'" (quoting Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869)); The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127
(1870) (recognizing the states' right of "self-preservation").
" Herbert Wechsler offers a related argument based on national self-restraint:
"Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent tendency
in our system is precisely the reverse, necessitating the widest support before intrusive
measures of importance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to
opposition grounded in resistance within the states." Wechsler, supra note 15, at 558;
see also Choper, supranote 15, at 1560 ("Numerous structural aspects of the national
political system serve to assure that states' rights will not be trampled, and the lesson
of practice is that they have not been."); id. at 1568 ("Congress has generally paid
fastidious attention to the reserved power of the states.").
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vis-4-vis the states. The theory fails to address the possibility that
national laws might in fact imperil the "separate and independent
existence" of the "States as States," 71 and specifically their status
as relatively autonomous participants in the national lawmaking
process. Although process theory might defend the states' power
of self-preservation by appeal to the metaphor of the "body
politic,"7 1 it remains unclear why we should assume that the states
are immune from self-destructive forces. 71 Unless we concede that
the states are free to acquiesce in their own dissolution, a concession seemingly at odds with process theory's professed commitment
to the value of federalism, then we are forced to acknowledge some
minimal extrapolitical constraints on national power.
Significantly, even Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in
Garcia pulls back from a wholesale embrace of the theory of state
self-preservation. Although he recognized political restraints as "the
principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power," he
nevertheless alluded to the "affirmative limits [that] the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States
under the Commerce Clause." 74
The significance of Justice
Blackmun's concession to the existence of affirmative limits on
congressional power cannot be overlooked. By leaving the door
open to judicially enforced limits, he acknowledged that participation in the political process alone may not guarantee that the states
will retain "their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 75 To retain a meaningful role in the constitutional structure,

7' See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 128 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[N]or can I agree
that a presumption can be admitted that the general government will act in a manner
hostile to the existence or functions of the State governments, which are constituent
parts of the system or body politic forming the basis on which the general
government is founded.").
" See Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based
ProceduralProtections, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1661 n.24 (1987) (noting that federal
legislators face a conflict of interest whenever their laws threaten to infringe on state
sovereignty); Rapaczynski, supranote 7, at 393 (noting that "in normal times, in which
most of the pressure to erode the independence of the states is exerted, the primary
constituencies of the national representatives may... be precisely those that advocate
an extension of the federal power to the disadvantage of the states").
7"Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556; see also Wechsler, supra note 15, at 559 ("Federal
intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for congressional
determination .... " (emphasis added)); Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 343 n.15
("While stressing the 'political safeguards of federalism,' the Court's opinion in the
Garciacase stops short of declaring outright that federalism-related limits on the
national commerce power present a nonjustifiable political question ...
7' Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
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federalism must rely on something more than a theory of state selfpreservation that itself depends on the grace of congressional selfrestraint.
The need to articulate some affirmative limits on the federal
lawmaking power led the Supreme Court back in the direction of
institutional federalism. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,7 Justice O'Connor
conceded that Garcia "left primarily to the political process the
protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers."77 Yet in evaluating the validity of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to state court
judges, she also reaffirmed Usery's institutional view of "the
constitutional scheme of dual sovereigns": "This provision goes
beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision
of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through the
structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise
78
government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign."
Although Justice O'Connor artfully avoided enforcing these
affirmative institutional limits on national power,7 1 the decision
one year later in New York v. United Statess0 confirmed the Court's
power of judicial review. Again invoking the institutional principle
of federalism, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that
"offer[ed] state governments a 'choice' of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of
Congress. " " The Court held that such a federally-mandated
choice "'commandeers the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
82
program.'"
76

501 U.S. 452 (1991).

7 Id. at
78

464.

Id. at 460.

"Atone point,Justice O'Connor suggests that "the authority of the people of the
States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials
... is a power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 463.
However, she later suggests that Congress has the power to override state sovereignty
under Garciaas long as Congress makes its intent to do so absolutely clear. See id.
at 464 ("We are constrained in our ability to consider the limits that the state-federal
balance places on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause." (citing Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985))).
80112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
S Id. at 2428.
Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
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Although at close range the decisions in Garcia and Usery might
seem to be in tension, from a more removed historical perspective
the institutional and process models of federalism are not so clearly
incompatible. In doctrinal terms, institutional federalism may be
understood to supplement process federalism by providing those
minimal affirmative limits on the exercise of federal power that
Justice Blackmun alluded to in Garcia.3 In terms of operating
principles, both models adhere to the two basic tenets that together
define the procedural paradigm: a categorical rejection of dual
federalism's substantive spheres of authority, and a complementary
concern for the preservation of the "States as States" in the
constitutional structure. Despite some irreconcilable differences at
the extremes," both models assume that the values of constitutional federalism are adequately served by the mere existence of the
states as independent political entities and nothing more. In both
views, whatever "affirmative limits" the Constitution might impose
on national power are directed to preserving not the substance of
state authority, but the integrity of state processes and decisionmaking.
Even on its own terms, however, the procedural model cannot
provide a meaningful conceptual framework for federalism. While
the prevention of governmental tyranny was once accomplished by
delimiting substantive realms of legislative power, the procedural
model has replaced this constraint with, at most, the much more
limited goal of prohibiting Congress from "commandeer[ing]" or
destroying state institutional processes.8 5 Within the procedural
paradigm, all that stands against the full centralization of governmental power are the "States as States," sovereign only in the most
limited sense of possessing the capacity for decision-making. Yet
the mere existence of the states, without some substantive vision of
their role in the constitutional scheme, does not suffice to set
boundaries on the scope of national power.
Put somewhat

'Professor Rapaczynski reconciles the two models by construing national
legislation that impairs the institutional autonomy of the states as a form of process
failure. See Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 394 ("[Iln undermining the states, the
federal government at the same time undercuts those very features of the national
political process as a whole ... on which its own health crucially depends.").
8 Professor Choper, for example, would not recognize any affirmative limits
on
congressional power as long as the national political process has not malfunctioned.
See Choper, supra note 15, at 1556-57. His argument that federalism claims are
nonjusticiable, see id. at 1557, suggests that Congress has the power, although perhaps
not the will, to obliterate the states altogether.

See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
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differently, the states' institutional autonomy-their power to make
decisions without interference from the national government-must
include the power to make decisions in specific areas. 6 If not, the
institutional autonomy at stake becomes a mere formalism. Despite
its stated commitment to the prevention of governmental tyranny,
therefore, the procedural model's only actual safeguard against the7
complete loss of state autonomy is congressional self-restraint.
And self-restraint, while perhaps a sufficient check on governmental
overreaching in ordinary times, ss is by definition inadequate as a
safeguard against the extraordinary aggrandizement of centralized
power that the Framers so feared.
The procedural model's commitment to the existence of the
"States as States" does arguably preserve some residual role for
federalism within the constitutional structure. In its most robust
institutional form, procedural federalism might be understood to
protect an "organizational framework" at the state level that serves
to break "the national monopoly on the power to coerce. " 89 Yet
' Professor Rapaczynski acknowledges this fundamental problem with the
procedural model:
[T]he vitality of the participatory state institutions depends in part on the
types of substantive decisions that are left for the states. Should the federal
government preempt them from most fields that touch directly on the life
of local communities, the states would become but empty shells within which
no meaningful political activity could take place.
Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 404.
87 In elaborating her procedural theory of federalism, Professor Merritt concedes
that, at bottom, the procedural model of federalism (which she derives from the
Guarantee Clause) rests on a theory of congressional self-restraint:
One might argue, of course, that a republican government must have the
power to regulate some aspects of private conduct and that the guarantee
clause requires Congress to allow the states to engage in some minimum
level of regulatory activity. As a practical matter, however, this question is
unlikely to arise. Although Congress' constitutional powers are broad, it
remains a government of delegated authority. Some purely local matters
may remain outside of Congress' regulatory competence. Moreover, even
if Congress could theoretically render the states obsolete by preempting
state regulation on every conceivable subject, practical limits on congressional time and federal funds would prevent Congress from exercising its
powers that broadly.
Merritt, supra note 28, at 59 n.329.
88 Cf TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-20, at 381 ("If there is any danger [of Congress
obliterating the states], it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that
Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially
nothing is left but a gutted shell.").
9 Professor Rapaczynski makes the most compelling procedural argument for the
states' effectiveness in preventing governmental tyranny:
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with no substantive agenda, the procedural paradigm ultimately
threatens to "obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government. " "
It was with this concern in mind that the Supreme Court departed
from the procedural approach in United States v. Lopez91 by reviving
a substantive model of federalism.
C. The Reemergence of Substantive Federalism:
United States v. Lopez
The Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez 2 has taken an
important step toward a fundamental reordering of the law
governing federal-state relations. Striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990,"3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the majority, reestablished substantive limits on Congress's
Commerce Clause power for the first time since the New Deal.
Despite a misguided effort to define these limits in terms of
"commercial" activity, the Chief Justice correctly assessed the need
for substantive restraints as the only effective constitutional check
against the threat of "a general federal police power."9 4 Equally
significant, both the majority and the dissent in Lopez invoked family
law as a paradigmatic example of state authority.9 5 The Justices'
shared concern for preserving state authority over family law
highlights the need for a theory of federalism that explains the
connection between localism and the role that families and
education play in the national liberal state.

[T]he independence of the very process of state government, without
seriously hampering the national authorities in regulating most private
activities, assures the existence of an organizational framework, more
efficient than any private institution could provide, that may always be used
as an effective tool for bringing together otherwise defenseless individuals
with some stakes in resisting the overreaching of the national government.
The value of this organizational apparatus thus lies not so much in any of
its concrete regulatory activities that the national government could not do
as well (or better), as in the very fact that it eliminates the national
monopoly on the power to coerce.
Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 390.
NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
9'
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
92

Id.

" 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
9 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
' See id. at 1630-31; id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The majority in Lopez began its analysis by asserting that "the
proper test [of congressional authority] requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce." 96
On its face, the majority's Commerce Clause
analysis does not depart significantly from the standard articulated
in many cases since the New Deal.9 7 But while prior cases exhibited a general deference to congressional decision-making, the Chief
Justice detected a "pattern" of sustaining congressional authority
only where the local activity in question was itself of a commercial
or economic nature.98 Concluding that the possession of a firearm
in a school zone "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms,"9 9 the majority held the Act to be outside Congress's

authority. In so holding, the Court removed noneconomic local
activity-whatever its effect on interstate commerce-from the scope
of federal regulatory power.
The majority in Lopez thus established a commercial-noncommercial distinction based on a legitimate concern that Congress

'6 Id. at 1630. The majority identified "three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power." Id. at 1629. Because the Act did
not involve either the regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce,
or the protection of the instrumentalities of, or persons or things in, interstate
commerce, the majority focused its analysis on the third category: the regulation of
'those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 1629-30.
7
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981) (-The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.");
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress may regulate
activity that 'exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (requiring a "close and
substantial relation" between a regulated activity and interstate commerce). The
dissent questions the use of the word 'substantial," but otherwise agrees with the
majority's formulation. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630 ("[T]he pattern is clear. Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained.").
" Id. at 1630-31. The majority also found that the Act 'contains nojurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession
in question affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1631. It is unclear whether this
jurisdictional basis for congressional authority is an exception that swallows the
majority's general rule regarding state authority over local noneconomic activity. If
all Congress had to do was provide that the specific firearm in question in any
prosecution under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 had a connection to
interstate commerce, then given the likelihood that either the gun or some of its
component parts had moved in interstate commerce, the jurisdictional exception
would appear to provide Congress with unlimited regulatory authority.
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would otherwise enjoy "a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation."' 0 The dissent's claims
notwithstanding, the majority is clearly right that the procedural
model of federalism threatens to "'obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government. '"0" As discussed earlier, without some substantive limitation on congressional power, federalism becomes nothing
more than an unenforceable promise of congressional self-re10 2
straint.
While the majority rightly identifies the need to limit federal
regulatory power, its distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity ultimately creates more problems than it solves.
The ChiefJustice seems unconcerned with the striking resemblance
between his commercial-noncommercial line and the failed
categories of "direct-indirect" and "production-commerce" that
characterized the era of dual federalism.' 03 As was true fifty years
ago and, as the dissent convincingly argued, is still true today, the
complex workings of our national economy make drawing the line
between commercial and noncommercial activities "almost impossible."10 4 With respect to education, the dissent provides powerful
evidence that, "in today's economic world, gun-related violence near
the classroom makes a significant difference to our economic, as
well as our social, well-being." 10 5 The majority concedes that its
commercial-noncommercial distinction "may in some cases result in
legal uncertainty,"0' but this fleeting moment of judicial candor
vastly understates the impossibility of identifying any area of
modern social life left untouched by commercial concerns.
The example of family law surfaces as the majority's principal
response to the dissent's empirical claim concerning the important
100 Id. at 1633.
101 Id. at 1629 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37

(1937)).
102

See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text; see also TRIBE, supra note 42,

§ 5-20, at 380-81 (insisting that, as a constitutional matter, "Congress cannot deny the
states some symbolic corollaries of independent status, some revenue with which to
operate, some sphere of autonomous lawmaking competence, and some measure of
choice in selecting a political structure").
103 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The distinction between
what is patently commercial and what is not looks much like the old distinction
between what directly affects interstate commerce and what touches it only
indirectly.").
Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10
6 Id. at 1633.
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connection between education and national economic well-being.
No less than four times the majority stresses the point that, "[u]nder
the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child
rearing as falling on the commercial side of the line because it
provides 'a valuable service-namely, to equip children with the skills
they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the
workplace.' 1 7 There can be no question that the majority correctly insists that the example of family law explodes the dissent's
position. The effects of divorce, nonpayment of child support,
foster-care, restrictions on marriage, and numerous other aspects of
family life on the national economy are widely documented.108
Indeed, it is arguable that no institution has more direct links to the
economic, social and political well-being of this country than the
family.
Yet despite a compelling analysis of the connection between
education and commerce, the dissent openly retreats from drawing
the same conclusions with respect to family law.' 0 9 Struggling
vainly to salvage federalism from the ruins of its own analysis, the
dissent weakly asserts that "the immediacy of the connection
between education and the national economic well-being is
documented by scholars and accepted by society at large in a way
and to a degree that may not hold true for other social institu"o"Id. at 1633 (quoting id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 1632
("[U]nder the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for
example."); id. (describing as "devoid of substance"Justice Breyer's suggestion "that
there might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power such as family law");
id. at 1633 (noting that the dissent's analysis "would be equally applicable, if not more
so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education").
8
"o
See, e.g.,

LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323

(1985) ("On a societal level, divorce increases female and child poverty and creates
an ever-widening gap between the economic well-being of divorced men, on the one
hand, and their children and former wives on the other."); CHILDREN OF POVERTY:
RESEARCH, HEALTH, AND POLICY ISSUES (Hiram E. Fitzgerald et al. eds., 1995)
(exploring issues surrounding the connection between poverty and family life in the
United States); NORA S. GUSTAVSSON & ELIZABETH A. SEGAL, CRITICAL ISSUES IN
CHILD WELFARE 181 (Nora S. Gustavsson & Elizabeth A. Segal eds., 1994) (noting that
"[t]he overall benefit to society of caring for our children today is a healthy and
productive workforce for tomorrow"); ARLOC SHERMAN, WASTING AMERICA'S FUTURE:
THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND REPORT ON THE COSTS OF CHILD POVERTY 59-119
(1994) (documenting the national economic costs of child poverty).
1
0 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (denying in conclusory
fashion that its approach would permit the federal government "to regulate 'marriage,
divorce, and child custody'").
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tions."" 0 Abandoning the implications of its critique at the
domestic threshold, the dissent remains unwilling to cede authority
over family law to the federal government, asserting without support
that its approach would not permit
Congress "to regulate 'marriage,
In
divorce, and child custody.'"
The discussion of family law in Lopez crystallizes the central
problem for contemporary federalism: how to identify meaningful
substantive limits on federal regulatory power. Both the majority
and the dissent invoke family law as a paradigmatic arena of state
authority, yet neither provides a basis upon which to distinguish
family law from other regulatory matters within Congress's power.
Missing from the discussion in Lopez is any inquiry into the
substantive connection between education and family law on the
one hand, and state authority on the other. The majority and the
dissent in Lopez both proceed on the widespread but mistaken
assumption that the presence of a strong national interest always
militates in favor of national regulatory authority. The Justices
neglect to consider, however, that the principle of federalism might
come into play precisely because local control over families and
education is vital to the survival of our national liberal democracy." 2 They fail to recognize that state sovereignty over family law
preserves the constitutional ideal of citizenship by promoting the
development of civic virtue-and in particular the virtue of situated
autonomy-in maturing children.
Federalism in this context
destroys the federal government's power to mold the moral
character of future citizens in its own uniform image.
Despite its obvious shortcomings, the decision in Lopez makes a
vital contribution to the contemporary debate over federalism by
reopening the general question of substantive spheres of governmental authority. Equally important, the decision highlights the
importance of family law to the constitutional ideal of federalism.
The following Section begins the task of elaborating a localist theory
of federal-state relations by examining the doctrinal history of state
authority over family law.
10
o Id. at 1662.
"I Id. at 1661.

112 Although I do not discuss state authority over education in this Article, the
theory of localism developed here with respect to families is also obviously relevant
to a discussion of primary education in a liberal society. For discussions of the place
of education in liberal society, see GUTMANN, supra note 12; Nomi M. Stolzenberg,

'He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out".• Assimilation, Indoctrination,and the Paradox of a
Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REv. 581 (1993).
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D. Localism and Family Law

From the earliest days of the Republic until the recent past,
family law has unquestionably belonged to the states. 1 3 The era
of dual federalism witnessed universal agreement that government
regulation of the family fell within the constitutionally protected
sphere of state sovereignty. 4 Although the Supreme Court during
this time did not have occasion to hold directly that family matters
were beyond the scope of congressional power, it did carve out a
domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction that
underscored its often expressed view that "[tlhe whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
"'Judith Resnik notes that"[w]hile federal law thus far has not regulated directly
either the marriage, divorce, or custodial relations of divorcing parents, federal law
does govern a host of legal and economic relations that do affect and sometimes
define family life." Resnik, supra note 11, at 1721. After surveying federal law on the
family, Professor Resnik then concludes, however, that "the idea that family law
belongs to the states becomes problematic." Id. at 1746-47. Although it is my view
that the core domain of family law, which includes marriage, divorce, child custody
and support, alimony, property division, adoption, foster care, child welfare, and
termination of parental rights, may properly be characterized as still "belonging" to
the states, Professor Resnik is right to point out that many areas of federal law (such
as taxation, immigration, and bankruptcy law) do address family life. Moreover,
much recent federal legislation has pressed up against, if not crossed over, the
boundary of traditional state authority. For examples, see supra note 1.
114 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,292-93 (1936) (noting that national
legislation on marriage and divorce, however vigorously demanded, is constitutionally
beyond Congress's power); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402
(1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting) ("Commerce depends upon population, but Congress
could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce.");see alsoVan
Alstyne, supra note 11, at 773 ("Many subjects (e.g., the divorce or descent laws of the
several states) were not in dispute at the time [of ratification].... and no proposals
were made or adopted to confide any general power to Congress.").
Sarah Barringer Gordon details the rise of a national antipolygamy campaign
during the second half of the nineteenth century. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The
Twin Relics of Barbarism": A Legal History of Anti-Polygamy in Nineteenth Century
America (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (manuscript
on file with author); see also Resnik, supra note 11, at 1743-44 (discussing nineteenthcentury fed2eral efforts to control polygamy and sexual relations). During this time,
Congress passed several measures designed to eliminate the Mormon practice of
polygamy in the federal territories, a geographic area in which the federal government possessed the traditional regulatory powers of the states. See id. at 1743 (noting
that the antipolygamy legislation "was directed at federal governance of the territories
and was implemented by the federal courts in their capacity as 'territorial courts'
(thus acting as 'state courts' for these purposes)" (footnote omitted)). Although
Professor Gordon provides compelling evidence of the importance of the national
antipolygamy movement to the national political life of the time, I see little evidence
in the law of federalism or domestic relations that the antipolygamy movement
ftindamentally altered the traditional presumption of state authority over family law.

1822

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1787

to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
115
States."

The domestic relations exception concerned the extent of
federal judicial power rather than congressional power, yet the

116
principle of localism underlying the doctrine was the same.

Justice Daniel's dissenting opinion in Barber v. Barber117 articulated

the important connection between family law and state sovereignty.' 8 Justice Daniel concluded that "[the] power [to regulate
the domestic relations of society] belongs exclusively to the
particular communities of which those families form parts, and is
essential to the order and to the very existence of such communities." 1 ' The domestic relations exception reflected the view that
family law constituted a distinctly communitarian endeavor, a
subject reflecting locally shared values and norms.1 20 The moral
dimension of family law gave rise to the localist view that family law
belonged to the particular states within which those moral norms
and values were conceived and followed. Perhaps more than any
other legal domain, family law epitomized dual federalism's
association of state sovereignty with the localist views of the
antifederalists"'
"' In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); see also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582, 584 (1858) ("We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony....").
But cf De la Rama v. De ]a Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1906) (stating that the
domestic relations exception does not apply to suits within the territories); Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (same).
16 See Ohio ex reL Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) ("If when the
Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations
of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there
is no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly.... ."). At least one decision
from the era of dual federalism proposed a statutory basis for the exemption. See De
!aRama, 201 U.S. at 307 (noting that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable in divorce
cases because a husband and wife by law share the same domicile and no monetary
amount is involved).
11762 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
..8 Drawing out the historical connection between localist ideology and pro-slavery
sentiments, Naomi R. Cahn describes ChiefJustice Taney's approach in Barber as an
effort "to preserve state control over the family and to protect another form of
'property,'" Cahn, supra note 11, at 1078, much as he had preserved state control
over slaves two years earlier in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
"' Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 602.
120 See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) ("Marriage, as creating the
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization
of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the
legislature.").
121 Cf. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
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The doctrinal implications of dual federalism's eventual demise
for family law were clear. If limits on Congress's substantive
lawmaking powers no longer existed, then the federal government
would be free to legislate pursuant to its Article I powers in the
domain of family life. 2 2 Until recently, however, Congress evidently chose to pursue a course of self-restraint with respect to
domestic relations. 2 ' The prevailing view of federalism would
suggest that this exercise of self-restraint derived from a pragmatic
deference to the states' historical expertise in the domain of the
family, an example of cooperative intergovernmental relations
under which the federal government delegates exclusive authority
to the states over particular subject matters. In the post-dualfederalism world, it is left to Congress to decide whether the
national government will exercise its plenary substantive authority
over matters of familial concern.
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on the domestic
relations exception, Ankenbrandt v. Richards,124 reinforces this
pragmatic understanding of family law's place in the federal system.
Whereas the domestic relations exception might once have been
understood as constitutionally compelled, the Supreme Court held
in Ankenbrandt that the exception exists as a matter of statutory

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 295 (1985). Professor Grossberg notes:

WJudicial dominance of domestic relations grew out of an abiding commitment to local control that lay at the heart of nineteenth-century American
family law. An expression of the nation's persistent localism, opposition to
national jurisdiction over the family stemmed from the deep-seated
republican aversion to centralized government in general, and more
particularly its lingering localist corollary that state policy makers and
community officials best understood the dynamics of family life.
Id.
" Any limitations on the federal government's power to legislate in the domain
of family law would flow, not from federalism concerns, but from the constitutional
protection for "family privacy." Although Supreme Court cases invoking the right of
family privacy have involved legislation at the state level only, see, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down a state law forbidding the use
of contraceptives), the right of privacy also constrains the power of the federal
government.
...
Until recently, Congress had not attempted to pass legislation directly
regulating such core family matters as marriage, alimony, property division, child
custody, child support, adoption, or termination of parental rights. For recent
legislation, see supra note 1.
1 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (1992) (interpreting a statutory grant of diversity
jurisdiction as incorporating a domestic relations exception). For a discussion of this
case that takes an affirmative view of federal jurisdiction in matters of family law, see
Cahn, supra note 11, at 1081-87.
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construction. 125 The Court concluded that Congress has the
authority to grant jurisdiction over domestic relations cases to the
federal courts, although the Court nevertheless affirmed the "sound
policy considerations" supporting the statutory exception.126 Yet
it is possible that Congress's posture of jurisdictional self-restraint
toward domestic relations reflects something more than mere policy
considerations: a lingering suspicion that "some sphere of autono12 7
mous lawmaking competence" must remain with the states.
Behind this congressional restraint may lie the persistent view that
our federal system in its very design contemplates that the states
shall possess primary regulatory authority over the realm of family
relations.
Congress's historical self-restraint has obscured the implications
of the demise of dual federalism for family law. Congressional
inaction has made it possible for courts and commentators to
overlook the value of localism in our constitutional structure. As a
consequence, we are unequipped to respond to the situation we
now face: the federal government's increasing involvement in issues
of family law. The contemporary approach to federalism provides
no conceptual framework for examining the substantive relation
between family law and the constitutional design. It is for that
reason that an understanding of the importance of family law in the
federal system is not merely of theoretical interest but is also of
significant practical importance.
The troubled history of dual federalism has led contemporary
proponents of federalism to overlook the important ways in which
our constitutional structure demands a richer, more comprehensive
account of the states' substantive role in the federal scheme than

11

See Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2212 (holding that "Article III, § 2, does not

mandate the exclusion of domestic relations cases from federal-court jurisdiction").
2
s Id. at 2215. The Court lists these policy considerations as follows:
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of
jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social workers to monitor
compliance. As a matter of judicial economy, state courts are more
eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the
close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to
handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter ofjudicial expertise, it makes far
more sense to retain the rule that federal courts lack power to issue these
types of decrees because of the special proficiency developed by state
tribunals over the past century and a half in handling issues that arise in the
granting of such decrees.
Id. 127
TRIBE, supra note 42, § 5-20, at 380-81.
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the procedural model can ever provide. Although the Supreme
Court in Lopez revived a substantive framework for federalism, the
Court failed to provide a meaningful defense of state sovereignty
over family law. The remainder of this Article undertakes to explain
why national regulation of the family raises a serious threat of
government tyranny over an area constitutive of individual identity
and essential to the moral autonomy of developing citizens in liberal
society.
II.

FAMILIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVC CHARACTER

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
128
with all that implies.
This Article argues that state authority over family law is an
essential feature of our liberal constitutional order. Implicit in the
design of the Constitution is the understanding that the states have
responsibility for developing a shared moral vision of the good
family life. Prohibited from assuming responsibility for this moral
domain, the federal government plays a limited but vital role in
protecting individual rights in the domestic sphere against state
encroachment. The localist theory of family law presented in Part
III of this Article explores the relationship between the federal and
the state governments and the distinct role that each plays in the
overall regulation of the family in the liberal state.
In order to understand the relationship between federal and
state authority over the family, however, we first need to understand
the more general relationship between government and families in
a liberal democracy. Whatjustifies governmental involvement at all
in the so-called private sphere of family life? How should we
understand the status of the family in a liberal polity committed to
the protection of individual rights and liberties? And what exactly
is at stake when the government undertakes, as it must, regulation
of family values? After clarifying the contours of the general
relationship between liberal government and families in Part II, I
then turn in Part III to the question of federalism and the importance of state authority over the moral terms of family life.
Section A of this Part explores the concept of parental authority
within liberal theory and the role that parents play in fostering the
development of civic virtue in children. Section B then examines

12

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
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the concept of citizenship that underlies the constitutional recognition of parental authority and explores what I call the civic virtue of
situated autonomy. Section C looks more closely at the relationship
between parental authority and the development of situated
autonomy in children.
Section C analyzes the notion of
"situatedness" by drawing out, first, the relational claim that parents
provide the necessary environmental conditions for the psychological development of autonomy and, second, the communal claim that
parents instill particular values and beliefs in their developing
children. Exploration of the parental role in fostering psychological
autonomy and cultural embeddedness will help to illuminate what
is at stake when the liberal state exercises its regulatory authority
over family life. This discussion of liberal citizenship and the civic
virtue of situated autonomy lays the conceptual foundation for Part
III's discussion of the need for local authority over the moral
domain of family law.
A. Families in Liberal Theory
The relationship between the liberal state and the family has
traditionally been understood in terms of the classic liberal
distinction between public and private spheres of life.' 29
In

" SeeJudith N. Shklar, The Liberalismof Fear,in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE,
supra note 12, at 21, 24 ("Because of the primacy of toleration as the irreducible limit
on public agents, liberals must always draw.., a line [between the spheres of the
personal and the public]."). For an exploration of the concepts of public and private
within liberal theory, see Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Liberal Conception of
the Publicand the Private, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSOCIAL LIFE 31 (S.I. Benn & G.F.
Gaus eds., 1983). For a critique of the public/private distinction from a feminist
perspective, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism andthe Public/PrivateDistinction,45 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 43 (1992) (-[F]ighting the verbal distinction between public and private, rather
than fighting invalid arguments which invoke them, or the power structures which
manipulate them in unjustifiable ways, is as futile as seeking individual therapy for
problems of social structure.") Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiquesofthe Public/Private
Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSOCIAL LIFE, supra, at 281, 283 (arguing that
"the separation and opposition of the public and private spheres is an unequal
opposition between men and women"); and from a critical perspective, see Duncan
Kennedy, The Structureof Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 286-89,35568 (1979). Liberalism may be understood, in part at least, as a reaction against the
prevailing seventeenth century political theory that conflated familial and political
authority. For the best known example of this preliberal theory, see ROBERT FILMER,
PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS (Peter Laslett ed., 1949). Benn and Gaus
suggest that the organizing antithesis prior to the Reformation was not public/
private, but temporal/spiritual. See Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Publicand
the Private: Concepts and Action, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE, supra, at 3,
19.
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addition to marking the fundamental boundary between collective
authority and individual freedom-the boundary that in large part
defines the liberal project-the division between public and private
has also expressed a qualitative distinction within liberal society.
Under liberalism, the public sphere of politics is understood to
operate according to the principles of governmental neutrality,
social toleration, and individual autonomy. The private domestic
sphere, in contrast, is governed by a quite different constellation of
values oriented around the affective virtues of love, trust, and
human dependence. More pointedly, the organic transmission of
shared values and beliefs that characterizes family life has been
considered antithetical to the studied neutrality and tolerant respect
13 0

of liberal politics.

The realms of public and private life, although antithetical, have
not been seen as incompatible. The private domestic sphere has
traditionally been thought to offer a necessary refuge from the
relentlessly amoral, individualistic concerns of public life.'- The
domestic sphere has also been viewed as the place where human
beings cultivate their individual values and beliefs free from
government control. Because the domestic sphere is understood to
be a central arena for the formation of individual values and beliefs,
liberalism has traditionally sought to set strict limits on the power
of the state to intervene in family matters. The constitutional
doctrine of family privacy stands as the most forceful embodiment
within contemporary legal doctrine of liberalism's concern for
preserving this "private realm of family life which the state cannot
13 2

enter."

A fundamental flaw in the traditional liberal distinction between
the public realm of politics and the private realm of family life lies
in the fact that government has always exerted a powerful, and often
130

See LINDA J. NICHOLSON, GENDER AND HISTORY:

THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL

THEORY IN THE ACE OFTHE FAMILY 43-44 (1986) (noting that, according to traditional
doctrine, the home represents a refuge from the sphere of business and politics, a
"domain where morality, concern for others, sensibility, and feelings [are] allowed to
exist"); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal

Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (1983) (noting that within the family "[t]he good
of all is ... achieved not by each family member's pursuit of individual goals, but
rather by sharing and sacrifice among family members"). I discuss this subject in
greater detail in Anne C. Dailey, ConstitutionalPrivacy and theJust Family, 67 TUL. L.
REv. 955, 964-72 (1993).
131

See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD:

BESIEGED
at xiii (1977).
1
2 Pince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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primary, influence within the domestic sphere.'
In addition to
the infinite ways in which the law indirectly affects family life,'
state laws directly govern who may marry, when they may marry, the
consequences of divorce, and, perhaps most important, the terms
and obligations of parenthood. 1 5 While the state cannot prevent
fertile couples from bearing a child, the law monitors parental
fitness by way of abuse and neglect statutes, and the states all claim
the ultimate power to terminate parental rights altogether. Most
dramatically, at moments of family transition, whether upon
divorce, death, or the intervention of child welfare agencies, the
state assumes authority for determining key issues of family life. In
addition to financial matters, the state determines what is in the
best interests of the child, an open-ended legal standard that
requires the decision-maker to draw upon substantive values and
ideals surrounding the welfare of children. 36 State legislatures
and courts are deeply engaged in an ongoing process of shaping,
articulating, and enforcing community norms concerning the good
life for families and their children.
The states' strong presence in the realm of family life is not
merely an unfortunate departure from the ideal liberal state. Family
privacy in the sense of freedom from governmental influence or
control is an incoherent idea. It is impossible to imagine how an
ordered society would evolve or survive with a domestic sphere
entirely free of governmental regulation. The pervasive presence of
law within the sphere of family life is not an historical accident, but
37
a defining attribute of kinship relations within human society.
ISS I discuss this point in greater detail in Dailey, supra note 130, at 997-1008.
Susan Okin also describes how "the liberal state has regulated and controlled the
family, in innumerable ways, and in such ways as to reinforce patriarchy." Susan M.
Okin, HumanistLiberalism, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 12, at 39,
42 (emphasis omitted); see also Pateman, supra note 129, at 295 ("Feminists have
emphasized how personal circumstances are structured by public factors, by laws
about rape and abortion, by the status of 'wife', by policies on childcare and the
allocation of welfare benefits and the sexual division of labour in the home and
workplace.").
" Examples of law's indirect effects on family life may be found in the areas of
criminal law, taxation, estate planning, insurance law, labor law, contract law, tort law,
and property law. See, e.g., Dailey, supranote 130, at 1001-02 (describing statutes that
extinguish rape claims within the marital context as "[o]ne example of the law's
historical role in setting the terms of family relationships").
" For examples of state laws and cases governing these areas of the family, see
infra notes 236-60 and accompanying text.
" See infra part II.C.2.
1
7 See e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 3 (1980) (noting that "anthropological studies
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Even in primitive cultures, the public regulation of intimate
relations imposes a necessary organizing structure on human
instincts, desires, and emotions, a structure that serves to stabilize
the social foundation for the development of more advanced
economic and political systems.13
It is inconceivable that any
society could operate in the absence of laws defining, organizing,
and regulating the social and economic aspects of primary kinship
relations.
Impractical under any circumstances, the concept of family
privacy is also vulnerable to critique from within the traditional
liberal paradigm. To the extent that the legal doctrine of family
privacy seeks to prevent the state from intervening in the governance of family life, it actually reinforces the authority of the
domestic community over its individual members. Family privacy
thus transgresses the fundamental liberal commitment to individual
autonomy, understood as the capacity of each individual to
determine for herself in what manner she will lead her life."3 9 The
expansive development of the constitutional right of individual
privacy in matters of family life beginning in the early 1970s 4 '
of cultures far removed in character from so-called civilized societies have turned up
virtually none which lacked a family life," and defining family life to include "socially
recognized and defined" rights and duties).
135 Claude L6vi-Strauss writes:
[I]t will never be sufficiently emphasized that, if social organization had a
beginning, this could only have consisted in the incest prohibition since...
the incest prohibition is, in fact, a kind of remodeling of the biological
conditions of mating and procreation (which know no rule, as can be seen
from observing animal life) compelling them to become perpetuated only in
an artificial framework of taboos and obligations. It is there, and only there,
that we find a passage from nature to culture, from animal to human
life ....
Claude L6vi-Strauss, The Family, in MAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 261, 278 (Harry L.
Shapiro ed., 1956); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 228 (1983) (noting that "[t]he rules of kinship are an
anthropological feast"). Although Walzer recognizes that formal and informal
regulations "constitute an elaborate system of rules" governing kinship, id., he
nevertheless overemphasizes, in my view, the "opposition of kinship and politics,"
which to him is "very old, perhaps primordial." Id. at 229. Obviously, I do not agree
with Walzer that "legislators ordinarily deal with [the rules of kinship] only at the
margins or after the fact." Id. at 228.
"9The modern women's movement, with its early emphasis on "the personal is
political," Dailey, supra note 130, at 1018, fortified this individualistic critique of
family privacy. Women's claim to equality and autonomy within the marital
relationship dramatically undercut the ideological power of family privacy. See id. at
1018-21.
4
o See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (striking down a
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underscores the radically individualistic impulses of traditional
liberal theory. Taken to their extreme, such impulses eventually
threaten to extinguish the legal authority of all communal enterpris141
es that stand between the individual and the liberal state.
Our understanding of the relationship between the liberal state
and the family has thus evolved in the last few decades. No longer
shielded from public view, the relations among spouses and children
have been opened to evaluation against liberal principles. In
general, the courts have moved in the direction of reconceiving
marriage in liberal terms as an equal, contractual relationship
designed to fulfill individual interests. 142 Viewing the spousal
relationship as a domestic partnership rather than as an organic
entity allows courts to promote the liberal values of individual
autonomy and governmental neutrality. Under this contractual view
of marriage, individuals may design the terms of their own relationships without governmental interference. Although the state may
still impose certain limited duties on spouses, 143 in many important ways individuals are now free to negotiate the terms of their
own marital relationships.
The expansion of individual rights within the domestic sphere,
however, has not entirely eradicated the rhetoric of family privacy
from legal discourse.1 44 The doctrine of family privacy may no
state abortion law requiring a married woman to obtain the prior consent of her
spouse); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,452-53
(1972) (recognizing the right of unmarried individuals to obtain contraceptives).
.4.
See Frug,supra note 44, at 1088 (arguing that "[t]he evolution of liberalism...
can be understood as an undermining of the vitality of all groups that... held an
intermediate position between what we now think of as the sphere of the individual
and 14that
of the state").
2
See Dailey, supra note 130, at 972-79 (discussing the liberalization of the family).
'43See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-37 (West Supp. 1995) (imposing a duty
on each spouse to support his or her family).
144See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (describing "the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the
relationships that develop within the unitary family"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 191 (1986) (limiting the right of privacy to activity connected to "family,
marriage [and] procreation"); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618
(1984) (arguing that the Constitution "must afford the formation and preservation of
certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State"); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our
jurisprudence has reflected Western Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children."); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (stating that "the liberty
interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought,
not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights"); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
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longer shield the marital relationship from public scrutiny, but it
continues to control the state's ability to intervene in the parentchild relationship on behalf of the child. Although courts and
commentators still conceive of family privacy in terms of negative
liberty-keeping the government out of family affairs-upon closer
examination the doctrine of family privacy in fact reveals itself to be
a means for the enforcement of parental rights over children. The
core meaning of family privacy has come to revolve around "the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."'
Far from keeping
government out of the domestic realm, the doctrine of family
privacy puts the power of the state behind46the exercise of parental
authority over the lives of their children.1
The right of parental authority presents a problem for liberalism, since the recognition and enforcement of parental rights entails
a corresponding denial of the right of children to direct their own
lives. Obviously, no one would suggest that infants have the
capacity to be self-governing. Nevertheless, the reality of childhood
dependence need not inescapably translate into parental rights.
Moreover, to say that the law must recognize parental rights because
to do so is in the best interests of children, while possibly true as a
general matter, would seem to contravene the basic liberal commitment to governmental neutrality on questions of the good life.'
All disputes that raise the issue of parental authority to some degree
pose a challenge to the parents' substantive values and beliefs. In
some cases, a third party might claim to offer a superior home
environment for the child, a closer psychological bond, or a
healthier life; in others, an older child herself might assert the right
to make educational, medical, or life-style decisions against her
parents' wishes. In all such cases, absent serious abuse or neglect,
the trump card of parental authority will control the legal outcome.
U.S. 494,498 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a municipal zoning ordinance
on the ground that the law "slic[ed] deeply into the family itself" (footnote omitted)).
14.Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
146 1 develop this point in greater detail in Dailey, supra note 130, at 983-89.
147 When I refer to the liberal principle of neutrality here, I do not mean to
suggest that liberalism is wholly impartial with respect to all theories of the good,

since liberalism itself must certainly be counted as one such theory. I do mean to
suggest that, as among differing ways of life compatible with the liberal political
order, the liberal state does endeavor to remain, to the extent possible, impartial. See
Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883, 883-86
(1989) (defining liberal neutrality). For a discussion of the liberal ideal of govern.
mental neutrality, see infra part III.A.
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And, if the child runs away or a third party resorts to self-help, the
coercive power of the state will intercede on the parents' behalf. 4 '
In these situations, liberalism must be able to justify on its own
terms why, when a dispute arises between parents and children, or
between parents and third parties with respect to children, the state
automatically enforces parental authority as a fundamental right.
The liberal view of children, which traditionally rests on a model of
incompetency or impaired choice, does not itself speak to the

question of parental rights.'4 9
Unlike contemporary liberal theorists, who for the most

part have overlooked the issue of parental authority,'

the

Supreme Court has worked to justify the presence of parental

rights within a constitutional philosophy oriented around the
48

See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH.

J.L. REF. 835, 837 (1985) (noting that even "the staunchest opponents of state
intervention in the family will insist that the state reinforce parents' authority over
their children").
' See Dailey, supra note 130, at 987-88.

For exceptions, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES,
AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 254-55 (1991) (discussing how liberal
150

democracies draw the line between parental and public authority over children's
education); GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 28-33 (describing the "state of families" in
which educational authority rests with parents). Although modern scholars have been
notably silent on this issue, one can assume that justifications for parental authority
would track the traditional strands of utilitarian and rights-based liberalism. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the NuclearFamily Has Failed,70 VA. L. REV. 87g, 886-

93 (1984) (discussing the legal and theoretical foundation for exclusive parenthood).
Either strand proves unsatisfactory. A rights-basedjustification for parental authority,
constitutionally rooted in an understanding of "this Nation's history and tradition,"
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845
(1977), cannot reconcile the inherent conflict between parental authority and the
competing needs and desires of the individual child. Similarly, a utilitarian
justification cannot explain why parental authority and not the authority of intimate
caregivers, close relatives, religious authorities, or educational leaders should prevail.
Unlike their modern counterparts, classical liberal thinkers did address the
question of parental authority. In describing "Dominion Paternal," for example,
Hobbes argues that, in the state of nature, the right of parental authority would lie
with the mother who chooses to "nourish" her infant, for the infant "owe[s] its life
to the mother and is therefore obliged to obey her rather than any other, and by
consequence the dominion over it is hers." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 164 (Liberal
Arts Press, 1958) (1651). However, Hobbes qualifies this rather radical proposal for
matriarchal rights with the important caveat that "[i]f the mother be the father's
subject, the child is in the father's power." Id. at 165. Locke grounded his theory of
paternal rule, as well as the rule of the husband over the wife, in nature. See JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 146-59 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner
Publishing Co. 1947) (1690).
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liberal ideal of individual autonomy.
Forsaking traditional
rights-based and utilitarian arguments, the Court has offered
what I construe as a civic justification for parental rights.151
In the Court's view, state enforcement of parental authority legitimately serves the liberal ideal by reinforcing the parents' unique
role in preparing children to assume the responsibilities of citizenship. 152
In Bellotti v. Baird,15 1 Justice Powell elaborated on
the connection between the exercise of parental authority in the
home and the preservation of individual liberty in the political
sphere:
[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedom of minors .... "[[T]]he child
is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." ... This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept
and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens.
We have believed in this country that this process, in large
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions.
Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious,
or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of
individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus, "[i]t is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
154
hinder."

As Justice Powell explains, parents help to instill the virtues of
mature reflection and public spiritedness required of citizens if our
1 55
liberal democracy is to succeed.

"' Developing a similar argument, to which I am indebted, Nomi Stolzenberg
explores what she calls the "civic" interest in public education. See Stolzenberg, supra
note 112, at 644-60.
52
See Bartlett, supra note 150, at 892 ("The family provides the setting within
which children are raised to become stable, responsible citizens."). Like Bartlett, I
also conclude that the nuclear family and exclusive parenthood are not essential to,
and in many situations may be counter to, the developmental needs of children in the
liberal state.
1 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 637-38 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted) (second alteration in original)).
1's For Supreme Court decisions affirming the importance of parental authority,
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The Supreme Court's defense of the importance of the parental
role is intuitively satisfying, for most of us share an unyielding sense
that parents do provide something for their children that is beyond
the reach of governmental expertise. The view that what parents
provide is instruction in the art of political citizenship, however,
resonates with a vision of parental authority more commonly associated with the civic republican tradition than with liberalism. Family
historians have recently begun to explore the antifederalists' emphasis on the family's essential role in inculcating the civic virtue required of citizenship in a republican state. "Though other institutions such as the common school and the church shared its duties,
molding the nation's young into virtuous republicans and competent
burghers became more clearly the primary responsibility of the
family."156 Linda Kerber points out that the primary political
responsibility for raising virtuous citizens during the revolutionary
era was assigned to mothers.1 57 Perhaps surprisingly, therefore,
the liberal defense of parental authority implicitly invokes an ideal

see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
11 GROSSBERG, supra note 121, at 8.
157 See LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 22-30 (1980). Professor Kerber elaborates on the role of
the Republican Mother during the revolutionary era:
The Republican Mother's life was dedicated to the service of civic virtue:
she educated her sons for it, she condemned and corrected her husband's
lapses from it. If, according to ... [one] commonly accepted claim, the
stability of the nation rested on the persistence of virtue among its citizens,
then the creation of virtuous citizens was dependent on the presence of
wives and mothers who were well informed, "properly methodical," and free
of "invidious and rancorous passions." It was perhaps more than mere
coincidence that virut was derived from the Latin word for man, with its
connotations of virility. Political action seemed somehow inherently
masculine. Virtue in a woman seemed to require another theater for its
display. To that end the theorists created a mother who had a political
purpose and argued that her domestic behavior had a direct political
function in the Republic.
Id. at 229; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 121, at 7-8 ("By charging homes with the
vital responsibility of molding the private virtue necessary for republicanism to
flourish, the new nation greatly enhanced the importance of women's family duties.");
BERNARD WISHY, THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC: THE DAWN OF MODERN AMERICAN
CHILD NURTURE 24-33 (1968) (discussing the republican view of the American

mother's role in the molding of future generations).
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of the Republican Mother 5 ' historically rooted in the political
thought of civic republicanism.
Long overlooked, the concept of parental rights turns out to be
central to the liberal project. The importance of parental authority
would seem to lie in the fact that the essential virtues of liberal
citizenship can only be acquired in the context of intimate human
relationships. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized,
"the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."159 Yet
the Court's explanation of parental rights leaves some questions
unanswered. What exactly are the virtues of liberal citizenship?
And why is the state itself incapable of instilling these virtues in its
future citizens? By exploring these questions in the following two
Sections, I hope to give some insight into the need for parental
authority in the liberal state, as well as an understanding of what is
at stake politically when the government assumes responsibility, as
it must, for regulating family life.
B. Liberal Citizenship and Civic Character
The obligations of citizenship in the liberal state are generally
understood to implicate the form of political participation rather
than the substance of political beliefs. Under liberalism, no one is
required to adhere to any particular values or ideas; 160 even in its
most robust form, what liberalism requires of its citizens is a
tolerant disposition, rational habits of thought, and a willingness to
engage in political discourse, what we may refer to as "civic
character."1 6 Although not tied to any particular value system,
" I borrow the term "Republican Mother" from KERBER, supra note 157, at 228.

Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman identify a modern version of the Republican
Mother in the theory of "maternal citizenship." As they explain, maternal citizenship
theorists "focus on the family, and mothering in particular, as the school of

responsibility and virtue." Will Kymlicka &Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A
Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theoty, 104 ETHICs 352, 364-65 (1994).

m Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
0 For one of the more well-known statements of this view, see West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
.6.
As critics of traditional liberalism have shown, it is certainly possible to
promote a minimalist theory ofliberalism that requires very little of citizens, perhaps

only the effort it takes to cast a vote. See BARBER, supra note 12, at 6-11 (describing
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civic character does entail commitment to a political way of life. It
implies a measure of critical distance from all beliefs and values, a
somewhat dispassionate and intellectual perspective from which

the "anarchist" disposition in liberalism). My understanding of liberalism assumes a
meaningful degree of democratic participation on the part of citizens, although I do
not mean to exclude the usefulness and necessity of representative politics for the
American system. See GALSTON, supra note 150, at 247 (observing that "in liberal
democracies, representative institutions replace direct self-government for many
purposes"). But see BARBER, supra note 12, at xiv (contending that "[r]epresentation
destroys participation and citizenship"); cf. id. (defining strong democracy "as a form
of government in which all of the people govern themselves in at least some public
matters at least some of the time").
Amy Gutmann employs the term "democratic character" in the same sense as my
use of the term "civic character." See GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 50-52. Gutmann's
term highlights the ambiguous and uneasy relationship between liberalism and
democracy within the American political tradition. Contemporary theorists seeking
to correct for what they see as traditional liberalism's overvaluation of individual
liberty have begun to emphasize the importance of the community-affirming aspects
of participatory democracy. In addition to Amy Gutmann, see BARBER, supra note 12,
at xi (arguing that "what little democracy we have had in the West has been
repeatedly compromised by the liberal institutions with which it has been undergirded
and the liberal philosophy from which its theory and practice have been derived");
cf. GALSTON, supra note 150, at 246-48 (correcting for what he views as the recent
overemphasis on democracy at the expense of liberty, as exemplified in Gutmann's
work). Theorists such as Gutmann and Barber who promote the ideal of participatory democracy are not too far off from those communitarian theorists who, while
purporting to reject liberalism altogether, nevertheless (and necessarily) retain a
commitment to the concept of individual autonomy. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE 139 (1982) (noting that "unless some principle
of individuation other than a merely empirical one can be found, the danger.., is
the drift into a radically situated subject"); see also infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of autonomy in prevailing communitarian
thought).
As theorists have begun to explore the interconnections between individual
autonomy and community life, the boundaries marking off the categories of
liberalism and communitarianism have blurred, and participatory democracy has
seemed to emerge as a central feature of both traditions. See Kymlicka & Norman,
supra note 158, at 361 ("The modern civic republican tradition is an extreme form of
participatory democracy largely inspired by Machiavelli and Rousseau (who were in
turn enamored with the Greeks and Romans)."). The question upon which liberal
and communitarian theorists seem to be converging is whether a reinvigorated form
of participatory democracy, sustained by responsible citizens engaged in political
dialogue, can generate enough of a shared identity to constitute community in the
"thick" sense without sacrificing the central liberal value of individual autonomy. See
GALSTON, supra note 150, at 44 (promoting "a nonneutral, substantive liberalism
committed to its own distinctive conception of the good"); Robert C. Post, Between
Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (promoting the
concept of "democratic community"); Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The LiberalCommunitarianDebate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 12, at 159-60
(describing the possibility of "holist[ic]" social theory).
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citizens may together deliberate "competing conceptions of the
Liberalism assumes that
good life and the good society."16
individuals so equipped with the habits of rational thought and
critical deliberation share the intellectual tools necessary for
communal engagement in the art of political dialogue. 163 At their
best, liberal citizens exhibit more than tolerance; they make a
patient and empathetic effort to understand and appreciate the
differences of others,' The ideal liberal can thus be defined by
reasonable, empathetic, persuasive,
personality type: tolerant,
1 65
honest, and clear-thinking.
162 GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 44. William Galston takes issue with the idea, as
presented by Gutmann, that liberalism requires citizens capable of rational
deliberation among competing ways of life. See GALSTON, supra note 150, at 252-53.
In his view, "[c]ivic tolerance of deep differences is perfectly compatible with
unswerving belief in the correctness of one's own way of life." Id. at 253. Galston
assumes, however, that the "examined life" necessarily fosters skepticism and is
therefore "incompatible with ways of life guided by unquestioned authority or
unswerving faith." Id. at 253-54. In my view, Galston errs in assuming that the
element of rationality almost universally cited as among the essential attributes of the
liberal citizen necessarily entails a skeptical or relativistic outlook; it may only require
that the individual be capable of reflecting upon and publicly defending her deeply
held beliefs. Moreover, to the extent that the capacity for self-reflection does entail
some degree of skeptical distance from one's beliefs, Galston himself should have no
reason to object since he already concedes that "[s]ome measure of reflection, or at
least critical distance, is likely to result" from the mere knowledge of the existence of
competing ways of life in the liberal state. Id. at 255. I discuss the capacity for selfreflection as the defining aspect of liberal autonomy below. See infra notes 182-93
and accompanying text.
"6' See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 158, at 352 (observing that "the health and
stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its 'basic
structure' but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens").
1641 discuss the feminist contribution of empathy to the liberal character in
Feminism'sReturn to Liberalism. See Dailey, supra note 12, at 1278-85; see also BARBER,
supranote 12, at 174-75 (positing empathy as an essential attribute of citizenship for
his theory of strong democracy).
165 Cf. GALSTON, supra note 150, at 221-27 (describing the liberal virtues as
including courage, law-abidingness, loyalty, independence, toleration, capacity to
discern and respect the rights of others, and a willingness to engage in public
discourse); GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 44 (describing "those character traits, such
as honesty, religious toleration, and mutual respect for persons, that serve as
foundations for rational deliberation of differing ways of life"); MACEDO, supra note
12, at 251 (describing the "ideal liberal personality" as characterized by "reflective
self-awareness, active self-control, a willingness to engage in self-criticism, an openness
to change, and critical support for the public morality of liberal justice"); Kymlicka
& Norman, supra note 158, at 353 (including a sense of identity, toleration for
differences, political participation, and economic self-reliance as among the qualities
necessary for democratic citizenship); Shklar, supra note 129, at 33 (describing
liberalism as requiring "habits of patience, self-restraint, respect for the claims of
others, and caution").
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Although the qualities that define citizenship in the liberal state,

the so-called civic virtues, 16 6 may seem to go more to style than
substance, they nevertheless clearly raise questions concerning
liberalism's professed commitment to the value of governmental
neutrality. The obligations of civic virtue in the liberal state quite
obviously limit and, to some extent, mandate the content and range
of the individual's substantive beliefs. 167 In appreciation of this
inconsistency, liberal theorists have moved quite willingly in the
direction of recognizing the inherent tension between liberalism's
stated neutrality with respect to competing ways of life and its

"' See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 158, at 365 (describing the importance of
civic virtue "to liberal virtue theorists" such as Gutmann, Macedo, and Galston). The
use of the phrase "civic virtue" in this context is somewhat confusing, as civic virtue
has traditionally been associated with the civic republican demand that individuals
subordinate their personal interests to the politics of the common good. See e.g.,
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADMON 74 (1975); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18-19
(1986). William Galston notes that liberalism as traditionally conceived was
understood as an effort to sever political life from a reliance on individual virtue. See
GALSTON, supra note 150, at 213-14. Following Galston, Kymlicka, and others, I
understand liberal virtue to mean the individual character or qualities necessary for
liberalism to "sustain" or "reproduce" itself. See id. at 214 ("For Charles Taylor and
his fellow communitarians, liberalism undercut the very possibility of community and
thus the significance of the virtues, understood as the habits needed to sustain a
common life."); GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 40 ("The justification for teaching
[democratic] virtues is that they constitute the kind of character necessary to create
a society committed to conscious social reproduction."). The liberal appeal to civic
virtue is part of recent efforts to refocus attention on the communal dimensions of
liberal
167 politics.
See GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 42 ("A democratic state of education constrains
choice among good lives not only out of necessity but out of a concern for civic
virtue."); MACEDO, supra note 12, at 258-59 ("Liberalism ... rules out certain
conceptions of the good life altogether: any that entail the violation of liberal
rights."); WISHY, supra note 157, at 136-58 (discussing the role of families and public
schools in a child's moral and civic upbringing); Stolzenberg, supra note 112, at 659
("[T]he liberal individualist commitment to the 'free mind'.. . requires a certain kind
of education-namely, education in the value of diversity, reason, and individual
choice."). As Professor Stolzenberg explores, the inculcation of liberal virtues, or the
liberal "way of life," has recently come under attack by fundamentalist religious
groups claiming that their way of life is incompatible with the development of critical
faculties in their children. See id. These parents claim that the public education in
civic virtue, with its emphasis on toleration rather than belief, threatens those
religious communities founded upon faith rather than upon reason. See id. at 596-97.

The fundamentalist debate over public education suggests that liberalism may simply
be unable to accommodate some forms of illiberal community, a necessary concession
to intolerance at the margins of social life in the name of political self-preservation.
See GALSTON, supra note 150, at 253; GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 30; Kymlicka &
Norman, supra note 158, at 367.
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insistence on the liberal way of life itself. Although liberalism does
endorse the civic virtues of rational reflection, civil dialogue and
toleration over unreflective sermonizing and moral dogmatism,
liberal theorists generally construe these virtues as first-order norms
that serve to establish a political framework within which competing
In this way, the values
values and ways of life may flourish."
promoted by liberalism are viewed as facilitative rather than
restrictive of human freedom; the framework that they establish is
understood to nurture rather than oppress the diverse and creative
strivings of the human spirit.
While the importance of civic character to liberal politics may be
self-evident, the assumption that only parents can instill civic virtue
is not. Indeed, public education has traditionally been viewed as an
important, if not the primary, means by which individuals acquire
the intellectual skills of rational thought and critical deliberation
demanded by liberal citizenship. 6 ' Furthermore, to the extent
Irs See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 203 (1985) (noting that
liberalism is not a "way of life," but rather a principle of political organization);JOHN
RAWiS, POLIrrCAL LIBERALISM 190-94 (1993) (arguing that all citizens share a sense
ofjustice that is not dependent on "any particular... doctrine"). Although critical
of liberalism, Michael Sandel affirms this point:
What is neutral about the principles of right is not that they admit all
possible values and ends but rather that they are derived in a way that does
not depend on any particular values or ends. To be sure, once the
principles of justice, thus derived, are on hand, they rule out certain
ends-they would hardly be regulative if they were incompatible with
nothing-but only those that are unjust, that is, only those inconsistent with
principles which do not themselves depend for their validity on the validity
of any particular way of life. Their neutrality describes their foundation, not
their effect.
SANDEL, supra note 161, at 12. Other theorists simply abandon the claim to
neutrality. For example, Gutmann states:
Democratic education is not neutral among conceptions of the good life, nor
does its defense depend on a claim to neutrality. Democratic education is
bound to restrict pursuit, although not conscious consideration, of ways of
life dependent on the suppression of politically relevant knowledge.
Democratic education supports choice among those ways of life that are
compatible with conscious social reproduction.
GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 46; see also GALSTON, supra note 150, at 96 ("[To reject
neutrality] is certainly not to say that the bias of liberalism is as systematically
constraining, as hostile to full human diversity, as are other forms of political life.");
RAZ, supra note 12, at 110-33 (discussing political neutrality and its relation to liberal
theory).
169
See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987). The
Court of Appeals upheld the use of certain school texts against the challenge that
they promoted secular humanism in violation of the First Amendment. In its
opinion, the Court noted:
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that families may have strongly held religious, ethnic, or other
communal affiliations, it is not at all clear that parents can be relied
upon to instill the virtues of rational thought, toleration, and public
spiritedness in their children. It may be that, with regard to habits
of thinking and respect for differences, the liberal state is in a better
position than parents to prepare children for the responsibilities of
17 0
public life.
If in fact parents are not any better situated than the state to
instill the qualities of citizenship in maturing children, then what,
if anything, is left of the liberal defense of parental rights?
Certainly something underlies our instinct that parents serve an
essential and unique role in raising their children to become
responsible citizens. If the cultivation of rational thought, toleration, and public spiritedness may be carried out by public institutions, then we need to ask whether we have overlooked some critical
aspect of civic character that is not amenable to state instruction or
control, an attribute that must be nurtured into being within close
affective relations.
Quite clearly, the individual quality most
important to the liberal world view, yet so far missing from the
71
account of parental authority, is autonomy.

[T]he message conveyed [in the school texts] is one of a governmental
attempt to instill in Alabama public school children such values as independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance
and logical decision-making. This is an entirely appropriate secular effect.
Indeed, one of the major objectives of public education is the "inculcat[ion
of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system."
Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (quoting
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,77 (1979) (alteration in original))); see also GALSTON,
supra note 150, at 241 (noting that the "necessity... of civic education ha[s] been
accepted without question"); GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 49 ("Education... forms
the moral character of citizens.. . ."); WALZER, supranote 138, at 197 (arguing that
education is a "program for social survival"); Shklar, supra note 129, at 33 (arguing
that the aims of liberal education should be to foster "well-informed and selfdirected" citizens). Benjamin Barber concludes that formal education is least useful
for instilling civic virtue in a true participatory democracy, although he defines formal
education in terms of imparting substantive knowledge, appearing to overlook the
educational goal of cultivating critical habits of thinking. See BARBER, supra note 12,
at 234.
170 See GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 29-30; Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 158, at
364-65; Mary G. Dietz, Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal
Thinking, 13 POL. THEORY 19, 20-21 (1985).
17' For a classic expression of the centrality of autonomy to liberal thought,
see
JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 13 (Emery E. Neff ed., 1926) ("The
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of

FEDERALISM AND FAMILIES

1841

It may come as no surprise that autonomy does not figure
prominently in a discussion of parental rights, since at first glance
the concept of individual autonomy and the exercise of parental
authority appear directly at odds. Indeed, it is because the exercise
of parental authority seems to override the autonomy of children
that a problem arises for liberalism in the first place. In common
terms, autonomy is generally understood to involve the capacity for
self-government, the ability to direct one's life in deliberate ways,
and the assumption of responsibility for one's beliefs and actions.1 72 The exercise of autonomy implies independence, separateness, and self-control; thus, it would seem to lie at the opposite
extreme from the childhood condition of dependence and subordination.'
Indeed, with some important exceptions, the law does
not consider individuals to be fully autonomous until they reach the
age of majority; 7 4 until then, their beliefs and intentions are not
entitled to legal recognition. Upon turning of age, the child
emerges from the protective womb of parental authority as a selfgoverning citizen of the liberal state.
This concept of autonomy, which plays such a central part in
liberal theory, has come under prolonged and serious attack in

right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign."). In the discussion of autonomy that follows, I do not intend to enter into
the more ambitious philosophical debate concerning its precise meaning within
liberalism. For a recent overview and reconceptualization of the concept of autonomy
in legal and political thought, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46
STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994).
"' Richard Fallon rightly notes that autonomy "is a protean concept, which means
different things to different people." Fallon, supra note 171, at 876. For purposes
of this Article, I nevertheless assume that all conceptions of autonomy presuppose
some idea of an acting, self-conscious, responsible self. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 12,
at 369 ("The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some
degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their
lives."); see also Michelman, supra note 166, at 26 (noting that Kant believed freedom
was a mixture of will and self-knowledge); Fallon, supra note 171, at 877 ("To be
autonomous, one must be able to form a conception of the good, deliberate
rationally, and act consistently with one's goals."); Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 8 ("The
image of humans as self-determining creatures.., remains one of the most powerful
dimensions of liberal thought.").
1" Some writers also stress that the concept of autonomy necessarily incorporates
the capacity for rational thought. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 171, at 887. I am
somewhat hesitant to define autonomy in terms of rationality, unless we view the
concept of rationality itself as capacious enough to embrace intuitive, emotional,
instinctual, and religious thinking.
1" The major exception in most states is an older child's right to seek legal
emancipation under certain circumstances. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-150b (West 1986).
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recent years, most prominently on the ground that autonomy as
traditionally understood rests upon a misguided theory of the
individual self. Originally associated with communitarian theorists,
this now widespread critique focuses upon the "atomistic" view of
human nature thought to underlie liberal theory. 175 "The liberal
psychology of human nature is founded on a radical premise no less
startling for its familiarity: man is alone. We are born into the
world solitary strangers, live our lives as wary aliens, and die in
fearful isolation." 176 In the atomistic world, individuality precedes
the world of social relations, and community consists in the coming
together of these solitary, independent, bounded selves. As Michael
Sandel describes, the "unencumbered" self of traditional liberal
theory exists "beyond the reach of its experience, " 177 an organic
subject who steps, fully formed, into the social relationships and
communal affiliations that comprise its world. Critics of atomism
175For

strong-communitarian critics of atomism, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER

VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1984)
(1981); SANDEL, supra note 161, at 150. For liberal-communitarian critics ofatomism,
see 2 TAYLOR, supra note 12; Benjamin R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of
Consent, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 12, at 54, 62. For feminist
critics, see ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983);
Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocatingthe Community, 99
ETHICs 275 (1989); Nedelsky, supra note 12; Okin, supra note 133, at 41; Iris M.
Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM 300,307 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990). For critical-theory views of
atomism, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
InterpretivismandNeutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781,783-85 (1983). See generally
Will Kymlicka, Liberalism and Communitarianism,18 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 181 (1988)
(defending liberalism against these critiques).
176BARBER, supra note 12, at 68. As Barber describes, the "genius" of liberalism
once lay in its ability to transform what it saw as the unavoidable solitude and
isolation of the human condition into the redemptive promise of political freedom
and self-realization. See id. at 69-70. He elaborates:
It was only with the Renaissance that man's essential aloneness came to be
construed as a liberation rather than a purgatory. It has been liberalism's
genius to transform the unavoidable into the desirable, the fate worse than
death into the ideal life, and the invisible walls keeping us out of the Garden
into bulwarks protecting us from its seductive communal intimacies. There
is no redemption, only the paradise of solitude. In the new worldly nirvana,
the struggle to overcome and to transcend isolation is supplanted by the
struggle to fortify it with rights and to undergird it with liberty and power.
Communion comes to mean interference, exile becomes privacy. The
kinship of tribalism and feudal relations and the citizenship of the classical
polis are alike identified as bonds, and community itself comes to be
understood as slavery.
Id.

17 Sandel, supra note 45, at 86.
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rightly contend that individual identity does not emerge in isolated,
transcendent singularity, but develops over time from within a
complex set of human relations and communal affiliations."7 Not
only within political theory, but across diverse disciplines, 179 we
have come to understand human identity as situated rather than
abstract, permeable rather than bounded, relational rather than
independent.
From the discussion so far, it might appear that the critique of
"atomistic" man also casts strong doubt on our conventional
understanding of autonomy.
If the situated self is essentially
reactive, then how can we conceive of an individual's self-determining conduct? Is autonomy incompatible with a view of the self as
constituted by communal forces? It may be true that a conception
of the radically (or wholly) situated self would be difficult to
reconcile with any familiar conception of autonomy, and would thus
prove to be a thoroughly illiberal idea. But such a conception
would also be difficult to reconcile with any reasonable conception
of individual liberty.
Certainly the theorists who endorse the
concept of the situated self do not propose that human identity is
178 See BARBER, supra note 12, at 90 ("It is from common rather than individual

consciousness-from generations of communal labor and not the passingwhimsies of
individuals-that the enduring features of human identity are born.").
179See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983)
(literary theory); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978) (history);
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) (anthropology); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN
FEMINISM (1986) (science); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989) (philosophy). Freud, of course, may be viewed as the
first to have posited a situated conception of the self to the extent he believed that
primary family relations (in addition to innate drives) define who we are. His Oedipal
theory, however, also has strong elements of biological determinism, relegating
individuals to predictable psychic outcomes depending upon their gender; the
classical Freudian understanding of the Oedipus complex may also be seen as unduly
deterministic by locating the origin of adult neuroses exclusively in childhood conflict.
Yet, one must concede, the transformative promise of psychoanalytic insight itself
would seem to undercut the theory's deterministic slant.
Contemporary psychoanalysis now grapples with the implications of the situated
self for its own theories. For an overview, see STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, HOPE AND
DREAD IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 95-122 (1993) (discussing the contribution of objectrelations theory to the psychoanalytic understanding of the self); see also MALCOLM
BOWIE, LACAN 76 (1991) (noting that the Freudian subject "is no longer a substance
endowed with qualities, or a fixed shape possessing dimensions... : it is a series of
events within language, a procession of turns, tropes and inflections"). For a
discussion of object-relations theory in psychoanalysis, see infra note 201 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the psychoanalytic process as metaphor for
(and clinical manifestation of) the "self-in-process," see infra note 184.
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entirely constituted by outside forces, for to do so would collapse
the theory of the situated self into a theory of cultural and biological determinism entirely at odds with the tenets of both liberalism
and democracy. 8 ° And so it seems that the situated self is not
wholly reactive to exogenous forces. We are only partly constituted
by social relations.'8 1 Something of us exists along with our
culturally-inscribed values and beliefs, and that something looks
suspiciously like a capacity to act in a morally responsible-or

"autonomous"-way.
Autonomy is not exclusively an attribute of the atomistic
conception of selfhood. The theory of the situated self views
autonomy in terms of the innate human capacity to act upon
culturally-inscribed beliefs and values, to embrace or to reject them,
in a process of self-reflection and self-understanding that ideally
produces a coherent, if unstable, personal identity.'82 What lies
at the heart of situated (as opposed to atomistic) autonomy is self" Such a proposal would also certainly be at odds with emancipatory political
theories such as feminism. See Dailey, supra note 12, at 1272-73; see also BARBER,
supra note 12, at 134 n.23 (noting that "every democratic theory requires a commitment to the reality of human agency"); Toril Moi, Introduction to THE KRISTEVA
READER 1, 15 (Toril Moi ed., 1986) ("[Slome concept of agency (of asubject of action)
is essential to any political theory worthy of the name."). It sometimes appears that
feminist scholars in the relational domain come dangerously close to advocating a
deterministic theory of the female self. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (examining the
ways in which women's moral development differs from men); Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 21 (1988) (arguing that "[w]omen are
more empathic to the lives of others because women are physically tied to the lives
of others in a way which men are not").
"'1See Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITics 5 (Michael
J. Sandel ed., 1984). As Sandel argues in his introduction:
Communitarian critics of rights-based liberalism say we cannot conceive
ourselves as independent in this way, as bearers of selves wholly detached
from our aims and attachments. They say that certain of our roles are partly
constitutive of the persons we are-as citizens of a country, or members of a
movement, or partisans of a cause.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added); see also SANDEL, supra note 161, at 179 (describing the
"more or less enduring attachments and commitments which taken together partly
define the person I am" (emphasis added)); GUTMANN, supra note 12, at 45 (arguing
that in a democracy "citizens are persons partially constituted by subcommunities"
(emphasis added)); MACINTYRE, supranote 175, at 220 ("I inherit from the past of my

family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful
expectations and obligations [that are] in part what give[] my life its own moral
particularity." (emphasis added)).
"82 For theorists who ascribe to a conception of the situated self but who also
expressly embrace the concept of individual autonomy, see MACEDO, supra note 12,
at 213-27; McClain, supra note 12, at 1190; Post, supra note 161, at 174.
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reflection (as opposed to choice)."' To the extent that it involves
self-reflection, autonomy is inward-directed, but it is not wholly selfregarding in the atomistic sense; situated autonomy is also profoundly other-regarding. We develop a mature sense of identity by
confronting, reconciling, embracing, repressing, or rejecting the
values and beliefs that we receive from the world into which we
were born and in which we live.18 4 Even the most thorough-going
theories of the situated self, those insisting on the constituent
effects of language itself,8 5 must nevertheless account for the
"'See MACEDO,

supra note 12, at 216 (defining autonomy in terms of "the

development of the capacity critically to assess and even actively shape not simply
one's actions, but one's character itself"); TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 337 (describing

"Kant'sideal of total rational self-determination [and] of free self-activity"); Kymlicka,
supranote 175, at 190 ("[T]he process of ethical reasoning is always one of comparing
one 'encumbered' potential self with another 'encumbered' potential self.");
Michelman, supra note 166, at 25-27 (describing the Kantian concept of freedom as
involving both will and self-knowledge); Okin, supra note 133, at 50 (arguing that no
goal should escape self-examination). Galston explicitly rejects the concept of
autonomy as self-reflection on the ground that "liberal freedom entails the right to
live unexamined as well as examined lives." GALSTON, supra note 150, at 254.
Although Galston contemplates that the "ways of life guided by unquestioned
authority or unswerving faith," id., are threatened by the skepticism he believes is
inherent in the practice of self-examination or self-reflection, I am not persuaded that
belief and self-understanding are inherently incompatible.
184Even as mature, responsible citizens, our identity is not static but evolving, a
"self-in-process" that continually works to remake its image in dynamic relation to the
world around it. Cf.Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, in THE KRISTEvA
READER, supra note 180, at 90-91 (discussing the "subject in process"); see also
MARGARET S. MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT 3
(1975) ("The biological birth of the human infant and the psychological birth of the
individual are not coincident in time. The former is a dramatic, observable, and wellcircumscribed event; the latter a slowly unfolding intrapsychic process."). Moreover,
at any one time our inner life may be experienced as conflictual, chaotic, and
fragmented, and over time our sense of self may radically transform, both manifestations of the contingent and unstable nature of human identity. SeeJUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 25 (1990);JANE FLAX,
DISPUTED SUBJECTS: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 92-110
(1993). The antiessentialist critique within feminism and feminist legal theory begins
with this insight. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 158-59 (1988) (criticizing feminist theory for its
essentialist view of women); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal
Theoy, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (criticizing feminist legal theory to the
extent it relies on "the notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be
isolated and described"); Martha Minow, Identities,3 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-100
(1991) (contending that law has neglected to consider the "negotiated" quality of
identities).
185 See JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 147 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977)
(arguing that "what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the
whole structure of language"). For a discussion of the place of Lacanian thought
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existence of a speaking subject, a human actor constituted by speech
but also capable of narrating his or her own life story. Situated
autonomy" 6 thus evokes the highly personal process by which the
individual comes to create a coherent identity or life story. 7 But
situated autonomy also implies a capacity for self-reflection that is
itself relational. Autonomy requires an understanding of the self in
relation to others; we come to know ourselves not in isolation but
in relationship, not through solitary silence but through communication and reflection.
The self-reflective aspect of situated autonomy has roots in a
modern psychodynamic understanding of selfiood.1 " No longer
within psychoanalytic theory and its appropriation by feminists, see NANCY J.
CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 187-98 (1989).
18 Stephen Macedo also employs the term "situated autonomy," by which he
means "[t]he active power of persons to shape who they are, to understand, control,
and shape their desires." MACEDO, supra note 12, at 225. Although his conception
of situated autonomy comes close to mine, his vision of the "strong evaluator," id. at
217, in many ways resembles the conception of the atomistic self he purports to
reject. In his view, for example, situated autonomy would rule out "[q]uiet
obedience, deference, unquestioned devotion, and humility," in favor of the "exciting
array of possibilities" that make it possible "to decide that next week I might quit my
career in banking, leave my wife and children, and join a Buddhist cult." Id. at 278.
Unfortunately, Macedo appears almost ready to celebrate the stereotypical arrogant
and narcissistic attributes of atomistic man, see id., and I am bewildered and
somewhat alarmed by his sexist example of the banker, particularly when viewed
alongside his exclusion of empathy, nurturance, and devotion from the ideal of liberal
citizenship.
Nancy Chodorow describes this process in psychoanalytic terms:
Freud ...[wanted]... to use the scrutiny of individual and self not to
celebrate fragmentation but to restore wholeness. He could not accept that
the self is the outcome of messy unconscious processes and a warring
structure, that it disallows individual morality, autonomy, and responsibility;
he wanted to reconstitute the individual and the self he had dissected. That

metapsychological dissection shows who we are, but the clinical project of
psychoanalysis is to develop individual autonomy and control in the self.
CHODOROW, supra note 185, at 155.
185 My argument here, as well as in the following Section on relational theory, see
infra part II.C.1, draws on a psychoanalytic understanding of child development and
adult therapeutic change. I recognize that psychoanalytic theory is not the only
plausible account of individual identity, nor is it the only legitimate methodology for
examining psychological growth and change. In my view, however, the psychoanalytic
model provides the most persuasive and comprehensive framework for analyzing the
liberal view of individual selfhood and moral autonomy. While I agree with critics of
psychoanalysis that Freud's theory was unduly deterministic, see, e.g., Stephen J.
Morse, FailedExplanationsand CriminalResponsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68
VA. L. REV. 971, 1016 (1982) (arguing that law "should reject all, or at least most, of
psychodynamic theory as a scientific, causal account of behavior"), I also believe that
the interpretive insights of contemporary psychoanalytic theory provide a meaningful
story of child development as well as a meaningful vision of the potential for adult
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focused exclusively on the inner dynamics of the patient's mind,
contemporary psychoanalysis now views the relationship between
analyst and analysand as the medium of self-insight. It is within the
intimate analytic relationship, that is, in the process of talking things
out with another human being, that the individual learns to create
(or more accurately recreate) a story of his life, a narrative account
that serves to integrate the splintered fragments of his life experience into a more coherent and satisfying identity. 189 The psycho-

analytic relationship captures the personal significance of conversation to self-redefinition as well as the political significance of
dialogue to the concept of situated autonomy. Deep self-reflection
entails working out one's place in the world either through actual
or imagined conversation with another; this process of self-reflection gives rise to a creative narrative we call personal identity.'
psychological change. Finally, even if one rejects psychoanalysis as a valid framework
for understanding human experience, one can still accept its premise, central to my
argument here, that the earliest relationships have a deeply formative effect on
individual identity.
189Dramatic advances in psychopharmacology, especially the recent development
of certain antidepressants such as Prozac, and what Peter D. Kramer has called the
possibility for "cosmetic pharmacology," PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC 15
(1993), have brought to public light issues concerning the extent to which biology
maybe said to determine our identity. Despite Kramer's claim for the transformative
potential of the new antidepressants (a claim which is itself controversial, see Sherwin
B. Nuland, The Pill of Pills, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, June 9, 1994, at 4, 8 (calling
Kramer's claims a "psychopharmacological fantasy")), at most biology may be
understood to set our temperament; although it may regulate our style of selfreflection (aggressive, inhibited, accepting, resistant, creative, fearful), it can never
determine the lived experience from which we form the story of our lives. See FLAX,
supra note 184, at 118-22 (discussing the relationship between temperament and
socialization in the work of D.W. Winnicott).

190See

ROY SCHAFER, RETELLING A LIFE:

NARRATION AND DIALOGUE IN

PSYCHOANALYSIS 21-35 (1992) (elaborating a narrative theory of the self). For a
discussion of the relationship between literary narrative and psychoanalysis, see PETER
BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INTENTION IN NARRATIVE at xiv (1984)
("Psychoanalysis, after all, is a primarily narrative art.. .

.").

In commenting upon

Brooks' view, John S. Rickard highlights the connection Brooks makes between
narrative, self-reflection, and the creation of identity:
The stakes are indeed high in Brooks' meditation on narrative, for it is clear
that he cannot imagine sustained thought without plot and sees narrative as
a vital and necessary element of our lives, a psychic process in which we
recognize and work through essential psychological needs for coherence and
understanding.
... Brooks sees the narrative impulse as a more urgent attempt to cope
with the human facts of our existence in the body and in time .... Plot
becomes, for Brooks, kinetic rather than static, a desire machine designed
and intended to adapt itself to the tensions inherent in the human
condition, caught as we are between an often obscure yet powerful past
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The elements of individual agency and the capacity for selfreflection central to the concept of situated autonomy prove to be

profoundly liberating in personal as well as political terms. In
personal terms, self-reflection holds out the promise of psychic
integration, the individual's capacity to bring cohesion and meaning
to the often disordered and conflicting aspects of her socially

inscribed self. 9 ' In political terms, situated autonomy retains the
concept of human agency, the idea of individual actors capable of
departing from their socially scripted roles. The concept of human
agency admits the possibility of resistance to received values and
beliefs; it accounts for social nonconformity and political dissi-

dence.'9 2 The situated self

is

thus capable of questioning as well

wherein the origins of desire are buried, and a desired future that takes its
shape from the past and present.
John S. Rickard, Introduction to PETER BROOKS, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND STORYTELLING

3 (1994). For a critical appraisal of the psychoanalytic process, see STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY
IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 525-54 (1989).
191 For a discussion of the relationship between autobiography and psychoanalysis
from a feminist literary perspective, see SHOSHANA FELMAN, WHAT DOES A WOMAN
WANT?: READING AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1-19 (1993); see also CHODOROW, supra
note 185, at 171 ("Psychoanalysis, then, is a theory of human nature with positive,
liberatory implications, a theory of people as active and creative."). Interestingly, the
communitarian Michael Sandel gives us a vivid picture of the subject "empowered to
participate in the constitution of its identity":
For a subject to play a role in shaping the contours of its identity
requires a certain faculty of reflection. Will alone is not enough. What is
required is a certain capacity for self-knowledge, a capacity for what we have
called agency in the cognitive sense....
... [T]he capacity for reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward
upon itself, to inquire into its constituent nature, to survey its various
attachments and acknowledge their respective claims, to sort out the
bounds-now expansive, now constrained-between the self and the other, to
arrive at a self-understanding less opaque if never perfectly transparent, a
subjectivity less fluid if never finally fixed, and so gradually, throughout a
lifetime, to participate in the constitution of its identity.
SANDEL, supra note 161, at 152-53.
19 I do not mean to go so far as to say that political autonomy, by which I mean
the citizen's participation in the collective process of self-government, is a condition
of personal autonomy. I associate such a view more with those strong communitarian
theorists, and in particular civic republicans, who see political identity as a primary
constitutive aspect of the individual. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION

26-27 (1958); Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour,in LIBERALISM
AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 181, at 149. I do not think citizenship must play such a
formative role in constituting personal identity, and to that extent I consider my views
here to be more solidly pluralistic. For views contrary to mine that strive to make
political participation the defining feature of liberal freedom and autonomy, see
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as accepting, doubting as well as believing, integrating as well as
destroying. She is an active, creative, subversive being, always
t
pregnant with the possibility of social and political resistance. 19
Contemporary liberalism has shown itself surprisingly hospitable
to the idea that human beings are to a large extent profoundly
shaped by human relationships and the social environment in which
they live." 4 Despite the assertions of communitarian critics, all
that liberalism must actually insist upon is that human beings
possess the capacity for assuming responsibility for socially instilled
values and beliefs. The notion of situated autonomy thus proves to
be an essential feature of contemporary efforts to reorient liberal
theory away from traditional atomistic values and toward what
Charles Taylor has termed a more "holist[ic]" political philoso95
phy."
Indeed, situated autonomy may be thought of as the
central, redemptive feature of the socially-constituted, liberal
self... 6 Without a meaningful conception of human agency, the
political ideal of individual liberty makes no sense. Situated
autonomy preserves an affirmative ideal of human freedom at the
BARBER, supra note 12, at xv ("Without participating in the common life that defines

them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat, women and men
cannot become individuals.").
"'Judith Fetterley has described this subversive self in literary terms as a
.resisting reader." See JUDITH FETrERLEY, THE RESISTING READER: A FEMINIST
APPROACH TO AMERICAN FICTION at xxii (1978) ("Clearly, then, the first act of the

feminist critic must be to become a resisting rather than an assenting reader ... to
begin the process of exorcizing the male mind that has been implanted in us.").
194See GALSTON, supra note 150, at 75 ("The revolt against traditional authority
in which liberalism originates does not entail repudiation of all social determination
of individual identity."); RAWLS, supra note 168, at 29-35 (offering a "political
conception of the person" that purports to avoid metaphysical claims); Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 488 (1989) ("We can have only the
thoughts, and ambitions, and convictions that are possible within the vocabulary that
language and culture provide, so we are all, in a patent and deep way, the creatures
of the community as a whole.").
195Taylor, supra note 161, at 159.
196 Empathy may be another. See BARBER, supra note 12, at 137 ("For what is
crucial [for strong democracy] is not consent pure and simple but the active consent
of participating citizens who have imaginatively reconstructed their own values as
public norms through the process of identifying and empathizing with the values of
others."); Dailey, supra note 12, at 1283-85 (arguing that a feminist ideal of empathy
"offers liberalism the possibility of political union built upon bonds deeper than selfinterest"). In fact, empathetic understanding may be a crucial feature of the process
ofself-reflection, as the psychotherapeutic relationship suggests. For the importance
of empathy in psychoanalytic practice and theory, see HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS
OF THE SELF: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDERS 300-07 (1971).
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same time that it stakes out the final defensive boundary against the

threat of unmediated and crushing governmental power.
C. Civic Characterand ParentalAuthority
The civic virtue of situated autonomy returns us to the question
of parental authority. Where does the self-reflective, integrated,
autonomous self that underlies the contemporary ideal of liberal
citizenship come from? Situated autonomy is not an innate
condition, a natural state of being, but an acquired capacity whose
origins lie in earliest childhood. 9
Unlike the civic virtues of
rational thought, toleration, and public-spiritedness, situated
autonomy cannot successfully be instilled through public education;
our capacity for active and responsible self-reflection is a virtue first
learned in the context of intimate human relations. 9 8
In an attempt to clarify the family's role in the developmental
process that gives rise to situated autonomy, this Section examines
with greater rigor the concept of the situated self which informs the
contemporary critique of atomism. In particular, it distinguishes
two approaches to understanding the way in which the individual
may be said to be "encumbered" by her social context. The first
view focuses on a relational model of selfhood that understands the
individual's sense of self as evolving out of primary caretaking
relationships during infancy. The second view focuses on a
communal model of identity that understands the individual's
substantive values and beliefs as originally instilled through primary
familial relations. 99 Sorting out the relational and communal
T97he fact that autonomy is to some extent itself a socially-inscribed capacity
explains why it is absent from some highly-communitarian cultures. See RAZ, supra
note 12, at 391 ("For those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment there
is no choice but to be autonomous .... ").
19 See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. Christopher Lasch, although
arguably a strong communitarian with a quite conservative agenda, focuses on the
role that the family plays in what the Frankfurt School saw as the "reproduction of
society":
If the reproduction of culture were simply a matter of formal instruction
and discipline, it could be left to the schools. But it also requires that
culture be embedded in personality. Socialization makes the individual want
to do what he has to do; the family is the agency to which society entrusts
this complex and delicate task.
LASCH, supra note 131, at 4. In a twist on the more common concept of the
"embedded self," Lasch refers here to "culture embedded in personality." Id.
"' Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell draw a similar, but more antagonistic,
distinction between communitarian and feminist critiques of the unencumbered self:
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approaches from within the general critique of atomism will help to
explain what is at stake when the liberal state assumes responsibility
for regulating family life. A deepened understanding of the concept
of situated autonomy brings us back, in Part III, to the question of
federalism and the important role that state authority over family
law plays in promoting the ideal of liberal citizenship.
1. The Relational View of the Situated Self
Critics of liberal atomism often rely upon a relational model of
selfhood, one that emphasizes the formative effect that primary
human relations, and particularly the mother-child relationship,
have on the shape of human identity."' The psychological premise of the relational model is closely related to the more general
turn within modern psychoanalytic theory away from the primacy of
the Oedipus complex toward an increasing emphasis on the
importance of the earlier pre-oedipal stage of infant development.
Object-relations theory focuses on the infant's pre-oedipal differentiation from its primary caregiver as an essential step in the develop21
ment of a separate (and psychologically healthy) sense of self.
Despite many common elements in their critique of the liberal concept of
the self, feminist and communitarian perspectives differ: whereas
communitarians emphasize the situatedness of the disembedded self in a
network of relations and narratives, feminists also begin with the situated
self but view the renegotiation of our psychosexual identities, and their

autonomousreconstitutionby individuals as essential to women's and human
liberation.
Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell, Introduction to FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON
THE POLITICS OF GENDER IN LATE-CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 1, 12-13 (Seyla Benhabib &

Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987). I agree with Benhabib and Cornell that strong
communitarian theories come close to a "traditionalism that accepts social roles

uncritically," id. at 13, but I also believe that contemporary liberalism is capacious
enough to embrace the "renegotiation" and "autonomous reconstitution" of feminist
thought.
200 See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 77-83 (1978) (analyzing the nature of the early
mother-child relationship); DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE
MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE 28-34 (1976) (discussing
the female role in early child care); OKIN, supra note 9, at 4 (studying the injustice of

the division of labor between the sexes). For criticism of the essentialist nature of
relational feminism, see infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.

0 Object-relations theory encompasses a quite diverse body of literature. For an
overview of the field, see JAY R. GREENBERG & STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, OBJECT
RELATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1983).

For object-relations theorists
specifically concerned with the primacy of the mother-infant relationship, see MAHLER
ET AL., supra note 184; D.W. WINNICoTr, THE MATURATIONAL PROCESSES AND THE
FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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One central concern of object-relations theorists is the relational
process of intrapsychic differentiation-the fact that our sense of
ourselves as distinct, bounded beings originates within relationships.
Born in a state that can only be described as the antithesis of
autonomy,20 2 we learn to negotiate the boundary between ourselves and others and to become self-governing within complex
relations characterized by dependence, trust and love. Paradoxically, relational theory teaches us that the origins of individual
203
autonomy lie in the primary human condition of dependence.

37-55 (1965).

For works by object-relations theorists, see W.R.D. FAIRBAIRN,
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES OFTHE PERSONALITY(1952); HARRY GUNTRIP, PERSONALITY
STRUCTURE AND HUMAN INTERACTION: THE DEVELOPING SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORY (1961); THOMAS H. OGDEN, THE MATRIX OF THE MIND: OBJECT
RELATIONS AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DIALOGUE (1986); Otto Kernberg, Structural
Derivatives of Object Relationships, 47 INT'LJ. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 236 (1966). In
contrast to classical Freudian theory, with its emphasis on instinctual drives and the
primary importance of the Oedipus complex, object-relations theory focuses on the
formative importance of early relationships and especially on the early mother-infant
dyad. In Mahler's view, for example, the infant initially develops a close, symbiotic
relationship with a primary caregiver, "a dual unity within one common boundary,"
MAHLER ET AL., supra note 184, at 44, and then proceeds to differentiate herself from
the caregiver in a developmental process of separation and individuation. See id.
It is interesting to note that Freud at the end of his career commented upon the
importance of the mother-child relationship in a way that foreshadowed objectrelations theory:
A child's first erotic object is the mother's breast that nourishes it; love
has its origin in attachment to the satisfied need for nourishment. There is
no doubt that, to begin with, the child does not distinguish between the
breast and its own body; when the breast has to be separated from the body
and shifted to the 'outside' because the child so often finds it absent, it
carries with it as an 'object' a part of the original narcissistic libidinal
cathexis. This first object is later completed into the person of the child's
mother, who not only nourishes it but also looks after it and thus arouses in
it a number of other physical sensations, pleasurable and unpleasurable. By
her care of the child's body she becomes its first seducer. In these two
relations lies the root of a mother's importance, unique, without parallel,
established unalterably for a whole lifetime as the first and strongest loveobject and as the prototype of all later love-relations-for both sexes.
SIGMUND FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 45 (James Strachey trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1969) (1949).
' Clinical researchers have begun to study the infant's capacity to distinguish self
from others, thereby suggesting that the child is born with some rudimentary sense
of autonomous identity. See DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF THE
INFANT: A VIEW FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 10 (1985)
(positing that infants "experience a sense of an emergent self from birth" and "never
experience a period of total self/other undifferentiation"). Such evidence would not
necessarily negate the critical importance of the relational processes that follow birth.
203 See CHODOROW, supra note 185, at 159 ("Even the sense of agency and
autonomy remain relational in the object-relations model, because agency develops
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The relational model brings into sharper focus the Supreme
Court's identification of parental authority as a fundamental right
in liberal society. Ideally, children develop a sense of an autonomous self-they construct the boundaries and fill the content of
their own identity-by seeing themselves reflected back in the caring
eyes of their close family members."' We forge a sense of individual identity and self-direction out of intimate, loving relations.
And parents are understood to be ideally situated to provide the
environmental conditions necessary for successful psychological
differentiation; the virtues of love, trust and empathy are commonly
205
considered beyond the capacity of state institutions to provide.
in the context of the early relationship with the mother and bears the meaning of her
collaboration in and response to it.").
o The importance of maternal mirroring to the development of the self is
emphasized most strongly in the branch of psychoanalysis called self psychology. See
HEINZ KOHUT, THE RESTORATION OF THE SELF 93-94 (1980); D.W. WINNICOTr,
PLAYING AND REALITY 111-18 (1974). Jessica Benjamin criticizes self psychology as
misleading because it ignores the subjectivity of the mother: "The mother cannot
(and should not) be a mirror; she must not merely reflect back what the child asserts;
she must embody something of the not-me; she must be an independent other who
responds in her different way." JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION 24
25

(1988).

See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the "affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example
...is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions"); CHODOROW, supra
note 185, at 149 ("The personal environment and quality of care experienced by the
developing individual... provide the context and material from which the individual
forms and shapes her or his psyche.");JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 13-16 (1979) (discussing the importance of parents in the
child's transformation to a well-functioning adult); TALCOTF PARSONS & ROBERT F.
BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS 16 (1955) (noting that
because "the human personality is not 'born' but must be 'made' through the
socialization process[,] .. families are necessary"); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional
Status of Marriag4 Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 472-78 (1983) (discussing the inability of the law to
enforce parents' mere obligation to prepare children for their adult lives). Winnicott
opines that the capacity for moral responsibility arises in the first two years of life:
The environmental essential here is the continued presence of the mother
or mother-figure ....
,.. Strong or repressive measures, or indoctrination even, may suit
society's need in the management of the antisocial individual, but these
measures are the worst possible thing for healthy persons, for those who can
grow from within .... It is these latter, the healthy, who grow into the
adults who constitute society, and who collectively establish and maintain the
moral code for the next decades, till their children take over from them.
WINNICOTT, supra note 201, at 102, 104-05. The preference for family over institutional care for older children may be weakening. See Mary-Lou Weisman, When
ParentsAre Not in the Best Interests of the Child, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1994, at 43
1

1854 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1787
The fundamental right of parents to raise their children rests upon
the assumption that state institutions, and in particular public
schools, cannot offer the quality and degree of human intimacy that
children require during their earliest years in order to develop the
foundation for a stable, differentiated, self-reflective sense of
20 6
identity.
Some relational feminists argue that the biological bond between
mother and infant is the primary determining factor in the
differentiation of the self. Verging on a theory of biological
essentialism, these feminists urge that a female's sense of self is
grounded in a primary connection to the biological mother, whereas
a male's sense of self is grounded in a primary separation from
her.2" 7 Connection and separation from the mother thus define
the meaning of gender and suggest the psychic primacy of the
maternal relationship over all others. Although relational feminists
seize upon the mother-child relationship in order to construct a
psychological account of gender differences, the relational model
need not be reduced to a deterministic (and essentialist) theory of
gender identity. We may recognize the significance that primary
mothering has on the formation of gender identity in young

(discussing how contemporary orphanages may raise older children to become betterfunctioning adults than in-home care).
-o6 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 150, at 903 ("The infant's need for continuity is
most often described as the need for attachment, which can be fulfilled only in a close
and selective relationship between a child and a caregiver.").
207 See, e.g., CHODOROW, supra note 185, at 45 ("1 shall propose that, in any given
society, feminine personality comes to define itself in relation and connection to
other people more than masculine personality does."); West, supra note 180, at 16
(noting a "female child['s]... sense of identity [is] 'continuous' with her caretaker's,
while a young boy['s] ... sense of identity... is distinguished from his caretaker's");
cf Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic
Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in DISCOvERING REALITY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 245 (Sandra Harding & Merril B. Hintikka eds., 1983) (discussing the
negative effect on children when women assume sole child-rearing responsibilities for
infants). Carol Gilligan has developed an influential relational model of moral
development, but she explicitly does not make any claims regarding the origins of the
gender difference she documents. See GILLIGAN, supra note 180, at 2 ("No claims are
made about the origins of the differences described or their distribution in a wider
population, across cultures, or through time."). Despite such disclaimers, relational
feminists (as well as some object-relations theorists) fall into a dangerous tendency to
idealize the mother-infant relationship and to rely on an essentialist conception of
maternity and mothering. See, e.g., BENJAMIN, supranote 204, at 8 (promising to show
that "the structure of domination can be traced from the relationship between mother
and infant into adult eroticism, from the earliest awareness of the difference between
mother and father to the global images of male and female in the culture").
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children without positing a biological basis for it. Instead, the effect
of primary mothering on the construction of gender may inhere in
the cultural role of women as primary caretakers and in the
traditional absence of nurturing fathers, rather than in any "natural"
or biological difference between women and men.

Thus, the relational account's insight into the psychic differentiation of the self does not necessarily designate a specific human
object (or Other) against whom the infant learns to define itself.
Although the infant's psychic need for at least one intimate, loving
relationship establishes a basis for preferring non-institutional to
institutional primary care, it does not necessarily establish a clear
basis for preferring parental over third-party child-rearing. Noninstitutional care clearly gives children the psychological foundation
for developing their capacity for situated autonomy, but noninstitutional care may take many forms. Third parties, such as
relatives, foster parents, or those in the position of psychological
parent to the child, might all seek a legal right to custody. Indeed,
it is the relational model, with its emphasis on the importance of
early affective ties, that provides the foundation for making
psychological parenthood the determining factor in custody
decisions. However, as long as someone is available to fill the role
of psychological parent for the child, there may be situations where
a change in caregivers is, for other reasons, desirable. Ultimately,
as the next Section discusses, all decisions of this sort put courts in
the uncomfortable position of evaluating what is in the best
interests of children, an evaluation that requires decision-makers to
articulate and enforce substantive values relating to the good family
life.208
Having opened the door to third-party claims, the relational
model nevertheless reinforces the principle of parental authority.209 What leads the relational model to favor parents over third

" See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctionsin the Face
oflndeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoSs., Summer 1975, at 226, 260 (asking "where
is thejudge to look for the set of values that should inform the choice of what is best

for the child").
' The possibility of state termination of parental rights makes evaluating the

relational model's view of parental authority somewhat complicated. When the state
terminates parental rights and places the child for adoption, one might say that
parental authority has not been undermined; parental authority has been transferred,
but preserved. Yet it is correct to say, I think, that in any case in which the state
alters parental rights, even if only to transfer them, the substance of those rights-the
authority of parents to raise children free from governmental control-has been
negated.

1856 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1787
parties in most cases is its emphasis on the importance of continuity
of attachment in young children's lives.21" The degree of attachment assumed to be necessary in the earliest years implies the
development of a relationship over time; because most children
begin their lives in the care of at least the biological mother, the
relational emphasis on continuity naturally favors the rights of
biological parents or, similarly, the legal parents of adopted
211
infants.
The relational understanding of situated autonomy illuminates
what is at stake in political terms when states regulate family life.
Constitutional protection for parental authority reflects in part the
importance of psychological autonomy to the ideal of liberal
citizenship. State regulations that unreasonably undermine the
development of the child's capacity for an autonomous sense of self,
however well-meaning, jeopardize the civic interests of the liberal
state in raising psychologically independent, self-directing, autonomous citizens. State authority over the family must be limited by
the liberal need for citizens possessing a developed psychological
capacity for autonomous thought and action. The relational
approach illuminates how the liberal ideal of citizenship necessarily
places limits on the states' moral aspirations for family life.
2. The Communal View of the Situated Self
In contrast to relational theorists, communitarian-oriented
scholars have tended, not surprisingly, to emphasize the constitutive
effect that social affiliations have on the development of human
identity. 212 These theorists focus on the central role that kinship,
210 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 205, at 31-39 (arguing that continuity in early
relationships is essential for the development of healthy adults); cf. Bartlett, supra note
150, at 902 (concluding that "it seems reasonable to adopt as an operating principle
the notion that a break in family continuity is detrimental to a child").
231But this is not necessarily the case, because in any particular instance parenthood can always be challenged by a third party claiming to have a deeper psychological bond to the child. Moreover, the relational model alone cannot provide a
principled justification for resisting state removal of infants from biological parents
at birth, a practice often advocated in the context of maternal drug use during
pregnancy, without resorting to a biological account of the mother-child bond.
Because the relational model does not in every instance favor parental authority, it
provides only part of thejustificatory foundation for the constitutional enforcement
of parental authority. The communal model of the situated self provides the
remaining part. See infra part II.C.2.
2121 use the term "communitarian-oriented" to indicate that this view is shared by
communitarian, liberal, feminist, and other critics of the atomistic self. Seesupranote
175 and accompanying text.
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neighborhood, education, religion, politics, and other social ties
Unlike the
play in constituting the individual's sense of self.21
directly
speak
relational model, the communitarian thesis does not
to the psychic formation of the self; rather, it focuses on the social
inculcation of particular values and beliefs.214 The importance of
familial relations from this perspective, therefore, is in the transference of particular substantive ways of life.2 1 Families are the first
and perhaps primary "community of origin" for developing
children, the one within and against which children learn to define
216
themselves.
The communal understanding of human identity has clarified
the importance of parental authority in the liberal state. Parental
authority erects a crucial barrier against the state's power 21to7
inculcate substantive values and beliefs in developing children.
211 See Sandel, supranote 181, at 6 ("Open-ended though it be, the story of my life
is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my
identity-whether family or city, tribe or nation, party or cause."). Liberal theorists
oriented around the communitarian conception of the self exhibit the same emphasis.
See BARBER, supra note 12, at 91 ("We can learn how to become creative individuals
").
within the families, tribes, nations, and communities into which we are born..
For an exploration of the constitutive effects of the workplace environment on adult
female identity, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1824-39 (1990).
214 The inculcation of substantive values and beliefs is not wholly distinct from the
development of a differentiated sense of self; we do not become a self first, and then
mold that self in the image of parental values. Instead, the inculcation of substantive
values directly shapes the contours of our early sense of self; it may determine, for
example, whether we will develop to be more or less morally independent or
conforming. Similarly, our sense of a distinct self emerges from within the values,
beliefs and general way of life that define our familial world. Overall, of course, the
formative influences of biological temperament, primary caregiving, and substantive
family values combine in a complex developmental process whose ultimate, and ideal,
is the situated, autonomous self.
outcome
215
SeeJohn H. Garvey, Child, Parent State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on
the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 821 (1978) (noting that the
family instills in children "the sense of belonging and having roots in a distinct
tradition").
26 Marilyn Friedman rejects prevailing communitarian theory as antifeminist. See
Friedman, supra note 175, at 277 (noting that "communitarian philosophy as a whole
is a perilous ally for feminist theory"). Yet, because she ultimately concedes the
importance of "communities of origin" to our early sense of self and concludes that
"communities of choice foster not so much the constitution of subjects but their
reconstitution," id. at 289, her position is not dramatically different from the theory
of the
situated self presented in this article.
217
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) (noting that
the "affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is
something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed
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In the liberal view, the recognition of parental rights prevents the
state from enforcing its own conception of the good family life.
Particularly with respect to children, whose belief systems are still
being formed, liberalism's commitment to preserving a relatively
broad sphere within which differing conceptions of the good life
may flourish explains the important role that parental authority
ultimately plays in preserving human liberty against the threat of
governmental oppression and tyranny. By ensuring that the primary
constitutive force in the child's life is not the state, parental
authority diminishes the threat of governmental control over the
substantive values and beliefs that shape individual identity.21
Contrary to traditional liberal wisdom, the importance of
parental authority does not inhere in governmental neutrality or
family privacy.
Parental rights instead represent a political
determination that the virtue of situated autonomy is best served by
limiting the state's role in the raising of children. At the same time
that parental authority works to conform children to the ideal of
liberal citizenship, it also serves to insulate those same children
from the direct threat of state-prescribed values and beliefs.
Indeed, one of the deepest paradoxes of liberal citizenship resides
in the civic virtue of situated autonomy, a virtue that, once instilled,
resists the very idea of instilled virtue. Situated autonomy seeks an
uneasy reconciliation between the child's embeddedness in the
family's way of life and her capacity to resist her social embeddedness by forging her own identity. The communal thesis insists that
it is our embeddedness, and most important of all our embeddedness in families, that protects us from the totalitarian threat of stateimposed values and beliefs.
Like the relational model, the communal approach illuminates
not only the importance of parental authority in the liberal state,

to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice"); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,506 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting that "the Constitution
prevents [the state]... from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns"); Michael Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Searchfor RealisticStandards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985,
992 (1975) ("Our political commitment to diversity of views, lifestyles, and freedom
of religion is promoted by allowing families to raise children in a wide variety of
living situations and with diverse childrearing patterns.").
218 See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (noting that
"certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the
power of the State").
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but also the threat to individual liberty posed by state regulation of
family life. If families wield a formative influence on individual
identity, as they certainly do, then state regulations affecting family
life may undermine in a profound and insidious way the very idea
of individual liberty. Seen as a form of state-prescribed orthodoxy,
family law potentially undermines the very concept of private
morality. The communal understanding of the situated self
highlights that the political stakes of family regulation are nothing
less than the preservation of individual moral freedom.

The relational and communal conceptions of the situated self
each contribute to our understanding of the importance of parental
authority in the liberal state. Yet despite its importance, the right
of parental authority obviously does not exclusively define the
relationship between the liberal state and the maturing child.
Parental authority is not absolute; it gives way when parents fail to
nurture their children in a minimally acceptable manner, when
families break apart, or when parents or children simply give up on
one another. Moreover, because the state sets the terms and
conditions of family life to begin with,2 19 parents are not entirely
free of state-imposed constraints even within their recognized
sphere of authority.2 20
Once we understand that the state exercises broad and profound
influence within the domestic sphere-that there are necessary and
inherent limitations on the scope of parental authority-we must
consider the implications for liberalism. How should liberalism
come to terms with the fact that the state enforces moral norms
governing the quality and structure of family life? If parental
See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
219
' See Bartlett, supra note 150, at 885. Professor Bartlett describes these

constraints:
The state, in addition to imposing duties on parents, also constrains
certain of their rights. For example, in disciplining children, parents may
not injure them severely. Parents may not, even for religious reasons, make

unconventional decisions about their children's medical treatment if such
treatment is likely to result in the child's death. A parental decision to
commit a child to a mental institution is subject to review by professionals

of the institution. Parents may not put their children to work in violation
of child labor laws, and they do not have unlimited options in educating
their children.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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authority serves to protect developing children from state-prescribed values and beliefs, then what safeguards exist in the context
of family law? The following Part first explores more closely the
moral dimensions of family law and the need for a communitarian
model of legal decision-making. It then explains why, in a liberal
democracy committed to safeguarding individual liberty, this sphere
of communitarian decision-making belongs to the states. The
following Part also examines the role of the federal government in
preventing state regulation of the family from undermining
fundamental liberal rights.
III. A LoCALIST THEORY OF FAMILY LAW
Communitarianism has the potential for helping us discover a
politics that combines community with a commitment to basic
21
liberal values.
This Part resumes the discussion of federalism and explains why
governmental authority over the family as a constitutional matter
belongs to the states. The discussion begins by elaborating the way
in which legal regulation of family life is, at least in significant part,
an inherently communitarian endeavor.
While "the claims of
community are several," 222 I use the term "communitarian" here
to identify the source for the moral legitimacy of family law. I do
not mean to suggest that family law is a product of strong communitarian lawmaking; it does not arise within a political community
defined by a full moral consensus, homogeneous lifestyle, or
teleological moral vision. Contemporary family law is communitarian in the less comprehensive sense of deriving its moral content
223
from the shared values of the relevant political community.

" Amy Gutmann, CommunitarianCriticsof Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 308,
320 (1985).
' Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 685, 688 (1992).
" Stephen Gardbaum labels this less comprehensive form of communitarian
decision-making "metaethical communitarianism." See id. at 705-19. What strong
communitarian theorists tend to mean by shared values is a communal recognition
of some objective, transcendent truth, or a degree of communal agreement that
approaches universality. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988) (noting that "[riepublican thought is characterized by a
belief in universalism"). The emphasis on universally shared values characteristic of
strong communitarianism implies either a level of social homogeneity or a belief in
transcendent truth that is clearly at odds with the pluralistic conditions of liberal
democracy.
Unlike their classical republican counterparts, contemporary civic republican
scholars appeal to dialogue and practical reason rather than transcendent truth as the
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Family law should be viewed as the product of a normative
discourse among a community of citizens living in a particular place
22 4
at a particular time in history.
Section A describes how family law calls upon legislatures and
courts to take sides in the clash among competing views of what
constitutes the good life for parents and children. Section B then
explains why the communitarian nature of family law reveals the
fundamental value of localism in the constitutional design. That
Section promotes state authority over family law as an essential
means for strengthening both the processes of communitarian
decision-making and the virtues of national citizenship in the liberal
state. Finally, Section C elaborates the important role of the federal
government in preserving individual rights by setting constitutional
limits on state moral authority.
A. The CommunitarianNature of Family Law
Family law does not conform to the liberal model of politics and
adjudication. By this, I do not mean simply that state regulation of
the family transgresses the traditional liberal view of the family as
a private institution, although this is certainly the case.22 5 More

source of these universal community values. See Michelman, supranote 166, at 23-24
(explaining the contemporary appeal of the tradition of civic dialogue in terms of

"practical reason"); Sunstein, supra, at 1541 (relying on "practical reason" to settle
"normative disputes with substantively right answers"). Although contemporary civic
republican'scholars emphasize dialogue and situated reason, nevertheless they do
stress community consensus and uncontested norms. But see Frank I. Michelman,
Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1505 (1988) (articulating an "inclusory, pluralityprotecting ideal" of republicanism). For that reason, although my view of family law
fits the republican model, I prefer to elaborate a model of community dialogue from

within a liberal paradigm that begins with an emphasis on social diversity and political
conflict. Cf C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican

Politics,41 U. FLA. L. REV. 491,521 (1989) (questioning "whether the choice between
republican liberalism and Michelman's liberal republicanism really makes a
difference").
22 My argument that family law is communitarian in the sense that it requires the
state to act on a particular conception of the good resembles the theory of liberalism
developed by Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom. See RAZ, supra note 12, at 133.

Whereas Raz promotes a perfectionist state in all areas of political life, my argument
in this Article speaks only to family law and rests on the place of families and the
needs of developing children in liberal society.
'See supra part II.A. Liberalism can, with little effort, restrict its conception of
privacy to the individual's fundamental right to make decisions regarding important
matters of family life, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973); Eisenstadt

v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972), thereby preserving the fundamental liberal
boundary between the sphere of collective power and the sphere of individual liberty.
This understanding of privacy is not altered by the concept of the situated self nor
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pointedly, state regulation of the family as it has always existed in
this country defies the fundamental liberal norm of governmental
neutrality on questions of the good life.226

We are accustomed to

the idea that liberalism is incompatible with moral argument; we
assume that lawmaking in a liberal society should concern itself with
protecting individual interests and facilitating individual desires and
not with enforcing communal values. 227 As long as a particular
domestic lifestyle comports with the basic liberal conception of
justice, as long as it does not seriously undermine the development
228
of civic character or the liberal state's ability to reproduce itself,
we would expect that the principle of governmental neutrality on
questions of the good life would assure state nonintervention.
Given the deeply formative effect that family life has on the child's
emerging sense of self, we might most vehemently insist on
governmental impartiality with respect to the domestic sphere. At

by the virtue of situated autonomy, both of which remain solidly committed to the
notion of individual agency, however embedded the individual agent is understood
to be. See supra part II.C. With the concept of privacy reoriented around the
principle of individual (but situated) autonomy, parental authority can be detached
from the notion of family privacy and claim its proper role in the cultivation of civic
character.
' See, e.g., Kymlicka, supra note 147, at 883 (defining liberal neutrality as "the
view that the state should not reward or penalize particular conceptions of the good
life but, rather, should provide a neutral framework within which different and
potentially conflicting conceptions of the good can be pursued"). For discussions of
the principle of neutrality within liberal thought, see DWORKIN, supra note 168, at
203; CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLExITY 42-47 (1987); RAWLS,
supra note 168, at 190-95; RAZ, supra note 12, at 110-33.
"' I should note that this traditional view of liberalism is misleading in two
respects. First, liberalism is not inherently inhospitable to moral argument; not only
does liberalism take a position on the meaning of the good political life, it also
promotes an ideal of the good citizen that itself implies a shared understanding of the
good family life. Around each of these foundational concepts-politics, citizenship
and family-may be found a constellation of moral assumptions and normative
ambitions that define the liberal political framework. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 12, at
1 (introducing his "essay on the political morality of liberalism"). Thus, when liberals
make a claim to moral neutrality, they necessarily mean to claim a sphere of personal
freedom and autonomy that is framed or limited by the moral imperatives of
liberalism itself. This distinction between the morality that defines the framework of
liberal politics and the sphere of individual moral freedom is sometimes characterized
as a distinction between the right and the good. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 168, at
173-213 (discussing the priority of the right over the good). Second, this Article
contends that liberalism must also accept moral argument even within the realm of
social life that we traditionally conceive of as personal freedom. Cf RAZ, supra note
12, at 133 (promoting a "perfectionist moral pluralism... which allows that certain
conceptions of the good are worthless and demeaning, and that political action may
and should be taken to eradicate or at least curtail them").
" See supra part II.B.
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the very least, we should expect liberalism to demonstrate a firmly
tolerant attitude toward those family lifestyles that do not directly
impair the continued viability of liberal society itself.
In stark contrast to moral neutrality, however, the law of family
relations radiates an aura of impassioned conviction on the meaning
of the good life. 229 My insistence on the communitarian significance of family law is certainly not in itself a novel insight; we are
all familiar with the view of domestic relations law as emotionally
charged, value-laden, and decidedly unlaw-like. Similarly, we are all
aware of the fact that American family law has its roots in ecclesiastical law, and that its current form continues to be profoundly
shaped by the Judeo-Christian moral tradition. The prevailing
wisdom, however, views family law as an unfortunate and perhaps
anachronistic departure from the liberal ideal of a morally neutral
state. 2 0 Indeed, there exists a relatively widespread perception
that the law of family relations is becoming increasingly "liberalized," and to a certain extent this is true.2 31 It is certainly fair to
See Carl E. Schneider, MoralDiscourseand the TransformationofAmerican Family
Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1805 (1985); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions
ofFamily Law, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. Rav. 991, 1004-06 (1989); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The] inclusion of the category of
morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only
to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people as well."). Although sensitive to the moral
nature of family law,Justice Harlan nevertheless assumes a static, and therefore quite
conservative, moral vision. See id. at 546 (concluding that the laws against adultery,
fornication and homosexual practices "form a pattern so deeply pressed into the
substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build
upon that basis"). For a case that follows Justice Harlan's views on homosexual
conduct, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
0 In reference to the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, Lea Brilmayer describes "the peculiardeference federal courts accord to states
in family cases," LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 346 (1986) (emphasis added), as follows:
[This deference] maybe due largely to the nature of domestic relations law.
Domestic relations cases are usually emotionally charged; and substantive
family law lacks clearly delineated standards. Because the cases are highly
fact-spedfic, it is difficult to develop clear-cut principles. Family law has also
been heavily imbued, historically, with moral and religious overtones. Under
the circumstances, federal courts have carved a special exception for
domestic relations cases ... from federal diversity jurisdiction so as not to
intrude into the cultural norms of the states.
Id. (footnote omitted).
231 I discuss the ideological and doctrinal shift toward the liberalization of family
life in greater detail in Dailey, supra note 130, at 972-79; see also Martha Minow,
"FormingUnderneathEveiything that Grows": Towarda History ofFamilyLaw, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 819, 827-34 (critiquing the traditional historical account of family); Olsen,
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say that the traditional liberal principles of individual autonomy and
gender equality have been applied in recent years to limited aspects
of the domestic sphere. With respect to relations among adult
family members, the law has shed much of its public moral content
in favor of an approach facilitating private interests and desires.
The Supreme Court has imposed a standard of equal treatment on
state marriage requirements, for example, by prohibiting states from
enforcing miscegenation laws,2" 2 and the states themselves have all
moved in the direction of granting no-fault divorces after a specified
waiting period."' Wives are now less likely to receive lifetime
support after a divorce, particularly if the marriage was of short
duration or there were no children," 4 a development that reflects
a shift away from the assumption that women cannot be economically self-supporting and toward a principle of gender-blind neutrality.
The law of child custody has discarded its traditional presumption
of maternal primacy in favor of the principle of gender neutrality
underlying the now-prevailing approaches ofjoint custody, primary
caretaker and psychological parenthood." 5
We would be right, therefore, to infer some important liberalization of the legal relationship between husband and wife. Yet
despite an increased concern for the principles of individual choice
and gender neutrality, the laws governing marriage and divorce
nonetheless continue to reflect substantive views on desirable family
arrangements. Persons of the same sex, 23 6 persons closely related
to each other, 3 7 persons already married, 3 persons who refuse
testing for certain infectious diseases, 23 9 and mentally incompetent

supra note 148, at 840 n.10 (referring to "the shift that has taken place from seeing
the family as an organic group to seeing it as a contract among individuals").
282 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
231 See Schneider, supra note 229, at 1809. For examples of no-fault divorce
statutes, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40 (West Supp. 1995); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3301 (1991).
234 See WEITZMAN, supra note 108, at 163-75.
2 5
3s SeeJUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 516-22, 623-40, 644-

49 (3d ed. 1992).
2s6 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (West 1968) (prohibiting certain marriages

but not explicitly outlawing same-sex marriage, although interpreted that way by M.T.
v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.01 (Anderson Supp. 1994) (sanctioning only heterosexual marriages).
27 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.21 (West 1986) (outlawing incestuous
marriages); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (Vernon 1986) (same).
2 8 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-201 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994)
(outlawing bigamy); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4301 (1983) (same).
239 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-20 (West 1968) (requiring a certificate of
syphilis testing for marriage license); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.210 (West 1986)
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persons240 are prohibited from marrying in most states, while
those seeking a divorce may have to comply with waiting periods, 241 submit to counseling and mediation, 242 and negotiate
their way through the highly-charged normative laws governing
alimony and property distribution. 24' The question of who gets
what after divorce continues to reflect society's deeply-held views
regarding moral worth and moral transgression. The principle of
equitable distribution, which governs the financial outcome of
divorce in the vast majority of states, empowers the judge to allocate
marital resources according to what seems just or fair in the
particular circumstances. 244
While an examination into the
parties' personal expectations, agreements, or motives may prove
useful for the decision-maker, personal understandings do not
necessarily govern the parties' ultimate financial standing. Even in
cases involving written prenuptial agreements-perhaps the most
distinctly liberal of family law doctrines-most jurisdictions impose
a standard of unconscionability not applicable in traditional contract
law which allows the judge to overlook agreements that appear
deeply unfair or unjust to one of the parties.24 5 Whatever steps
lawmakers and courts have taken in the direction of liberalizing the
legal relationship between adult family members remain decidedly
tentative.
(requiring venereal testing for marriage).
240See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750 para. 5/301 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (dissolving

marriages due to incapability to consent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-9 (West 1968)
(preventing issuance of a marriage license when a party is adjudicated mentally
incompetent).
241See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-67 (West 1986) (instituting a 90-day
waiting period); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.89(6) (Callaghan 1984) (instituting a 60-day
waiting period).
242 See e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-b (Supp. 1994) (requiring courts to
order parties in divorce proceedings to undergo marital counseling in certain
situations); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-29 (1988) (giving courts discretion to order marital
mediation).
24s See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 46b-81, -82 (West 1986) (concerning
property distribution and alimony).
244 Community property laws, which exist in nine states, also appear illiberal in
their subordination of the principle of individual rights to the principle of spousal
equality. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (instituting default of equal
asset distribution in divorce proceedings); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (West 1991
& Supp. 1995) (same).
245 See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1985); see also
DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986)
(suggesting that prenuptial agreements rendering one spouse destitute or putting one
spouse in the public charge will be unenforceable); In re Button, 388 N.W.2d 546,
551-52 (Wis. 1986) (invalidating a substantively inequitable prenuptial agreement).
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While adult family relations in theory might lend themselves to
liberal principles, the relationship between adults and children in
the family clearly does not. The communitarian nature of family
law finds its deepest roots in legal regulations governing the parentchild relationship. As we have seen, liberalism promotes parental
authority as a means of instilling the important virtue of situated
autonomy in future citizens.24 Yet parental rights are not absolute. In cases where parents differ over an important aspect of
childrearing, as often occurs in the context of divorce, the courts
are called upon to resolve the dispute in accordance with their
understanding of what is in the best interests of the child. Custody
battles between fit parents, for example, require courts to determine
which parent will provide the better home for the child, where the
meaning of "better" is often left to the discretion of the judge.247
In cases where the quality of parenting is brought into question by
state intervention, courts must also determine the proper placement
of the child in accordance with substantive standards on child
development. In all families split by serious conflict, which may
include the majority of families in this country, authority over the
child shifts from parents to the state.
The normative dimension of legal standards such as equitable
distribution or the best interests of the child-standards which
govern the breakdown of traditional, intact families-is easily
grasped. If the presence of communally shared views on the good
life were actually limited to the application of these two standards,
then we would not be warranted in identifying family law as a
communitarian legal realm. But the communitarian dimension of
family law extends far beyond the standards governing the breakdown of traditional families. The traditional custody dispute
between divorcing parents is only the most familiar instance in
which the state enforces substantive norms. With respect to a wide
246 See supra part
47

1

II.

The approach advanced in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child attempts to

replace this standard with the rule that custody must always go to the psychological
parent. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 205, at 53. Some courts in turn have
reduced the standard of the psychological parent to the more objectively identifiable
primary caregiver. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (W. Va. 1981).
Although the concepts of psychological parent and primary caregiver have wielded
considerable force in custody determinations, they are not always the determinative
factors in custody decisions. See, e.g., In re Kovacs, 854 P.2d 629, 632-33 (Wash. 1993)
(en banc) (rejecting a presumption favoring placement with the primary caregiver).
Moreover, the process of identifying the psychological parent or the primary caregiver
itself raises normative issues.
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variety of less familiar family issues, the moral content of legal rules
and standards is equally apparent.
Disputes over medical decision-making on behalf of children are
illustrative. Curran v. Bosze,245 for example, involved the question
whether a noncustodial father could consent to a bone marrow
harvesting of his twin daughters over the objection of the custodial
mother.249 The harvesting would have been performed for the
benefit of the twins' half brother, who was dying of leukemia. The
Illinois Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the best interests
of the children would not be served by forcing the twins to undergo
the harvesting procedure against the wishes of the custodial parent.
The court determined that medical donation cannot be compelled
in any situation where "an existing, close relationship between the
donor and recipient" does not exist;25 ° the child must derive some
personal, tangible benefit from the continued survival or improved
welfare of the recipient. 2 1 The issue in this case turned on the
court's conception of the good life for children: would the young
twins benefit from the remote possibility of saving another child's
Court concluded, with some misgivings,
life? The Illinois Supreme
25 2
that they would not.

The communitarian role of the state extends beyond the
resolution of disputes between legal parents; it goes to the underlying definition of parenthood itself and to the question of who may
lay claim to a legal interest in the child. The new reproductive
218 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).

See id. at 1321.
m Id. at 1343.

249

251 See

id.

The Illinois Supreme Court's attitude toward its own role in the fate of the ill
boy, Jean Pierre, is reminiscent of Robert Cover's depiction of the Civil War era
judges who enforced fugitive slave laws against the dictates of their own moral values.
See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
6 (1975). The Illinois Supreme Court noted at the end of its long opinion:
This court shares the opinion of the circuit court thatJean Pierre's situation
"evokes sympathy from all who've heard [it]." No matter how small the
hope that a bone marrow transplant will cure Jean Pierre, the fact remains
that without the transplant, Jean Pierre will almost certainly die. The
sympathy felt by this court, the circuit court, and all those who have learned
ofJean Pierre's tragic situation cannot, however, obscure the fact that, under

the circumstances presented in the case at bar, it neither would be proper

under existing law nor in the best interests of the 3 -year-old twins for the

twins to participate in the bone marrow harvesting procedure.

Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1345 (alteration in original). Jean Pierre died two months
later. See Boy at Center of Suit for a Marrow Donor Is Dead of Leukemia, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1990, at B9.
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technologies have exposed in dramatic ways the moral component
to legal parenthood. Although disputes relating to gestational
surrogacy contracts raise some of the most complex issues relating
to human identity and the meaning of parenthood,2 55 even the
relatively less complicated traditional surrogacy arrangements
expose the substantive values underlying legal definitions of
parenthood. In the well-known Baby M case, 254 for example, the
NewJersey Supreme Court concluded that a woman who conceived
through artificial insemination with no original intention to raise
255
the child as her own was nevertheless the child's legal parent.
Although it ultimately recognized the mother's rights, the court's
need to justify its decision revealed the normative gap between
biological and legal parenthood. Similarly, in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 256 the United States Supreme Court upheld a California
evidentiary statute that denied a biological father any rights with
respect to a child with whom he had already established a relationship. 25 7 The Supreme Court concluded that nothing prevents the
State of California from bestowing the privileges of legal fatherhood
on the man to whom the mother is married rather than on the
258
child's natural father.
The diverse laws governing adoption in this country provide
another example of communitarian lawmaking. Adoption laws
establish a procedural framework for transferring final authority
over a child from the state to private individuals, a framework
particularly attentive to issues surrounding parental coercion and
third-party profiteering. In addition, however, adoption laws and
policies clearly incorporate societaljudgments concerning the "good
parent" and the "good identity" for children. Courts evaluate
prospective adoptive parents on the basis of age, health, marital
status, sexual orientation, wealth, and general psychological wellbeing. Similarly, race and religion play a central role in adoptive
placements, a role often mandated by so-called state matching
laws.2 59 Such laws, which create a presumption that children

' In Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993),
which involved a dispute between genetic parents and a gestational mother over the
right to legal parenthood of the child, the California Supreme Court decided in favor
of the genetic parents. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787.

' In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
215 See id. at 1242-43.

- 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
2
2'8

See id. at 129-30.
See id.

9-1 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993) ("In the placement of
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should be placed in families of the same race or religious background, rest on a particular view of human identity as constituted
around the factors of race and religion. Not only do adoption laws
reflect the community's shared views on ideal child development, it
is impossible to imagine how we might reconstruct the law of
adoption without appealing to substantive values. The process of
finding individuals well-suited to raise parentless children simply
cannot be accomplished without some vision of what children need
and who is best situated to meet those needs.
The communitarian dimension of family law characterizes not
only the doctrines internal to the field, but also the boundaries of
the field itself. What falls within the realm of family law and what
lies outside it are deeply contested issues which ultimately turn on
how we choose to define the family itself. The definitional
boundaries of the family can only be resolved by elaborating a
shared vision of what a family should be in this society.2 60 We
might wish to include homosexual unions within our legal definition
of the family, but we must also be able to justify excluding a group
home for college students or even, perhaps, the relationship
between a live-in childcare provider and the infant for whom she
adoption of a child of minority racial or ethnic heritage ... the court shall give
preference [to]... [a] family with same racial or ethnic heritage as the child. .. .");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1995) (providing for racial and ethnic
consideration with regard to adoption). The legality of state matching laws has been
thrown into question by the Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 108 Stat. 3518,4056-57 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5115a) (prohibiting state agencies from denying adoptive placements solely on the
basis of race).
2' The Supreme Court grappled most directly with the definition of "family" in
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
Justice Brennan framed the issue in that case as whether "the relation of foster parent
to foster child [is] sufficiently akin to the concept of 'family' recognized in our
precedents to merit similar protection." Id. at 842. In concluding that it did not,
Justice Brennan noted that "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological
relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have
stressed this element." Id. at 843. He went on to note, however, that "biological
relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family." Id.
at 843. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy
of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through
the instruction of children." Id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)) (second alteration in original). Although foster families may serve this role,
Justice Brennan concluded, foster parents possess only"the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the foster family," id. at 846, since unlike a "natural family," whose
origins lie "entirely apart from the power of the State," the foster family "has its
source in state law and contractual arrangements." Id. at 845.
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cares. And we simply cannot draw definitional lines such as these
and remain wholly, or even minimally, "neutral."
Although liberals insist that "modern democracy is precisely
characterized by the absence of a substantive common good,"" 1
any viable liberal democratic theory must make room for a politics
of the common good relating to the family. In practical terms, it is
simply impossible for liberalism to bracket the "family question."
In considering the best custodial placement for a child, whether
blood relatives may marry, whether a woman may adopt the
biological child of her lesbian lover, or whether an unmarried
woman may claim alimony when her long-term lover leaves her,
family law raises important questions concerning the good family
life. Issues involving the removal of children from their homes, the
approval of adoptive parents, the rights of gestational surrogates,
and custody over young children upon divorce foreclose a stance of
liberal neutrality. Rather than viewing family law as incompatible
with the ideal of liberal justice-as a subject needing to be recast in
the image of governmental neutrality on questions of the good
life-we need to understand liberalism as compatible with, and
dependent upon, a domestic sphere governed by communitarian
262
norms.
Liberals have historically been quite wary of community,
although this wariness may be waning even among traditional liberal
theorists. 263
Still, the liberal fear of communitarian decision21

Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in

DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY: PLURALISM, CTZENSHIP, COMMUNITY 225,229

(Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992).
262Michael Sandel is among those communitarian theorists who believe that
liberalism's need for communitarian politics compromises the entire liberal
enterprise. He concludes:
[I]f my argument is correct, if the liberal vision we have considered is not
morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it officially

rejects, then we should expect to find that the political practice that
embodies this vision is notpracticallyself-sufficient either-that it must draw
on a sense of community it cannot supply and may even undermine.
Sandel, supra note 45, at 91. Although I agree that the liberal tradition has officially
rejected community, I disagree with Sandel's conclusion that it must do so.

' See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 194, at 479 (purporting to "test" the assumption
that "liberalism... is hostile to the value or importance of community"). Communitarian politics that emphasize democratic decision-making might also appeal to the
populist tradition. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 7, at 405 ("It was populism,
rather than liberalism, as well as the defense of a peculiar, provincial mode of life that
found the ideology of federalism useful and congenial."); Sandel, supra note 45, at 9293 ("From Jefferson to the populists, the party of democracy in American political
debate had been, roughly speaking, the party of the provinces, of decentralized
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making reflects a valid concern for the preservation of individual
liberty against the potentially coercive and oppressive force of
communal will. 2 Yet to acknowledge this concern as legitimate
does not mean that community has no role at all to play in a liberal
regime. As we have already seen, liberalism needs communitarian
decision-making in the realm of domestic relations in part to
provide for the civic development of its own citizens. At the same
time, liberalism must also erect effective safeguards against the
potentially oppressive effects of a regulatory sphere oriented toward
the enforcement of communally shared values and norms. The
wholly unrestrained enforcement of community values within the
realm of family life would pose an intolerably grave threat of
governmental tyranny over our intimate lives. In the following
Section, I propose that state authority over the core domain of
family law serves a crucial function in safeguarding individual liberty
against the potentially dangerous excesses of communitarian
decision-making. In Section C, I explain that the federal government also has an essential role to play in ensuring that state
authority over the family is not exercised so as to undermine
fundamental rights or the familial preconditions of citizenship in
liberal society.
B. State Sovereignty over Family Law
The localist approach to constitutional federalism presented in
this Section affirms the importance of state authority over family
law to the stable flourishing of liberal democracy in this country.
As the following discussion elaborates, localism makes a three-fold
contribution to the prevention of governmental tyranny over family
life. First, the communitarian nature of family law requires a level
of political engagement and a sense of community identity that lie
beyond the reach of national politics. As the quality of political
deliberation falls and as the bonds of community thin out, the
danger that shared values will degenerate into governmentally
dictated values increases. By situating communitarian politics at the
state level, therefore, localism ensures that the civic participation,
political dialogue, and shared values essential to family law will
power, of small-town and small-scale America.").
' See Shklar, supra note 129, at 21 (positing that liberalism "has only one
overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise
of personal freedom").
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develop within the states' smaller, relatively more accessible political
locales.
Second, state sovereignty over family law serves to diffuse
governmental power over the formation of individual values and
moral aspirations. Localism serves to decentralize direct governmental authority over the moral development of children; it
diminishes the national government's power to mold the moral
character of future citizens in its own monolithic image. Localism
promotes diversity-not in the traditional sense of protecting the
states as "laboratories of experiment" for the national project2 6 but in the name of preserving citizen choice in matters of family
life. As long as the citizen's right to exit local communities is
guaranteed in a meaningful way, localism promotes diversity as an
important barrier against moral tyranny on the national scale.
Third and finally, localism reserves to the federal government
the role of ensuring that states do not override fundamental liberal
values. Most importantly, the federal government retains ultimate
responsibility for protecting the rights of individual privacy,
equality, and parental authority in the sphere of family life. In the
discussion that follows, I first explore the value of state sovereignty
over family law in the constitutional design. Section C then turns
to the role of the federal government in the regulation of family

life.
1.

Strengthening Communitarian Decision-Making

Family law raises the question of whether and in what way
communitarian decision-making can be carried out across a large,
morally heterogeneous nation.2 66 Communitarian decision-making
2" See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 49-50

(1930) ("The very notion of our federalism calls for free play of local diversity in
dealing with local problems."). For consideration of what Professor Amar calls the
"laboratory" perspective, see Akhil R. Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983"
in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233-36 (1994).
266 In some ways, this question is nothing more than a modern recasting of the
revolutionary debate between the federalists and antifederalists over the issue of state
sovereignty: a debate apparently won, if not by the federalists themselves, then by
their nationalist successors in the aftermath of the Civil War and the New Deal. See
supra part I.A. Yet the fact that this debate was long ago settled in favor of a national
liberal politics is precisely what distinguishes the modern question ofcommunitarian
decision-making from the revolutionary one; the issue now raised is how we may
foster a limited politics of the common good relating to the family without
undermining the liberal principles that define our national political ideal.
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directed to the good family life-however democratic and
pluralistic-entails a degree of civic engagement and a measure of
community identity that are dangerous and undesirable on a
national scale. The process of formulating shared values within a
pluralistic society requires both a high degree of citizen initiative
and a strong sense of communal bonds. As I elaborate below, these
aspects of communitarian decision-making-civic engagement and
community identity-are more likely to be realized at the state rather
2
than federal level.
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The communitarian dimension of family law calls for a deliberative political process by which a diverse citizenry comes to
provisional agreement on questions of the good family life.2 8 In
a pluralistic society, a communitarian model of legal decisionmaking must emphasize the value of democratic self-government.2
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While also an important part of efforts to revitalize

Professor Post has also noted the possibility of a "communitarian defense for
federalism." Robert C. Post,JusticeBrennan and Federalism, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY
227, 235 (1990). In his view, this defense stresses "the values of local participation
and celebrates the ability of small communities to foster a kind of gemeinschaft that
constitutes and embraces the identities of those who comprise them." Id. at 238.
Professor Post also rightly acknowledges, however, the need to know "whether the
states in fact comprise [such] communities." Id.
26 Much of the recent writing within liberal theory focuses on the value of
participatory democracy and how best to reshape the contemporary liberal landscape
in a more participatory form. Benjamin Barber has offered perhaps the most
impassioned defense of, as well as the most detailed plan for, implementing
participatory democracy on the national as well as local scale. See BARBER, supra note
12, at 261-311 (advocating the implementation of neighborhood assemblies, television
town meetings, national referenda, electronic balloting, and, on an experimental
basis, vouchers for housing, education, and transportation); see also YOUNG, supranote
12, at 91 (arguing that justice requires "participation in public discussion and
processes of democratic decisionmaking"); Hanna F. Pitkin & Sara M. Shumer, On
Participation,DEMOCRACY, Fall 1982, at 43, 43 ("Everyone... is capable not merely
of self-control, of privately taking charge of his own life, but also of self-government,
of sharing in the deliberate shaping of their common life. Exercising this capacity is
prerequisite both to the freedom and full development of each, and to the freedom
and justness of the community."). Contemporary proponents of participatory
democracy often rely on the work of Hannah Arendt, see ARENDT, supra note 192;
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (Greenwood Press 1982) (1963); HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (new ed. 1973), despite the fact that
Arendt's theory of politics, with its rigid distinction between the public sphere of
politics and the private sphere of personal, economic, and social obligations and
needs, seems dangerously antidemocratic. See Pitkin & Shumer, supra, at 46.
29 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 91-95; Michelman, supra note 166, at 75; Pitkin
& Shumer, supra note 268, at 43. In promoting a similar idea of "deliberative
universalism," Amy Gutmann argues that "[d]eliberation (within the bounds of what
is reasonable) provisionally resolves fundamental moral conflicts here and now, but
not necessarily once and for all." Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalismin
161
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traditional liberal politics, 270 civic participation is central to the
communitarian endeavor. The task of formulating a shared vision
of the good family life requires that citizens consider and make

known their views on family issues. Citizens must actually engage
in political dialogue about, and come to some shared understanding

of, the good life for parents and children. 27 1 Citizen passivity and
political disengagement 272 threaten to reduce the deliberative

PoliticalEthics, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171, 199 (1993). In her view, "the give and take
of respectful argument can create the broadest justifiable consensus across a range
of reasonable but conflicting positions because mutual respect enjoins an economy
of moral disagreement, the search for substantive points of convergence between
fundamentally irreconcilable positions." Id.
270 Contemporary proponents of institutional federalism in particular stress the
value of civic participation to our liberal democracy. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (naming the opportunity for civic participation in government
as an advantage of federalism). Professor Merritt explains the liberal benefits of
increased participation:
The second major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of state and
local governments to draw citizens into the political process. The greater
accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to
participate actively in governmental decisionmaking. This participation, in
turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and
enhances voter confidence in the democratic process. For these reasons, the
opportunity to participate personally in governmental decisionmakingis an
important part of the democratic process.
Merritt, supra note 28, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see also A.E. Dick Howard,Judicial
Federalism: The States and the Supreme Court, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A NEW
PARTNERSHIP FOR THE REPUBLIC 215, 237 (Robert B. Hawkins, Jr. ed., 1982) ("[B]y
promoting citizen participation in the making of governmental decisions, by fostering
civic education, and by promoting democratic choices at the local level, federalism
enhances fundamental constitutional values.").
271 As noted earlier, theorists from both the liberal and communitarian
perspectives seem to be converging upon the value of civic participation and dialogue.
See supra note 161. For civic republicans emphasizing deliberation, see Michelman,
supra note 166, at 19 (noting that "[r]epublicanism favors a highly participatory form
of politics, involving citizens directly in dialogue and discussion"); Sunstein, supra
note 223, at 1554 ("The republican commitment to universalism amounts to a belief
in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics, or different
conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue."). For liberal
theorists emphasizing deliberation, see generally BARBER, supra note 12, at 163-212
(elaborating the importance of political participation to his theory of strong
democracy); see also MACEDO, supra note 12, at 58 ("Liberalism establishes, for good
reason, a process of public debate about itself among other things."); Gutmann, supra
note 269, at 199 (promoting a theory of "deliberative universalism"); cf. GALSTON,
supra note 150, at 248 (admonishing that liberal democratic theory "is not free to give
participatory virtues pride of place or to remain silent about the virtues that
correspond to representative institutions"). For a discussion of the value of political
participation in liberal theory, see CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1970).
' I recognize that the failure to participate may result from economic and
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model of communitarian politics to a form of state moral authoritarianism. State authority over family law decreases the risk that a
politics devoted to the good family life will degenerate into
governmental oppression.
The scale of national politics not only impedes citizen participation, but also dilutes the sense of community identity necessary to
the deliberative process of working out shared values and norms in
family law. States are not fungible political units; rather each state
enjoys a particular history, a particular geography, a particular
climate, and a particular population that necessarily shares a set of
situated interests and disputes.75 The kind of impressionistic
views we all hold of the differences among states-the slow charm of
Georgia (or alternatively its conservative moralism), the creative
excitement of New York (or alternatively its inhuman chaos), the
visionary optimism of California (or alternatively its zany materialism)-are often what attract people to particular places and give rise
political oppression as much as from apathy. For an argument that certain oppressed
groups in our society are systemically barred from political participation and that
removing barriers to their participation must entail affirmative group rights, see
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 183-91.
' See Kaden, supra note 56, at 854. Professor Kaden observes:
Experience also supports the traditional claim that federalism promotes
variety in political choice and counters the impulse toward social and
ideological homogeneity by allowing cultural differences to find expression
in different places. Despite the homogenizing effects of media and mobility
on twentieth-century American life, the existence of separate state and local
governmental units still provides avenues for expression of the variations in
style in different parts of the country. Tax burdens, public services, habits
of living, and patterns of tolerance do vary as one moves from Maine to
Alabama or New York to New Mexico, reflecting in part the differences in
the political choices made by subnational governmental authorities. Thus
one state opts for an elaborate system of subsidized postsecondary education
while another spends far less on this service; one state chooses to permit the
use of marijuana while others continue to prosecute for possession; and one
state appeals to retired persons by supplementing the natural advantage of
climate with tax preferences, while another discourages this type of
migration.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also ELAZAR, supra note 14, at 11-25 (maintaining that
particular issues unite states internally); Ann Althouse, Federalism Untamed, 47 VAND.
L. REv. 1207, 1216-17 (1994) ("The states are not simply small subdivisions of the
nation; they have decided cultures, traditions, and histories-longer than the
nation's."); Briffault, supra note 42, at 1345 ("Due to the states' permanence, clearly
markedjurisdiction, inherent authority, and structural role in the organization of the
national government, people are more likely to organize their thoughts about the
political world in terms of the states. This, in turn, may lead people to think about
some of the broader aspects of American society-economic, social, and cultural
questions-in terms of the states.").
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to a shared sense of belonging. State citizens in our pluralistic
society possess what we might call a situated identity, one that arises
from both the abstract idea and the concrete experience of living in
274
a particular place at a particular time in history.
Even at the state level, the communitarian emphasis on civic
participation and communal interests may seem a false ideal in the
contemporary United States. Some proponents of communitarianism view the states as simply too large to sustain an authentic
politics rooted in direct citizen participation, meaningful public
dialogue, and the development of shared values and goals across a
heterogeneous population. 75 Yet the point here is not that the
states live up to some abstract ideal of communitarian politics,
however that might be conceived, for clearly they do not. It would
be impossible to claim, for example, that California-with a
population of 17 million-offers the kind of communitarian
decision-making associated with the ancient Greek polis or the New
England town meeting. Rather the point is that the states potentially offer a relatively more inclusionary, deliberative political life than
the national government ever could.
Although communitarian theorists have tended to reject the
states in favor of more localized political bodies, this Article
supports state authority over family law rather than municipal,
regional, or other nongeographic authorities for several reasons.

4 Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictionalRedundancy: Interes4 Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 658 (1981) ("I am inclined to believe that
the very long-range trends are distinctly in the direction of rendering geography a less
salient corollary of ideological differences. But I am also inclined to believe that this
is a matter of degree and that there remain important ideological correlates to the
political lines within America."). But see Choper,supranote 15, at 1572 ("[A]lthough
some social and cultural differences among the people in the country may be
identified by reference to state and regional boundaries, the divergence thus defined
exists more plainly in its statement than in reality.").
'7 SeeJerry Frug, DecenteringDecentralization,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 271 (1993)
(asserting that "states could never engender the kind of democratic participation in
public affairs that is possible on a local basis"); Frug, supra note 44, at 1069
("Reestablishing the definition of political democracy as popular involvement in the
decisionmaking process.., is possible only at the local level." (footnotes omitted));
Rose, supra note 36, at 94 ("[R]epublicanism, with its self-rule and civic participation,
is only possible at a level more localized than the states."). Although Hanna Pitkin
and Sara Shumer suggest that meaningful participatory democracy can occur only in
face-to-face dialogue within "small and local associations," Pitkin & Shumer, supra
note 268, at 51, their vision that the outcome of "democratic political struggle ...
remains contested as much as shared," id. at 47, a theory effectively merging the
liberal and communitarian models, informs my thesis of state sovereignty presented
here.
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First, state authority is expressly recognized by the Constitution and
any claim to regulatory authority by local communities other than
the states would be much more difficult to sustain as a matter of
constitutional principle. Second, family law as presently organized
operates almost exclusively at the state level. The likelihood that
authority over family law would devolve to other communities,
involving among other things the disruption and relocation of entire
judicial departments, seems highly unlikely. Third, I believe the
states may actually be better situated in a practical sense than more
localized communities to exercise authority over family life.276
Finally, the distinctiveness of family law may make it unsuitable to
decision-making at a level more localized than the states. There are
advantages to some degree of uniformity in family law. Giving more
localized communities the power to define the terms and conditions
of marriage or parenthood, for example, would likely prove too
destabilizing and chaotic for the broader social order. Nevertheless,
a localist approach to family law is certainly compatible with efforts
to resituate state regulatory authority along the lines of alternative
local communities. Whatever the merits of these more localized
efforts, however, it remains clear that the national community is
simply too weak and its citizenry too dispersed, heterogeneous, and
numerous to reach even provisional agreement on complex moral
issues of family law.
2. Fostering Diversity
However open and participatory political decision-making on the
family may be, the communitarian model of family law must still
confront the issue of legal authority." Despite striving for shared
moral answers, communitarian lawmaking does not, and cannot,
suppress the moral pluralism that is foundational to liberal society.
Even open participation in the process of fashioning answers to
questions of the good family life is not enough to protect dissenting
individuals and families from the threat of moral oppression. The
diffusion of governmental authority among the fifty states is also
urgently needed as a structural safeguard for individual liberty in
276

See Briffault, supra note 42, at 1306 ("Local governments typically lack the

political, legal, and fiscal capacities and cultural associations to be effective
subnational focal points and counterweights to national power.").
2" See Paul W. Kahn, Community in ContemporaryConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J.
1, 7 (1989) (arguing that "[t]he authoritarian character of constitutional law is
inconsistent with the egalitarian quality of the community of discourse").
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matters of family life.217 Federal regulation of the family poses a
much greater threat of governmental tyranny for the simple reason
279
that national laws are more difficult than state laws to elude.
The existence of fifty bodies of state laws on the family provides
some degree of choice for families who care to relocate and offers
at least some opportunity for exit to families who feel themselves

oppressed. 28 0

State authority over family law erects a structural

2' As Section C explains, in addition to the structural safeguard of federalism, the
federal government has a role in safeguarding individual rights against the potentially

oppressive
effects of communitarian decision-making. See infra part III.C.
2

See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1503 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDER'S DESIGN (1987)). McConnell writes:
The main reason oppression at the federal level is more dangerous is that
it is more difficult to escape. Ifa single state chose, for example, to prohibit
divorce, couples seeking a divorce could move (or perhaps merely travel) to
other states where their desires can be fulfilled. Oppressive measures at the
state level are easier to avoid. Important recent examples of this phenomenon are the migration of homosexuals to cities like San Francisco, where
they received official toleration, and the migration of individuals from
Massachusetts to New Hampshire to escape high rates of taxation.
Id. For other examples of federalism's effect on citizens' choice, see Althouse, supra
note 273, at 1217 & n.26 (discussing Wisconsin's history with respect to antislavery
and criminal procedural rights); Amar, supra note 265, at 1237 (discussing an 1890
Wyoming suffrage law extending the franchise to women as an effort to induce
women to move there).
In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957),Justice Harlan expressed a similar
concern about federal uniformity in the context of First Amendment law:
Quite a different situation is presented.. . where the Federal Government
imposes the ban. The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one
State, through their legislature, decide that "Lady Chatterley's Lover" goes
so far beyond the acceptable standards of candor that it will be deemed
offensive and non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to make its
own choice. At least we do not have one uniform standard. But the
dangers to free thought and expression are truly great if the Federal
Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation on such a book. The
prerogative of the States to differ on their ideas of morality will be
destroyed, the ability of States to experiment will be stunted.
Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. See Van Alstyne, supranote 11, at 777-78 (noting that states cannot bar the exit
of citizens who find the "moral climate" overly repressive, although suggesting that
the opportunity for exit may diminish the differences among state laws). This argument from diversity is related to the economic argument that the right of exit
increases interstate competition, thereby increasing government accountability. See
Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1992, at 147, 149; Carol M. Rose, Planningand Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 886 (1983). The foundational work
in this area is ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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defense against the potentially tyrannous consequences of moral
281
lawmaking on a uniform national scale.
State diversity is of vital constitutional importance in the domain
of family law, a legal sphere directly constitutive of children's
developing sense of self and moral identity. As discussed earlier,2" 2 the liberal ideal of citizenship, at the heart of which lies the
virtue of situated autonomy, requires that maturing children be
protected to the extent possible from governmentally instilled moral
values. Although parental authority serves as a rights-based shield
against the morally coercive power of the state, parental rights are
often not controlling. In the absence of parental authority,
federalism serves to defuse governmental tyranny over the moral
autonomy of developing children by preserving some measure of
regulatory diversity at the state level. State authority destroys the
national government's power to mold the moral identity of
developing citizens in its own monolithic image.
While it is true that localism does not guarantee a diversity of
views-the issue of gay marriage shows that state sovereignty does
not eliminate moral uniformity altogether 25 5 -significant diversity
in the sphere of family regulation nevertheless exists. Laws relating
to alimony,"" the enforceability of prenuptial agreements, 2 85 the
281 Citizens must be able, however, to take advantage of localism; they must be
free to exit and to enter states according to their preferences. See Seth F. Kreimer,
'But Whoever TreasuresFreedom...': The Right to Travel and ExtraterritorialAbortions,
91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 915 (1993) (noting that "[t]he right to travel provides us with
the ability to experiment with modes of living other than those sanctioned at home
and to return with the potentially transformative knowledge we have gained"). In
addition to the freedom to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)
(noting that "inhibiting migration ... into the State is constitutionally impermissible"), the meaningful exercise of the right to exit might also imply certain affirmative

constitutional entitlements. For example, it might provide a basis for individuals to
assert a claim to minimum welfare benefits that would enable families to leave their
state of origin and to resettle within their state of choice. For related arguments
tying federalism to affirmative state entitlements, see Frank I. Michelman, States'
Rights and States' Roles: Permutationsof "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Laurence H. Tribe, UnravelingNational League of
Cities: The New FederalismandAffirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
282 See supra part II.
2

' But ef. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a state
statute limiting marriage to two persons of the opposite sex is subject to strict
scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution).
284 States differ on the factors which courts may consider when awarding custody.
Compare 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(b)(14) (1991) (listing "marital misconduct
of either of the parties" as a relevant factor in determining alimony) with MINN. STAT.

ANN. § 518.552(2) (West 1990) (providing that maintenance shall be awarded
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standards for adoption,28 6 and the legality of surrogacy contracts287 are only a few examples. This diversity of state laws
provides a structural defense against the potentially tyrannous
impact of national laws on the growth of children into morally
autonomous citizens. State sovereignty over family law fosters
diversity with the aim of preserving individual moral liberty.
C. The Role of the Federal Government
Although the states possess exclusive authority for regulating the
core domain of family life,28 8 state authority cannot be wholly
without boundaries. Communitarian decision-making in the area of
family life raises serious concerns regarding the preservation of
individual liberty. We have already seen that localism provides
some structural protection against moral oppression by reinforcing
state diversity and providing some opportunity for citizen choice
through exit. Structural safeguards alone, however, are not a
sufficient defense against the excesses of communitarian decisionmaking in a liberal society. The federal government also has a vital
role to play in ensuring that state regulation of family life does not
undermine fundamental rights essential to the development of civic
character in maturing children.
The federal government always operates in the area of family law
against a background of presumptive state authority. In the core
domain of family law, which includes marriage, divorce, and child
custody, the states possess exclusive regulatory authority subject
only to constitutional limitations relating to the rights of equality,
privacy, and parental authority. In other areas of legitimate federal
regulatory concern that bear directly or indirectly on family
"without regard to marital misconduct").
288

See, e.g., Lewis Becker, PremaritalAgreements: An Overview, in PREMARITAL AND

MARITAL CONTRACTS:
A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING
ENFORCEABLE MARITAL AND COHABITATION AGREEMENTS 1, 1 (Edward L. Winer &

Lewis Becker eds., 1993) ("State law regarding premarital agreements varies
considerably; different states take vastly different approaches to legal issues associated
with these agreements.").
28 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161:2, 170-B:4 (1994) (denying gay
individuals the opportunity to be foster or adoptive parents) with In re Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (allowing gay individuals to adopt).
287Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West Supp. 1995) (making
surrogacy contracts illegal) and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991) (making
surrogacy contracts unenforceable) with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165(A) (Michie 1990)
(providing that only married couples may enter into such agreements).
288 For a definition of this core domain, see supra paragraph preceding note 11.
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life-areas such as taxation, immigration, and bankruptcy--a
presumption of state authority arises that may be overcome only by
a sufficiently important federal interest. Finally, the federal
government may also act to reinforce state authority by funding
state endeavors and resolving interstate jurisdictional disputes.
1. Setting Constitutional Limits
The fundamental rights of equality, privacy, and parental
authority set federal constitutional limits on state authority over
family law. With respect to racial equality, the Supreme Court has
held that prohibitions on interracial marriage are constitutionally
impermissible 289 and that race cannot be a factor in resolving
ustody disputes between two biological parents.9 0
Similarly,
Congress recently passed the Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, 1 which prohibits states from making
foster care or adoptive placements solely on the basis of race, color,
or national origin. The stated purpose of the Act is to promote the
best interest of children by facilitating adoption and eliminating
discriminatory placement practices. 292 While real controversy
exists over the merits of interracial adoption, 293 the federal
289 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("[T]he freedom to marry, or not
to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State.").
29 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). In Palmore, the state court
awarded custody of the child to the father on the ground that the mother's
remarriage to a man of a different race would prove damaging to the child. See id.
at 430-31. In reversing the state court judgment, the Supreme Court stated: "The
effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannotjustify a racial classification removing
an infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate
person to have such custody." Id. at 434 (footnote omitted).
291Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056.
See § 552(b), 108 Stat. at 4056.
" See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politicsof Race
Matchingin Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991) (arguing for the elimination of
current policies favoring same-race adoption placements); Twila L. Perry, The
TransracialAdoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination,21 REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1993-1994) (arguing that interracial adoption unfairly places
the burdens of racial integration on children). The Act itself reflects the complexity
of the issues surrounding interracial child placement by providing that "[niothing in
this section shall be construed to affect the application of the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. [§] 1901 et seq. [(1988)])." Howard M. Metzenbaum
Multiethnic Placement Act, § 553(f), 108 Stat. at 4057. Under this provision, Native
American children as a class are exempt from the requirement that an expeditious
placement overrides racial considerations. Why this should be so for Native
American and not other minority children is not entirely self-evident.
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government may act to remedy the effects of racial discrimination
on children. The general subject of foster care and adoptive
placement is off-limits to federal regulation, but the specific issue
of racial equality in child placements clearly is not.2
Gender equality in the family is also an important arena of
federal concern. Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has
struck down state laws that discriminate between adult men and
women within the family on the basis of sex. 295 Although families
may choose to conform to traditional gender patterns, states may no
longer dictate that they do so. Moreover, states may not presume
that women's primary responsibility for child care renders them
unwilling or unfit to assume the duties of citizenship. As recently
as 1961, the Supreme Court concluded that, because a "woman is
still regarded as the center of home and family life," a state may
exempt women as a class from jury service. 29 6 By 1975, the Court
had repudiated this reasoning in part on the ground that "all
citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to
297
take part directly in our democracy."
An example of federal legislation that speaks to gender equality
in family life is the recently passed Safe Homes for Women Act of
1994.29' As part of a national initiative to reduce domestic vioni

The federal government's role with respect to eliminating racial discrimination

in family law finds its educational counterpart in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954) (outlawing racial segregation in public education).
"'5 See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981) (invalidating a Louisiana
statute giving a husband "exclusive control over the disposition of community
property"); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (holding unconstitutional the
provision of the AFDC program that only provided welfare benefits if the father, but
not the mother, was unemployed); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979)
(invalidating a New York statute that allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed
father, to block the adoption of their child); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1979)
(invalidating an Alabama statute that imposed an alimony obligation on husbands, but
not on wives, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (invalidating the
gender distinctions in the survivors' benefits provisions of the Social Security Act);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (striking down an Illinois statute which
presumed unwed fathers were unfit to retain custody of their children).
'
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). The statute in Hoyt allowed women to
serve 7asjurors only if they affirmatively registered their desire to do so. See id. at 58.
1 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); see also id. at 1424
(noting that the reasoning of Hoyt had been repudiated).
298 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1925 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266
and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Safe Homes for Women Act was passed as
part of the comprehensive Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (to be codified at scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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lence, the Act makes it a federal crime for a person to engage in
"interstate domestic violence," which is defined as violence against
one's spouse or intimate partner that occurs in the course of, or as
a result of, crossing state lines. 9 The federal government's effort
to address the problem of violence against women in the home
should come as no surprise. The pervasiveness of domestic abuse
against women and the degree of trauma and impairment suffered
by female victims transform what might otherwise be considered an
individualized and isolated incident of physical abuse, one no
different from stranger assault on the street, into a systemic pattern
of gender discrimination in the home. The Safe Homes for Women
Act reflects a federal effort to enforce the adult woman's right to
equal protection and bodily integrity in the domestic sphere. The
issue of gender equality among adult family members is a legitimate
and important matter of federal regulatory concern.
In addition to promoting racial and gender equality in
family
life, the federal government also bears responsibility for protecting
the adult individual's right of privacy within the realm of family
relations. It should be emphasized that the right of privacy--the
right to make decisions in important matters of family life-attaches
to adult citizens. As the Supreme Court's enforcement of parental
authority makes clear, children by definition lack the legal, and
00
presumably moral, capacity to make decisions on their own.
Together, the right of privacy and the right of parental authority
define the basic constitutional framework of individual rights within
the family.
This constitutional framework can be discerned most clearly in
the context of abortion. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 301 the
Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania abortion statute requiring
a married woman to notify her spouse and an unmarried minor to
obtain either the consent of a parent or authorization by a court for
See § 40221, 108 Stat. at 1926 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2261).
" The authority of parents embraces the right to control the religious, medical,
educational, and cultural upbringing of children, see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."), as well as the
right to decide the terms of family membership. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down a city ordinance that
prevented a grandmother from residing with her two grandchildren). For a further
discussion of parental authority, see supra part Il.
ml 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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the procedure. 0 2 With respect to adult women, the Court invalidated the spousal consent provision on the ground that the
provision imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy.303 In contrast, the Court
upheld the provision requiring either parental consent or judicial
authorization before a minor may obtain an abortion. 0 4 The
decision illustrates that children, even those mature enough to
become pregnant, are vulnerable to state regulation in ways adult
family members are not. The abortion question highlights the line
separating the federally protected domain of adult liberty from the
state-regulated domain of parents and their children.
Although the states exercise exclusive regulatory authority over
the core domain of family law, the federal government obviously
retains some regulatory influence on family life. In part, federal
authority exists because it must; the breathtaking expansion of
federal legislation over the past half-century means the federal
05
government confronts the family in numerous and diverse ways.
Federal taxation, 0 6 immigration, 07 retirement benefits, 08 and
bankruptcy laws 0 9 are among the most obvious examples of
federal legislation that intersects with family life."' ° The pertinent

s02 See id. at 2803.
so See id. at 2829; see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)
(holding that "since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first
stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot
delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion
during that same period").
"4 See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480
(1990) (upholding two-parent notification with judicial by-pass). For a discussion of
the Hodgson decision, see Dailey, supra note 130, at 982-94, 1008-16.
s See Resnik, supra note 11, at 1721-29.
See id. at 1722 (noting that federal tax laws set the parameters for what
comprises a household); see also Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the
Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1392 (1975) (examining how changing attitudes
regarding the family, parents, children, and the role of the state may be shaped by
federal tax laws).
s See Resnik, supra note 11, at 1728-29 (delineating the ways federal immigration
law defines family units and affects family life).
'See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988); Resnik, supra note 11, at 1723 (commenting that the 1984 amendments to
ERISA "give surviving spouses a forced share of pension rights").
' See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 292 (1991) (holding that a
bankrupt husband could not avoid his former wife's judicial lien); Resnik, supra note
11, at 1726-28 (discussing the intersection of bankruptcy law, women, and family law).
s-0 Federal welfare laws are another example. While discussion of welfare is
beyond the scope of this Article, I should note that, to the extent that federal welfare
laws condition receipt of federal funds on the state eligibility rules governing family
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question in any case involving a federal regulatory scheme that
directly or indirectly bears on family law3"' is whether the federal
interest is sufficiently important to outweigh the presumption in
favor of state authority. A clearly expressed intent to preempt state
law would not be sufficient; the federal government must justify the
imposition of a uniform family law with a strong federal interest.
2. Reinforcing State Authority
Although the regulation of the core domain of family law
belongs to the states, the national government may act in a limited
way to promote and reinforce state responsibility. The Child
Support Enforcement Act3 12 is one example of federal legislation
that seeks to promote state responsibility in the area of family
regulation. The Act deploys monetary and other incentives to
encourage the states to develop plans for establishing and enforcing
child and spousal support orders."1 ' The Act also requires partici14
pating states to formulate specific guidelines on child support.
Because the federal law induces the states to take responsibility for
child support standards and enforcement, it can be viewed as
reinforcing rather than undermining state authority. 15
behavior and organization, they raise serious federalism concerns. What makes
welfare such a complex issue is the important connection between government aid
and full citizenship in liberal society. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED
288 (1994) ("We cannot do without the concept of entitlement because it is
fundamental to citizenship."). This connection may implicate a duty on the part of
the federal government to provide aid to poor families with children while at the
same time preventing the government from using that aid to impose moral norms on
otherwise functioning families.
5 I am assuming that the federal scheme does not regulate the core domain of
family law, which includes marriage regulations, divorce, and child custody. Seesupra
paragraph preceding note 11. If it does so, then the federal scheme should be
invalidated as a violation of state sovereignty.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3s See § 654.
314 See § 667.
3 The federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act may overstep federal
bounds to the extent they mandate rigid guidelines over discretionary standards, see
45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(2) (1994) (requiring that state guidelines "[b]e based on specific
descriptive and numeric criteria and result in a computation of the support
obligation"), require that the states consider "all earnings and income of the absent
parent," § 302.56(c)(1), and require that the states provide for the "child(ren)'s health
care needs." § 302.56(c)(3). It is significant, however, that the Act allows the
guideline amounts established by the states to be rebutted in any particular case "as
determined under criteria established by the State." § 3 02.5 6 (g).
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Reinforcing state initiative through its spending power is one
way in which the federal government may reinforce state authority;
another is settlingjurisdictional disputes that threaten to undermine
one state's authority vis-:-vis another's. An example of federal
legislation that seeks to settle interstate jurisdictional conflicts is the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.16 In an effort to
reduce the incentives for parents to kidnap their children, the Act
requires states to accord full faith and credit to the prior custody
decrees of other states. 1l Once a state exercises jurisdiction in
conformity with the Act, no other state may assume concurrent
jurisdiction. The jurisdictional provisions of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act are intended to resolve disputes among the
states, but are not meant to supplant state authority over the merits
of child custody determinations.
A recent Supreme Court decision confirms the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act's jurisdictional focus. In Thompson v.
Thompson,"'8 the states of California and Louisiana, notwithstanding the Act, had come to conflicting custody decrees. The father of
the child brought suit in federal district court in California seeking
to establish the validity of the California decree. In an opinion by
Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act did not provide a private cause of action in
3 19
federal court for enforcement of its jurisdictional provisions.
Justice Marshall's reasoning rested on congressional deference to
state authority over domestic matters: "Instructing the federal
courts to play Solomon where two state courts have issued conflicting custody orders would entangle them in traditional state-law
questions that they have little expertise to resolve. This is a cost
20
that Congress made clear it did not want the PKPA to carry."'
In Marshall's words, a private cause of action under the Act would
316

28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988).

'17 Prior to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, parents receiving an
unfavorable custody decision in one jurisdiction had an incentive to remove their
children illegally and seek modification in the courts ofanotherjurisdiction. Federal
legislation was considered necessary in this area because custody decrees, being open
to modification at any time, were not subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See

Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
318484 U.S. 174 (1988).

319See id. at 178-80. Justice Marshall, however, is not among the Justices who
believe that the federal courts "should get out of the business of implied private
rights of action altogether." Id. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3
20 Id. at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
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"involve the federal courts in substantive domestic relations
21
determinations."
While Justice Marshall adopted a localist interpretation of the
Act, his opinion nevertheless left open the possibility that Congress
might in the future create an express federal cause of action in
interstate child custody cases. To the extent that the jurisdictional
provisions rely on substantive standards such as "the best interests
of the child;" however, the Court's decision denying a federal forum
for enforcement of the Act seems compelled on constitutional as
well as statutory grounds. Were Congress to provide for a private
cause of action, the federal courts would find themselves involved
in substantive decisions concerning the best interests of children,
child abuse, and child abandonment, decisions that would prove
determinative to the ultimate outcome of the suit. Conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts to make conclusive determinations
concerning the proper custodial placement for children in every
case involving a dispute between parents residing in different states
would directly and substantially erode state authority over child
custody.
As it stands, however, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
simply seeks to arbitrate jurisdictional conflicts among states. Like
the Child Support Enforcement Act, the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act works to reinforce state responsibility over custody
matters, in this case by clarifying which state possesses ultimate and
exclusive authority over the particular dispute. To the extent that
the Act fails to accomplish its goal-as the situation in Thompson
illustrates-jurisdictional conflicts among states over child custody
must be considered an unfortunate but necessary cost of federalism.
CONCLUSION
State sovereignty over substantive domains of law seems
inextricably woven with the idea of competing, antagonistic
governmental entities each vying for a larger share of the regulatory
pie at the expense of the other. The concept of sovereignty may
appear incompatible with a view of governmental relations premised
on interdependent and shared political aims. Not surprisingly, the
modern paradigm of cooperative federalism emerged out of the
collapse of dual federalism's more antagonistic conception of
321 d. at 186 n.4. Justice Marshall refers to determinations concerning the "best
interests" of the child in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)-(D) (1988).
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federal-state relations. Beyond its troubling historical reputation,
therefore, state sovereignty may seem an obsolete political model in
a world where governmental boundaries are so fluid and governmental interests so intertwined.
Yet state authority over family law need not be understood as
inherently incompatible with either the complex workings of our
modern industrial state nor with a national commitment to equality,
toleration, and individual rights. Instead, as explained in this
Article, state sovereignty may reflect a more developed appreciation
of the communitarian underpinnings of the liberal state and the
role of the family in fostering the virtues of citizenship in liberal
society. State authority over the domain of family life arises from
the dynamic relationship between the civic needs of the national
liberal polity and the communitarian aspirations of its constituent
states.
The localist theory of family law recognizes that the
constitutional commitment to individual liberty entails a corresponding appreciation for the importance of state authority over the
domain of human relations that, in a truly comprehensive way, gives
life to the liberal citizen.

